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What do we call a ‘Muslim’ in Europe? This is
a seldom-asked question in response to
which there are two approaches: the ethnic
one and the purely religious one. The more
common approach in Europe is to consider
Muslims as a quasi-ethnic group, identifying
them with people originating from Muslim
countries, as it is the case in Belgium.1 M a n y
British Muslims are campaigning to make
the ‘Inter Races Relations Act’ (which allows
to sue for defamation) applicable to Islam.
In this sense, being Muslim has nothing to
do with faith and belief, but rather with ori-
gin and culture. The stricto sensu r e l i g i o u s
aspect is diluted in a larger form of identity.
But the problem is that nowadays pristine
ethnic cultures are fading away, either
through assimilation or because they are re-
cast into new sets of identities. Neverthe-
less, for the first immigrants as well as the
European public opinion (comforted by the
culturalist approach of many anthropolo-
gists or social workers), Islam is embedded
in such pristine cultures (‘Arab’, ‘Asian’). But
these cultures are not transmitted as such
from generation to generation: language
might be lost (as is colloquial Arabic in
France) as well as dress and diet. A process
of acculturation is under way, even if it does
not lead to integration, but to other pat-
terns of differences. The b e u r (slang for
Arab) culture of the suburbs in France has
nothing to do with Islam or even with Arab
culture: the slang (v e r l a n) is French, the diet
and the clothing are American (Mc Donald’s
and baseball caps), the music is western
(rap, ‘hip-hop’), they are fond of dogs such
as, for example, pit bulls. In fact, this is a typ-
ical western urban youth sub-culture: the
terms used to qualify such groups might be
taken from the ethnic register, but we have
here the process of ethnicisation of a space
of social exclusion along the patterns of a
western urban sub-culture, and not through
importation of patterns from the primary
culture. In this sense, any endeavour to de-
fine a ‘Muslim community’ by retaining the
criteria of origin, does not refer to Islam as
such. It also does not refer to ‘real’ cultures.
What we have here is the fabrication of a
neo-ethnicity. It may work, but has little to
do with Islam.
We have to go back to a very basic idea:
Islam is a religion, not an ethnic identity,
not even a culture as such. But how can this
religion be expressed as such? It is not a
question of inter-faith dialogue: Europe is
no longer a Christian society, it is a secular
one. What we see is that Muslims do adapt,
not by changing Islam, but by adjusting
their way of thinking of themselves as be-
l i e v e r s .
Islamic identity
Believers who want to maintain a purely
Islamic identity are also confronted by the
fact that pristine cultures divide the Muslim
community in Europe. Mosques tend to be
attended in Europe according to common
origin, dialect, or by belonging to communi-
ty groups. There are ’Moroccan’, ‘Algerian’,
‘Punjabi’ and even ‘Kurdish’ mosques. For
many second or third generation Muslims,
or even for ‘born-again Muslims’ identifying
Islam and culture of origin is a mistake for
two reasons: it is a dividing factor, but it also
tends to embed Islam in cultural traditions
which have little to do with ‘true Islam’. The
‘salafist’ approach, which stresses the return
to an authentic Islam, rid of local traditions
and superstitions, fits well with the contem-
porary process of acculturation. Its propo-
nents strive to build non-ethnic mosques
and communities. To bypass the cultural di-
visions brought by pristine cultures, they
tend to advocate the use of language of the
host country (English, French, etc.), which is,
by the way, the main if not the sole lan-
guage understood by the youth, or to push
for modern Arabic. In both cases, they go
along with the process of acculturation and
globalization. In this sense, modern funda-
mentalism is not a leftover of traditional cul-
tures, but on the contrary, an expression of
modernization and globalization. Religion is
voided from its cultural content (there is no
such thing, for a fundamentalist, as ‘Islamic’
music, or even an Islamic novel). Religion is
assimilated to a code of behaviour (‘do’s’
and ‘do not’s’), and not to a culture. In this
sense, it can adapt to a world where nation-
al cultures are giving way to codes of com-
munication and sub-cultures.
’Born again Muslims’
A second consequence of the immigration
is that there is no longer any social evidence
of religion. Of course in neighbourhoods
where large Muslim populations are concen-
trated, there is some social pressure to adopt
a conservative way of life (especially for
women). But there are no social constraints
or even inducements to behave as a good
Muslim; praying, fasting, eating halal require
personal involvement. One has to re-create,
on an individual basis, the patterns of an
everyday life for a Muslim. Even if one joins
specific communities (with or without a
neighbourhood basis), this community is es-
tablished on the basis of a volunteer and
personal engagement. In fact, to be a ‘true’
Muslim is an individual choice, because it
usually means a double break: with a too tra-
ditional familial environment and with the
dominant secular society. Here we meet the
phenomena of the ‘born again Muslim’, who
after a very mundane and sometimes dis-
solute life (e.g. womanizing, alcohol, drugs)
goes back to Islam, after a spiritual experi-
ence, on patterns very similar to many ‘born
again Christians’: the emphasis is here on
personal conversion, redeeming and expres-
sion of self, not on community and social
conformism. The terms ‘faith’, ‘salvation’,
that is the quest for identity and psychologi-
cal balance, are more important than ‘licit’
and ‘illicit’. Stories of conversions underline
this quest for equilibrium and happiness.
Fundamentalism, even in its stress on the
communitarian nature of Islam, goes also
along the individualization of social life,
common to the western societies.
This lack of evidence can also been seen in
the problem of authority: Who is entitled to
teach Islam? The famous institutions of the
Muslim world, like the University of Al Ahzar,
in Cairo, retain some prestige but are unable
to meet the religious needs of the Muslim in
Europe: training of modern imams, adapta-
tion of the curriculum of studies, etc. But the
problem is not so much a lack of trained
ulema: in fact the vacuum is filled by self-
proclaimed thinkers, who, whatever their in-
tellectual background, claim that they know
and can teach ‘true Islam’. The web is full of
sites emanating from individuals or small
communities, which share two patterns: a
high level of fragmentation and the stress on
The presence of a rather important Muslim popula-
tion in Western European countries is a consequence
of a recent voluntary immigration of workers coming
from the Middle East, North Africa or South Asia.
Their administrative status and social integration
vary considerably from one country to the other
(often citizens in France and UK, rarely in Germany).
Until recently they kept a low profile. But through
upward social mobility or the ‘brain-drain’ from the
rest of the Muslim world, a Muslim intelligentsia has
slowly emerged in Europe and is now more vocal in
calling for a recognition of the Muslim presence, trig-
gering heated debates in European public opinion. 
Muslims in Europe:
From Ethnic Identity 
to Religious Recasting
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The ISIM initiated a wide range of activities in 1999-2000, includ-
ing the design of its education and research programmes, the or-
ganization of academic meetings and lectures (see pages 3 and
5), the construction of a database and a website, and the estab-
lishment of national and international networks of cooperation.
These and other ISIM activities are an indication that ISIM is
quickly expanding its horizons.
Within two years’ time the ISIM has been shaped in such a way
as to attract the intellectual curiosity of many in the broad field of
the study of Islam and Muslim societies, in particular because of
its unique thematic profile and its broad geo-
graphic focus. The ISIM has established its name
in this international field, a process in which the
ISIM Newsletter plays an essential role. While the
diversified and dynamic approach of the ISIM is
clearly reflected in this publication, the institute
is far from being its only source. Its pages are filled with contribu-
tions by highly active researchers in the field. Its contents echo
the trends, ambitions, and even future prospects of the study of
Islam and Muslim societies.
Vital to the development of this field of research are methodol-
ogy and theoretical approaches. Gudrun Krämer critically ad-
dressed a number of these issues at the ISIM Annual Lecture
(page 6-7). She starts with the simple question: ‘Why do we study
Islam and how should we do it?’ She advocates focusing on actors
rather than systems, concentrating on intra-cultural variation
rather than homogeneity. Another important issue is that of
modernity, which is of particular interest to the ISIM as it forms
one of the founding concepts of the institute. Patrick Chabal
(page 9) approaches the concept of modernity in Africa by disso-
ciating it from the notion of development. In a provocative essay,
Sadik Al-Azm (page 11) calls for a critical reflection upon the posi-
tion Arabs and Muslims take v i s - à - v i s modernity and the West.
David Shankland (page 43) comments on current tendencies in
the study of Muslim societies, in particular Turkey. He warns
against overemphasizing Islamist trends and underestimating
the importance of non-religious movements and practices.
In recent months, the position of Muslims within the Nether-
lands, and in the West in general, has gained prominence in the
discussions of multi-cultural society. These discussions clearly
demonstrate the need for further research as well as for a critical
assessment of identity – whether that be cultural, national, reli-
gious, or ethnic identity. In this debate, an increasing number of
players foresee the development of an European (or for that mat-
ter, Dutch, French, or German) Islam. Some even argue that this is
the inevitable outcome of the integration of (post-)migrant Mus-
lim communities. However, Olivier Roy (page 1) argues that other
processes, such as individualization and restructuring of identi-
ties, are at work and that they prevent the coming into being of
an European Islam. In some radical cases, individual believers
have the choice of opting out of society. And although some of
them may well be in the spotlight, they are unlikely to attract a
large and lasting following as the case of Metin Kaplan shows
(Werner Schiffauer, p. 27). The examples given in Yasha Lange’s
article (page 29) demonstrate that no matter
what direction is taken in the process of integra-
tion and (mutual) adjustment, the scrutinizing of
existing laws and the seeking of new precedents
can not be avoided. The problematic relationship
between cultural, national and religious identi-
ties informs the debate on the position of Islam in Europe, includ-
ing the difficult position of Europe’s autochthonous Muslims, in
particular in the Balkans (Raymond Detrez, page 26) and Russia
(Vladimir Bobrovnikov, page 25). The problematic of religion and
nationality is nonetheless not limited to Europe; it is indeed a
worldwide issue of particular interest in an increasing number of
Middle Eastern countries (Henry Munson, page 10).
The ISIM Newsletter has once again tried to give attention to the
diversity of approaches to Islam and Muslim societies. Among the
most dynamic research domains at present, health and the body
are dealt with in the articles of Sylvia Wing Önder (page 12) and
Sabine Strasser (page 13) respectively. Yet another booming field
of research is that of the role of the new media in the expanding
public space (Jon Anderson, page 39). Media coverage strength-
ens the mobilizing force of Islamic notions of national and inter-
national order, including those concerning the politics of human-
itarian aid in local (Imad Sabi’, p. 24) as well as global contexts
(Jérôme Bellion-Jourdan, p. 15). The persistent relevance of the
more syncretic – and even heterodox – trends and movements
in/to the lives of many Muslims is clearly demonstrated in the
cases of Jammu (Yoginder Sikand, p. 19), Bengal (Anne-Hélène
Trottier, p. 17), Iran (Matthijs van den Bos, 18), and Turkey (Krisz-
tina Kehl-Bodrogi, p. 23).
The ISIM Newsletter would like to continue to expand on these
and other issues, by tapping into new resources within the field.
In order to do so, however, we depend on the critical input of our
a u d i e n c e . ♦
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The ISIM solicits your response to the ISIM News-
letter. If you wish to contribute to the Newsletter,
style sheets may be obtained upon request from
the ISIM Secretariat or on the ISIM website. In order
to offer update information on activities concern-
ing the study of Islam and Muslim societies, along
with news on vacancies, grants, and fellowships,
the ISIM relies on its readers. The information will
be made available on the ISIM Website.
The ISIM Newsletter is a tri-annual publication of
the International Institute for the Study of Islam in
the Modern World (ISIM). Responsibility for the
facts and opinions expressed in this publication
rests solely with the authors. Their views do not
necessarily reflect those of the Institute or its sup-
porters. The ISIM Newsletter is free of charge.
Staff ISIM
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• Drs J.G.F. Veldhuis (Chairperson)
President of Utrecht University
• Dr S.J. Noorda
President of University of Amsterdam
• Dr Th.H.J. Stoelinga
President of University of Nijmegen
• Drs L.E.H. Vredevoogd
President of Leiden University
Academic Committee
• Prof. Peter van der Veer (Chairperson)
University of Amsterdam
• Prof. Léon Buskens
Utrecht University
• Prof. Mamadou Diouf
CODESRIA, Dakar
• Prof. Dale Eickelman
Dartmouth College, Hanover,
New Hampshire
• Prof. Gudrun Krämer
Free University Berlin
• Prof. Jean-François Leguil-Bayart
CERI, Paris
• Prof. Frits Staal
University of California at Berkeley
• Prof. Kees Versteegh
University of Nijmegen
• Sami Zubaida
Birkbeck College, University of London
• Prof. Erik J. Zürcher
Leiden University
E d i t o r i a l
M I S C E L L A N E O U S A N N O U N C E M E N T
ISIM Academic Committee
New Members
The ISIM would like to announce the appointment of two new members to its Acad-
emic Committee. Kees Versteegh, Professor of Arabic and Islam and Chairman of the
Department of Middle Eastern Studies of the University Nijmegen (the Netherlands)
is now the representative of this participating university. He has published widely on
l i n g u i s t i c s .
Léon Buskens, Professor of Law and Culture of Islam at Utrecht University, suc-
ceeds Professor Martin van Bruinessen as the representative of his university in the
Academic Committee. He has published on law and anthropology.
Our Apologies
In the ISIM Newsletter 4, the following error was made in our Info Pages, page 39.
T h e address of the New Masters of Arts Programme at the University of Melbourne,
Australia, was inadvertently omitted. The relevant information is as follows:
Contact: Abdullah Saeed, Melbourne Institute of Asian Languages and Societies,
the University of Melbourne, Parkville, Victoria 3252, Australia
Tel: +61 3 9344 5555 / 9344 / Fax: +61 3 9349 4870
E-mail: enquiries@asian.unimelb.edu.au
URL: www.arts.unimelb.edu.au
Further, we would like to apologize to Dr Elizabeth Attané (ISIM Newsletter 4, page 11)
for having referred to her in the author’s description as Dr Isabelle Attané.
ISIM Fellowships
The ISIM invites applications and research proposals for various fel-
lowships. Applications from candidates in all fields of the social sci-
ences, humanities, and religious studies will be considered. Appli-
cants should be competent in academic English. The ISIM fellow-
ships include the following:
– PhD fellowships are granted for a period of four years to students
who have an MA degree or its equivalent. The fellowships are
awarded twice annually for a period of up to four years.
– Post-doctoral fellowships are granted for a period of up to two
years and are available to junior scholars who have received their
PhD degree less than 5 years prior to application.
– Visiting fellowships are granted for a period of up to 3 months.
Some of these senior fellowships are offered upon invitation. Oth-
ers are awarded in an open competition.
– Sabbatical fellowships are offered to academic staff of participat-
ing and other universities to conduct research. In specific cases,
the ISIM makes funds available to finance the temporary replace-
ment for teaching at the home university.
For more information on the various fellowships, please consult the ISIM website: 
h t t p : / / w w w . i s i m . n l /
All those interested are invited to apply. Application forms may be downloaded
from the website or obtained upon request from the ISIM secretariat.
ISIM Fellowship Programmes
P.O. Box 11089, 2301 EB  Leiden, The Netherlands
Inst itut i o na l Ac t iv i t i es
M A RT I N  V A N  B R U I N E S S E N
ISIM’s first international conference held in Leiden,
10-12 December 1999, concerned the role of Islam,
Islamic political thought, Muslim parties and organi-
zations, and the responses of secular or non-Muslim
circles to the resurgence of Islam in the electoral
process. The stimuli for this conference were the fact
that 1999 was witness to important elections in three
major countries, Turkey, Indonesia and Nigeria, and
that Islam had been a crucial factor in these events –




C o n f e r e n c eIndonesia experienced its first free electionssince 1955, and a wide range of parties took
part. In the months leading up to the elec-
tions, the country was afflicted by a series of
violent conflicts that often took the form of
Muslim-Christian clashes. The leaders of In-
donesia’s largest Muslim organizations, Ab-
durrahman Wahid and Amien Rais, played
central roles in the transition to the post-
Suharto era. Both chose, however, to style
themselves as national rather than Muslim
leaders. The political parties with which
they are most closely associated are secular
parties that attracted also non-Muslim
votes. The explicitly Muslim parties polled
considerably less strongly than had been
e x p e c t e d .
The 1999 elections in Turkey indicated
that the apparently irresistible rise of the Is-
lamist Virtue (Fazilet) Party has been
brought to a halt. The ‘silent coup’ of Febru-
ary 1997, by which the military leadership
forced prime minister Erbakan to resign,
and the repressive anti-Islamist policies of
the following years have not led to greater
numbers of pro-Islamic protest votes. Many
of those who voted for the Islamist party in
the past appear to have voted for conserva-
tive or ultra-nationalist parties this year.
In Nigeria, where Muslims make up about
half the population, none of the candidates
in the 1999 presidential elections were Mus-
lim. Nonetheless, Islam did play an impor-
tant role in the elections as the votes of the
Muslim electorate were to be decisive. In
order to win, the candidates had to gain the
confidence and loyalties of a large part of
the Muslim voters.
The aim of the Islam and the Electoral
Process conference was to highlight the var-
ious modalities of the democratic process
and the place of Muslim political behaviour
in it through comparisons between coun-
tries and by a juxtaposition of different per-
spectives on the electoral process. In order
to broaden the range of comparison, two
other countries where elections took place
in 1999 were added: Yemen, which is practi-
cally 100% Muslim, and India, where the
Muslims constitute a minority.
For each country, two to four scholars
were invited to contribute papers on differ-
ent aspects of the electoral process. The pa-
pers were grouped not by country but in
three broad thematic categories:
– Muslim political thought and ideology (for
the panel entitled ‘Expressing Islam’)
– the organization and performance of Mus-
lim political parties or non-party associa-
tions (for the panel entitled ‘Empowering
I s l a m ’ )
– the responses of other political actors (no-
tably the military, but also civilian non-
Muslim groups and secularist politicians)
to Islamic political activity (for the panel
entitled ‘Disarming Islam’).
The conference was opened with a keynote
speech by Professor James Piscatori (Ox-
ford) on the origins and development of the
idea of representation in Muslim political
thought. Tracing the historical dialectic be-
tween theocratic elitism and democratic
populism, and showing how in one form or
another, the concept of democracy has – at
least in principle – found almost universal
acceptance in the Muslim world, this intro-
duction provided an excellent backdrop to
the entire conference. Each of the contribu-
tions illustrated how flexible and responsive
to concrete situations Muslim politics tends
to be.
Electoral Politics
In most electoral democracies, the vote of
an illiterate peasant has the same weight as
that of a secular nationalist intellectual, a
Marxist ideologist, or a learned religious
scholar. A single woman’s vote, moreover, is
worth as much as that of any man, and an
unbeliever’s equals that of a pious Muslim.
Much as democracy may be applauded in
principle, all elites are uncomfortable with
the egalitarianism of the voting booth. Na-
tionalists, socialists and Islamists may claim
to speak on behalf of the masses, but the
voting behaviour of the masses has been
notoriously out of step with the wishes of
those ideologists. Understandably, the pur-
veyors of ideologies that appeal to the
masses tend to be suspicious of the masses
whom they claim to represent, and they are
often inclined to reserve privileged roles for
ideological avant-gardes – a concept that
appears to be incompatible with ‘one per-
son, one vote’ democracy.
The attitudes of Muslim thinkers and ac-
tivists towards the established democratic
process have ranged from an aversion to
politics or a total rejection of the existing
system and its values, through aloofness or
pragmatism, to a wholehearted endorse-
ment of politics, in which the act of voting
can be seen as an affirmation of religious
commitment. Periods in which elections
and parliamentary politics were seen as the
major avenue towards desired changes
have alternated with periods of dismay and
disappointment with this particular form of
m o b i l i z a t i o n .
Military elites in most Muslim countries
have had, at best, ambivalent attitudes to-
wards the mass mobilization taking place in
the electoral process. They too have claimed
to represent the real interests of the entire
nation and have arrogated themselves the
right to intervene in the electoral process
(by banning parties or imprisoning leaders)
in order to safeguard the alleged common
interest. Whereas in the 1960s and 1970s
such interventions were commonly directed
against the left, more recently they have pri-
marily targeted the perceived Islamic threat
(e.g. Algeria, Turkey).
In those cases where electoral democracy
was introduced or restored after a period of
authoritarian rule (as in Turkey in 1950 and
again a few years after each military coup; in
Indonesia in the early 1950s, to some extent
in 1971 and fully again in 1999), Islam be-
came a major factor in the sense that ap-
peals to Muslim sentiment by certain parties
could mobilize large numbers of votes. The
parties that managed to sweep the Muslim
vote in various Muslim countries appear,
however, to have little in common, and few
of them had an explicitly Islamic political
programme. The so-called Muslim vote has
often been a protest vote against the estab-
lishment. Islamist parties have generally not
been very successful, with the exception of
Algeria’s FIS and Turkey’s Refah Partisi (the
advance of both of which was stopped by
military intervention).
Even the non-Islamist Muslim parties have
been able to gain the support of only a frac-
tion of the committed Muslims. Individual
Muslims, but also major Islamic movements
have for various reasons preferred to sup-
port secular parties. Personal, class or other
group interests may be at stake; the move-
ment may wish to alleviate suspicions on
the part of the secular (military) establish-
ment or may genuinely believe in a separa-
tion of religion from politics; or priority may
be given to other ways to gain power or es-
tablish a more Islamic society (such as
dacw a, (general) education, journalism, infil-
tration of the bureaucracy and the army).
Changes in the nature of Muslim electoral
politics may be related to the tremendous
demographic and socio-economic develop-
ments that all Muslim countries have experi-
enced in the course of the past few decades
(although their effects have been far from
uniform and by no means easily predic-
table). Mass literacy and mass education
have not only made new forms of mass mo-
bilization possible, but have also facilitated
the dissemination of new types of Muslim lit-
erature. Rural-to-urban migration brought
numerous people into closer physical con-
tact with politics, and to some extent de-
creased their dependence on traditional re-
lations of power and patronage. Transistors,
computers and satellites have completely
changed the nature of the public sphere;
such media as radio and television, the
audio cassette, fax and e-mail have made
unprecedented numbers of people in-
formed participants in it. Access to these
media, however, although widespread, is
essentially unequal, which may introduce
new social cleavages or reinforce old ones.
Islamists have often been among the first to
understand and utilize the possibilities of
these new media (and of technology in gen-
eral), which may have helped them to gain
influence at the expense of the ulama. They
have, of course, not been the only ones, nor
have they been the most successful in utiliz-
ing the media; the struggle for control of the
media has been part and parcel of the elec-
toral process. ♦
Papers contributed to the conference:
– James Piscatori (Oxford)
‘The origins and development of the idea of
representation and election in the Muslim
world’ (keynote address)
– Masykuri Abdillah (Jakarta)
‘Indonesia’s Muslim intellectuals in the 1999
e l e c t i o n s ’
– Amiq Ahyad (Surabaya)
‘The debate in Indonesian Muslim circles on the
uses and dangers of Muslim political parties’
– Burhanettin Duran (Sakarya, Turkey)
‘Muslim intellectuals, Islamist media and
t h e elections in Turkey’
– Zoya Hassan (New Delhi)
‘Muslim discourse on elections in a minority
situation: India’
– William Miles (Boston)
‘Muslim political discourse and the elections
i nN i g e r i a ’
– Menderes Cinar (Ankara)
‘Why has the Welfare Party failed in Turkey?’
– Renaud Detalle (Sanaa, Yemen)
‘Islam and the electoral process in Yemen:
t h e routinization of fitnah?’
– Thomas Blom Hansen (Copenhagen)
‘Muslim politics in Mumbai’
– Mochtar Pabottinggi (Jakarta)
’Indonesia’s Muslim parties and the recent
e l e c t i o n s ’
– Hakan Yavuz (Utah)
‘The Welfare / Virtue Party in Turkey’s most
recent elections’
– Raufa Hassan (Sanaa, Yemen and
A m s t e r d a m )
‘Yemeni ulama and their attitudes towards
women’s participation in elections: experiences
of a woman activist’
– Toyin Falola (Austin, Texas)
‘Muslim and non-Muslim in the Nigerian
e l e c t i o n s ’
– Andrée Feillard (Paris)
‘Responses in military and civilian circles to
t h e recent resurgence of political Islam in
I n d o n e s i a ’
Martin van Bruinessen is ISIM Chair at Utrecht
University, the Netherlands.
E-mail: bruines@denicser.let.uu.nl
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I S I M
MA R Y  B AK K E R
The veritable driving force behind the start-up phase
of the ISIM, Wim Stokhof guided the institute as di-
rector in charge for almost two years, until shortly
after the appointment of Khalid Masud as the ISIM
academic director in May 1999.
Tribute to ISIM’s former
Director in Charge: 
Prof. Dr W.A.L. Stokhof
which was to last for 14 years. In 1986,
Stokhof returned to the Netherlands where
he was appointed chair of Austronesian Lin-
guistics, succeeding the well-known lin-
guist, Joop Anceaux.
At the same time, he founded the Projects
Division of the Department of Languages
and Cultures of Southeast Asia and Oceania
of Leiden University, where he initiated the
Indonesian-Netherlands Cooperation in Is-
lamic Studies (INIS) Programme. Further-
more, he established two programmes on
Irian Jaya Studies and a Public Administra-
tion Project in Indonesia, to name but a few.
Apart from these projects, he initiated and
stimulated several influential series on lin-
guistics in Indonesia, such as the I L D E P - s e-
r i e s, and Pacific Linguistics: Materials in Lan-
guages of Indonesia. His interests, however,
reach beyond the archipelago and his en-
deavours are far too numerous to be listed
h e r e .
The most well known of his projects, INIS,
was first financed by the Dutch Ministry of
Development Cooperation. In 1992, after a
major crisis between the Minister and the
Indonesian government, relations between
the two countries came heavily under dis-
cussion. From then on, projects could only
be initiated under the headings of ‘mutual
benefit’ and ‘equal footing’. Stokhof suc-
ceeded as one of the very few to save his
project and became a partner of the Dutch
Ministry of Education, Culture and Sciences,
Wim Stokhof, born as the son of an Amster-
dam craftsman in 1941, began his fruitful ca-
reer as a scholar in Slavic Languages. Having
been asked by the Indonesian literature
specialist, Hans Teeuw, to conduct linguistic
research on the remote island of Alor, In-
donesia, Stokhof published several articles
and books on the linguistic aspects of the
local ‘Woisika’ and other related languages.
During his 10-year stay in Indonesia, he also
expanded the successful Indonesian
Netherlands Development Project (ILDEP),
a relationship that continued successfully
for several years.
In 1993, he also became director of the In-
ternational Institute for Asian Studies (IIAS),
a post-doctoral institute jointly established
by the Netherlands Academy of Arts and
Sciences (KNAW), Leiden University, the
Free University and the University of Ams-
terdam. Even at that time, Stokhof had al-
ready begun to launch ideas about an insti-
tute for research on modern Islam. The Islam
in the 21s t-century Conference, organized in
1996 by the INIS, helped in making clear
that the strengthening of a global, interre-
gional academic dialogue was needed.
At the end of 1997, a constitutional docu-
ment was written, upon which the Ministry
of Education, Culture and Sciences, the Min-
istry of Development Cooperation and three
main universities in the Netherlands agreed
to establish an institute for Islam Studies.
Stokhof was asked to become the ‘building
pastor’ of the institute, until an academic di-
rector was found to develop research and
fellowship programmes.
Stokhof operated, together with a Work-
ing Group consisting of crucial advisors
from each of the participating institutes, to
design the scientific programme. He recruit-
ed the necessary staff for the office and or-
ganized the remarkable opening of the ISIM
on 20 October 1998. Finally, he led the
search for an academic director. Four
months after Khalid Masud was appointed,
Stokhof withdrew from the institute. Never-
theless, his input is still vital as reflected in
his position in the International Advisory
Committee of the ISIM. ♦
E R I K  J .  ZÜ R C H E R  
Between 21 and 24 February 2000 a joint masterclass
was held in Leiden, the Netherlands, organized by
the Research School of Asian, African and Amerindi-
an Studies and ISIM. The theme of the class was ‘vi-
sions of modernity in the Islamic Middle East.’ The
objective of the class was to gain an understanding
of the quest for the elusive concept of ‘modernity’
which has played such a dominant role in the politi-
cal projects of intellectuals, governments and social




M i d d l e E a s t
ISIM-CNWS masterclassThe class was open to students in the Ad-
vanced Master´s Programme of the research
school, students in ISIM’s Mphil programme
and Ph.D. students. During the class, four
prominent authorities in the field gave lec-
tures while the students presented papers
on the basis of required reading. The stu-
dents had prepared themselves by reading
and discussing a set of articles and chapters
dealing with the problems of modernity and
modernization in different contexts and
from different theoretical angles before the
start of the masterclass. This set, with texts
by Bearman, Appadurai, Eisenstadt, Keyder,
Göle gave rise to lively discussions in
preparatory tutorial meetings.
The convener of the class was Erik-Jan
Zürcher (Turkish studies, Leiden University)
and the guest lecturers were Professor
Khaled Fahmy (Hagop Kevorkian Centre,
New York University); Professor Shükrü Han-
ioglu (Near Eastern studies, Princeton Uni-
versity); Dr Alexander H. de Groot (Middle
East Studies, Leiden University) and Dr
Touraj Atabaki (Oriental studies, Utrecht
U n i v e r s i t y ) .
The class started with a lecture by Khaled
Fahmy in which he illustrated the process
of modernisation and the different con-
cepts of modernity in nineteenth-century
Egypt on the basis of the efforts to intro-
duce European-style healthcare and hy-
giene in Cairo. A comparative aspect was
introduced in the shape of the nineteenth-
century development of Paris as a ‘healthy’
city described by Alain Corbin in his famous
The Foul and the Fragrant. The second lec-
ture was by Shükrü Hanioglu. It concerned
the vision of modernity of the most radical
section of the Young Turk movement, the ‘
Westernists’ whose ideas were realized only
in the Turkish Republic from the mid-nine-
teen twenties onwards. Alexander de Groot
treated the last generation of high-ranking
religious scholars of the Ottoman Empire,
who were in search of a ‘liberal’ religious
culture and many of whom had no problem
in transferring their allegiance to the gov-
ernment of the republic, which they served
until the nineteen fifties. The final lecture,
by Touraj Atabaki, was entitled ‘Moderniza-
t i o n or Pseudo-Modernization in Iran? The
advocates and their opponents’. In it the
speaker drew attention to the close rela-
tionship between visions of modernity and
nationalism in late Qajar and early Pahlevi
I r a n .
The class gave rise to lively debates, par-
ticularly on issues like the validity of the
modernization paradigm, with its black and
white opposition between ‘modern’ and
‘traditional’ sections of society, the rele-
vance of theories of incorporation and de-
pendency and the uses of post-modernist
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Inst itut i o na l Ac t iv i t i es
M A RT I N  V A N  B R U I N E S S E N
From 26-28 April 2000, twelve prominent Muslim
thinkers from a wide range of regional backgrounds
(Tunisia, Egypt, Iran, India, Malaysia, Indonesia, South
Africa and the European diaspora) met at an ISIM work-
shop to discuss some of the major intellectual and po-
litical challenges facing the Muslim world at present.
Each of them presented a paper on an important as-
pect of the encounter with modernity, to which he or
she had been devoting much thought recently. Several
of the papers explicitly addressed the question of com-
patibility between Islam and modernity (or rather, as
several participants emphasized, interpretations of
Islam and conceptions of modernity). Some engaged in
such sensitive issues as minority rights, women’s rights
and pluralism and called for the development of a con-
temporary religious discourse based on rights to bal-
ance the traditional emphasis on obligations or con-
tributed to a theory of civil society. Others focused on
(reformist revisions of) the relationship between the
sacred texts, context and contemporary discourse.
ISIM Workshop: M u s l i m
Intellectuals and
Modern Challenges 
thinkers from various parts of the Muslim
world and for meetings between Muslim in-
tellectuals and scholars studying the Muslim
world, ISIM hopes to play a stimulating role in
both intellectual worlds. The April 2000 work-
shop was intended in the first place as a
forum for Muslim thinkers from different cul-
tures to exchange ideas and experiences and
to identify the most important themes for fur-
ther debate. In order to allow the discussions
to be as frank and unrestrained as possible,
the workshop was not public and only a small
number of scholars and students attended.
(Edited versions of the papers and excerpts of
the discussions will, however, soon be pub-
The development of contemporary Muslim
thought constitutes one of ISIM’s primary
areas of research interest, and by providing a
platform for discussions between leading
lished on the ISIM website.) Parallel to the
workshop were a number of public events in-
volving the participants, including public lec-
tures for academic and general audiences in
the Netherlands and a panel discussion with
an audience of second-generation young
Muslims living in the Netherlands (see the
boxes).
The participants
Those attending the workshop represented
all the major regions of the Muslim world,
from the Maghreb to Indonesia and South
Africa, and a great diversity of views. All were
invited because of their contributions to pub-
lic debate in their own countries, and as had
been hoped, their coming together gave rise
to stimulating discussions. The participants
and the titles of their contributions were as
follows (in alphabetical order):
– Mahboobeh Abbasgholizadeh, a promi-
nent representative of Iranian Islamic femi-
nism, book-publisher and chief editor of the
Iranian journal of women’s studies Farza-
neh, and an active participant in the pre-
sent reform movement in Iran: ‘Islamic fem-
inism in Iran’.
– Saif Abdel Fatah, political scientist at Cairo
University, previously affiliated with the In-
ternational Institute of Islamic Thought,
concerned with the question whether mod-
ern political concepts such as civil society
have an authentic counterpart in the intel-
lectual heritage of Islam: ‘Umma institu-
tions and civil society in Islamic thought
and practice’.
– Nasr Abu Zayd, Egyptian Muslim thinker
and professor of Arabic literature whose
critical research on the sacred texts of Islam
aroused so much controversy that in 1995
he had to leave his country for the Nether-
lands, where he is now affiliated with Lei-
den University: ‘Codification of the Sharica
in Egypt: a problem of power struggle’.
– Asghar Ali Engineer, prominent liberal Mus-
lim thinker in India, concerned with the de-
mocratization of the Muslim community
and known for his efforts to develop an Is-
lamic theology of liberation: ‘Islam and
modernization: compatibility and values’.
– Khira Chibani, professor of philosophy at
Zaytuna University, Tunis: ‘Civil society and
the problematics of identity’.
– Abdelmajid Charfi, professor of humanities
and Islamic studies at the University of
Manouba (Tunisia), presently at the Wis-
senschaftskolleg in Berlin: ‘Intellectual or
psychological, sociological and cultural
challenges?’.
– Nurcholish Madjid, the most prominent re-
formist Muslim thinker in Indonesia, who
played an important role in the process of
gradual democratization of that country:
‘Reflections on the challenges and opportu-
nities of Islam in the modern age: with spe-
cial reference to Indonesia’s current experi -
mentation with democracy’.
– Ebrahim Moosa, South African Muslim re-
formist thinker, formerly active in the
anti-apartheid movement in Cape Town;
presently visiting professor of religious
studies at Stanford University (USA): ‘Is-
lamic modernities revisited: a critique’.
– Farish A. Noor, Malaysian human rights ac-
tivist, presently conducting research at the
Wissenschaftskolleg in Berlin on the rise of
the Islamist party PAS in Malaysia: ‘From
cultural authenticity to the politics of differ-
ence: Islamism’s entry into Malaysian poli-
tics and its consequences’.
– Jalaluddin Rakhmat, prominent Muslim
thinker, academic and educational re-
former in Indonesia, who played an im-
portant role in introducing modern Shici
thinkers such as S h a r ica t i and Mutahhari,
and became a popular Sufi teacher in
urban middle class circles: ‘The revival of
Sufism: Does it help? A Glance at the
Modern Sufi Associations in Indonesia’.
– Tariq Ramadan, European-born Muslim in-
tellectual of Egyptian origin, who now
teaches at the University of Geneva, and
who in his writings is particularly concerned
with the issue of being a Muslim in Western
secular society: ‘Islam and Muslims in Eu-
rope. a silent revolution: towards rediscov-
ery’.
– Abdul Karim Soroush, arguably the most in-
fluential contemporary Muslim thinker in
Iran, often viewed as the successor of Ali
Sharicati but much more steeped in the
philosophical and mystical tradition of the
Iranian Shica. Initially a supporter of the rev-
olution, today his ideas play a significant
role in the Iranian reform movement: ‘Re-
vised modernity versus revised Islam’.
F o l l o w - u p
It was agreed that edited versions of the
papers and excerpts of the discussions first
be published on ISIM’s website. Additional
contributions will be sought, and the partic-
ipants will be requested to respond to each
other’s contributions, so that the workshop
finds a continuation on the website. A num-
ber of smaller meetings will be organized in
the future so as to pursue in greater depth a
number of the themes that surfaced at the
w o r k s h o p . ♦
Public lectures
– Ebrahim Moosa (Cape Town, presently at
Stanford University, California): ‘Challenges to re-
thinking Islam’, Leiden, Thursday, 27 April 2000.
– Mahboobeh Abbasgholizadeh (Tehran): ‘Islamic
feminism and its challenges: the Iranian
experience’, Amsterdam, Friday, 28 April 2000.
– Nurcholish Madjid (Jakarta): ‘Tensions between
Christians and Muslims in Indonesia: the
present situation and prospects for the f u t u r e ’ ,
Amsterdam, Friday, 28 April 2000.
Panel Discussion
Utrecht, Wednesday 26 April 2000
In cooperation with a local Muslim counterpart,
the Foundation for Higher Islamic Education,
ISIM organized a meeting between young
educated Muslims living in the Netherlands and
four of the workshop participants, Asghar Ali
Engineer, Jalaluddin Rakhmat, Tariq Ramadan
and Abdul Karim Soroush. The panel attracted a
large and enthusiastic audience; the speakers’
thought-provoking comments gave rise to lively,
and at certain moments heated, discussions.
Martin van Bruinessen is ISIM Chair
at Utrecht University, the Netherlands.
E-mail: bruines @denicser.let.uu.nl
N u r c h o l i s h
M a d j i d
Khira Chibani
Abdul Karim
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IS IM An nua l  Le ctur e
G U D R U N  K R Ä M E R
Why do we study Islam, and how should we do it? As
usual, what appears like a simple question poses the
most intricate problems. Compared to the ‘how’, the
‘why’ is relatively easy: culture is very much in fash-
ion, and it has been so for a while. The ‘cultural turn’
is widely debated, not only in the humanities, but
also in the social sciences. This includes the disci-
pline I was first trained in and remain attached to:
history. The cultural turn has made an impact on so-
ciology and political science, and to a lesser extent
on economics and law. Its strong appeal has certainly
to do with politics, for there can be little doubt that
the demise of the Soviet Empire and the intensifica-
tion of ethnic conflict in many parts of the world have
contributed towards giving so high a profile to mat-
ters of culture and identity. The fact that there
should be a link to politics (and I hasten to emphasize
that I do not subscribe to monocausal explanations)
need not render the interest in culture and identity,
variously and often ill-defined, suspect or illegiti-
mate: I at least can see nothing intrinsically wrong
with an approach that looks at politics, society, law
and the economy with a greater awareness of, and
sensitivity to, cultural norms and aspirations. But
there are disturbing aspects to this preoccupation
with culture, if it is not an outright obsession; aggres-
sive ethnic assertiveness on one hand, and the talk
about a potential if not inescapable ‘clash of civiliza-
tions’ on the other, are among them. The latter in
particular would not have found such fertile ground
and reached so wide an audience, had it not been for
the cultural turn in academic as well as in what is
commonly considered to be ‘real’ life.
The attraction of the cultural turn for the
scholar is obvious: if culture is seen not as a
separate compartment of life, let alone a
system of its own, where literature, music
and the arts belong (at least good literature
and what in German is called serious music),
but as a mobile configuration of patterns of
perception, representation and conduct
that guide and inspire the way we live our
lives both individually and in communion
with others, including society at large or any
other community real or imagined, then
much can be gained from a close scrutiny of
these patterns and configurations: their
making and unmaking, their complex inter-
play, their meaning to different people in
different contexts, their ambiguities and
contradictions, their variations over time
and space, their adaptations and transfor-
mations. The risks involved in focusing on
culture rather than the social order, power
or the international system are equally obvi-
ous: there is a danger that economic reduc-
tionism as propagated not so much by Marx
himself but by some of his more simple-
minded adherents (or were they just single-
minded?) could be replaced by cultural de-
terminism. There is a risk that intra-cultural
choice, change and conflict be overlooked.
This is difficult to avoid when culture is un-
derstood to be uniform, timeless and total-
izing, creating discrete units that are fully in-
tegrated internally and sealed off by water-
tight boundaries against an outer world of
equally distinct entities. But we could aspire
to more sophistication. If the analogy of the
personality that is sometimes used in this
context was taken more seriously (for we
used to hear much about the German or the
Egyptian personality), the reductionist
temptation could be resisted: no personali-
ty is fully integrated and free from contra-
dictions, nor does it develop in splendid iso-
lation. For the personality to grow it needs
external stimuli. There is, to my mind, no
way around taking culture seriously. It is a
must for both the scholar and the politician.
Culturalism, by contrast, is a trap studiously
to be avoided.
The study of Islam serves to illustrate the
point: dealing with Islam cannot but involve
dealing with culture or civilization, and with
the role of religion in defining the parame-
ters of Islamic culture(s) or civilization(s), re-
gardless of whether we put them in the sin-
gular or in the plural. Unlike Chinese, Indian
or African studies, it does not really consti-
tute an area study, for Islam is global and
not restricted to any particular territory.
Though it may sound offensive to say so,
Islam has centres and peripheries, but the
Middle East is no longer its only centre, at
least not in intellectual terms, not to men-
tion demography. The closest parallel to Is-
lamic studies, I would argue, is Jewish stud-
ies. It is all the more regrettable that there
should be so little comparative work, if any,
examining the evolution, methods and or-
ganization of the two fields. One need not
have to be of a deconstructivist bent to find
particular interest in the kind of questions
they ask and those they eschew, or exclude
as taboo. The comparison would yield re-
vealing insights into both disciplines.
Orientalism reconsidered
In Islamic studies, and here I use the term
in the widest possible sense to include vari-
ous area studies such as Turkish, Iranian or
Indonesian studies in as far as they touch on
Islam, the dangers of culturalism have been
discussed at great length, only in this case
culturalism has become known as oriental-
ism, and orientalism is a very bad thing in-
deed. It is awkward enough to be addressed
as an ‘Islamist’ rather than an ‘Islamicist’, as
it frequently happens among the uninitiate,
for there is after all a distinction between
the practitioner of political Islam and the re-
searcher studying the phenomenon. But as
a self-respecting scholar, one would not
nowadays want to be called an orientalist,
much less so in Arabic where m u s t a s h r i q
(orientalist) comes perilously close to
m u s h r i k (pagan, heretic) – although it must
be said that the connection is seldom ex-
plicitly made.
Orientalism, as we have learned, is a pro-
ject that presents, or as many would say
‘constructs’ or ‘represents’, Islam as a dis-
tinct, homogeneous and timeless entity
that is essentially defined by its normative
texts, i.e. the Qur’an as divine word and the
Sunna, or tradition of the Prophet Muham-
mad. For the unreformed orientalist, Mus-
lims are sufficiently defined by their being
Muslim. Little does it matter whether they
live in Kuala Lumpur, Cairo or Karachi. They
are over-determined by Islam. This is, of
course, vintage culturalism. But orientalism,
its critics continue, does not stop here: it
‘constructs’ Islam as the ultimate Other,
using it as a negative foil against which the
achievements of Western civilization, rest-
ing on the triple foundation of ancient Ju-
daism, ancient Greece and the Christian
faith, appear all the more glorious. Islam, by
contrast, lacks the notion of liberty, a sense
of responsibility both individual and civic, a
spirit of scientific inquiry, an independent
middle class, any kind of recognized com-
munity except the u m m a, etc., etc. If one
adopts this logic, Islam is little but a ‘cluster
of absences’ (Bryan S. Turner, who, to avoid
any misunderstanding, does not share this
view). There is little point in going into this
list of ‘what we have and Islam has not’,
though it would not be difficult to paint a
much more nuanced picture. Our subject
here is orientalism and its critique. To judge
by their ‘cluster of deficiencies’, die-hard
orientalists reveal not only an appalling lack
of sense and sensibility. They pursue a polit-
ical project that is intimately linked to colo-
nialism past and present, and all the more
powerful for its stark simplicity. Simplicity
does not always equal innocence after all.
But the same is true for the critique of ori-
entalism, or for that matter, the study of
Islam if done by ‘outsiders’ more generally.
It would come as a relief and a great encour-
agement to all those interested in Islam if
orientalist-bashing were slowly to go out of
fashion – inside the Muslim world as well as
outside of it. Rather than pointing accusing
fingers at certain scholars dead or alive,
some of them eminent and others less so, it
could prove useful and refreshing to take
more notice of what is currently being done
in the field, and not only in the English lan-
guage. Much of it is based on rigorous self-
examination that would do a puritan proud,
or a strictly observant Sufi. The way out of
the dilemma of taking culture seriously
without making it the prime mover of histo-
ry is, I think, not so much to join in the ritual
denunciations of orientalism. Nor does it
solve the problem to put the difficult terms
in quotations marks, and therefore write
‘Islam’ rather than Islam, ‘Islamic culture’
rather than Islamic culture, and ‘difference’
rather than difference, or always to use the
plural and so to consistently write Islams o r ,
to be entirely on the safe side, ‘Islams’. That
still leaves the possibility that there i s s o m e-
thing that could legitimately be referred to
as Islam, or culture, or difference. And how
can you have something in the plural any-
way that does not exist in the singular, at
least not for the scholar?
Unity / diversity
A more promising way to distance our-
selves from primitive orientalism, as indeed
we must, is to pay yet more attention to the
dynamic and plural nature of Islam, and
here it does not seem to matter much
whether we use the singular or the plural.
This corresponds to a marked tendency in
the humanities and the social sciences to
focus on actors rather than on systems, and
therefore to concentrate on agency, prac-
tice and processes mediating between
structures, or systems, on one hand and ac-
tors on the other. ‘Negotiation’ is the catch-
word here, taking us straight to the market-
place. I will come back to that. Scholars now
insist on the openness of historical process-
es that are neither linear nor homogeneous
(‘contingency’ is the word to be known
here), focusing on countervailing forces to
megatrends such as industrialization, mod-
ernization or globalization. They highlight
intra-cultural variation rather than uniformi-
ty, intra-societal conflict rather than harmo-
ny, fragmentation rather than coherence.
Gender studies have contributed much to
this shift of emphasis and perspective. His-
torians have learned from anthropologists,
and vice versa. Deconstructivists have spo-
ken about the ‘cacophony’ of discourse(s)
that characterizes any given situation. In our
context, we should perhaps rather refer to a
‘polyphony’ of Muslim voices, for even
though they are numerous the sound need
not grate on the ear, as a cacophony does.
Yet even when we focus on plurality,
polyphony and variation, major challenges
remain, and they do so on several levels. Is-
lamicists may insist on the plurality of
Islam(s), they may use inverted commas to
express their discomfort with essentializing
terms, they may even deny that there is
such a thing as Islam, or Islamic law, art or







The Use and Abuse
of the Study of Islam
Continued on page 7
ISIMI S I M  N E W S L E T T E R  5 / 0 0 7
discourses on Islamic history rather than Is-
lamic history proper, suggesting that histo-
ry proper does not exist, no matter whether
Islamic or other: there still remains the fact
that for ever so many Muslims, Islam is pre-
cisely the timeless, homogeneous and
unique whole, the sum total of divinely or-
dained norms, values and aspirations Islam-
icists spend so much time and energy on
‘deconstructing’. That they often do so in
order to defend Islam (no inverted commas
here) and the Muslims against those critics
who seem unable to distinguish between
the Taliban in Afghanistan, the Islamic Re-
public of Iran, a mullah in Cologne and the
teachings of the Prophet as understood by
Muslim communities in the Netherlands,
adds to the irony of the situation. How then
should the student of Islam deal with the
firm convictions of the Muslim believer (that
is to say: not just any Muslim regardless of
his or her personal views)? For it will hardly
do to summarily dismiss them as evidence
of false consciousness.
Culture in the market-place
One way to reconcile the demands of in-
tellectual integrity with the recognition of
strong beliefs among those who are after all
the principal partners of the students of
Islam, and not just the object of their re-
search, is to look at Islam as a repertory of
references, textual, visual and other, that
can be variously transmitted, but which
under all circumstances require interpreta-
tion if they are to acquire force, and have
done so from the very beginning of Islamic
history (I do not hesitate to use the term). In-
terpretation is done by active minds, or to
put it in current scientific jargon: it is
premised on agency. To speak of a repertory
of references that are continually re-inter-
preted, and re-defined, and frequently con-
tested, without losing their status of norma-
tivity for those involved, has a liberating ef-
fect. Among other things it frees students of
Islam from the necessity to declare them-
selves on the highly sensitive issue of
whether the Qur’an is actually God’s word,
and whether Muhammad was truly God’s
prophet, or indeed the last and final one in a
long line of messengers that had been sent
to humankind for God’s will to be known.
What matters is that Muslim believers view
and revere them as such. Considering the
explosive nature of the issue particularly in
our times, this is an advantage not to be un-
d e r e s t i m a t e d .
To put it bluntly then, it is not the task of
those who study Islam to define Islam for
the Muslim believer, to delimit its bound-
aries and to measure transgression. I would
maintain that in spite of the current fascina-
tion with negotiated space, shifting bound-
aries and imagined communities, bound-
aries exist that cannot all be negotiated. The
very notion of a repertory suggests that it is
limited (or should I say ‘bounded’?), and
that it can be exhausted. To speak of negoti-
ated space does not mean that ‘anything
goes’. Islam, Sayyid Qutb is said to have re-
marked, is flexible but not fluid. But it is not
for the scholar to fix those boundaries. It is
our task to unravel how in a given context
the available (normative) references are se-
lected, used and combined, and by whom,
to what purpose and to what effect. In
doing so we should perhaps be more careful
when employing the market metaphor:
shopping around for suitable references to
uphold specific views and to further particu-
lar interests has not always been an option
and may not always be one today. It is pre-
cisely more interesting to find out what ref-
erences are available to specific people in
specific situations. In many cases, the choice
could turn out to be more restricted than it
might appear to the scholar with full access
to all kinds of ideas, sources and resources.
At the same time I would be more cautious
when speaking about inside and outside
views, for in many situations the divide is by
no means as clear as some seem to think. I
see, at any rate, no reason why the ‘under-
standing’ of an urban middle-class academ-
ic of Muslim faith should by definition be
more authoritative, and insightful, than the
‘interpretation’ of an urban middle-class
academic of Hindu, Christian or uncertain
leanings; otherwise European medievalists
would not face the methodological prob-
lems that they do in trying to understand
medieval history.
On difference and modesty
If the concept of ‘understanding’ cul-
ture(s), no matter whether it is done from
the inside or the outside, is so problematic
and Islam so elusive, why should we make
the effort in the first place? There are, of
course, practical reasons: the presence of
growing numbers of Muslims in Western so-
cieties, not as migrants and visitors, but as
integral parts of these societies; the rise of
political Islam; the call for an application of
the Sharia, for an Islamization of knowledge,
etc. As is well known, these practical con-
cerns are all too often tied to some sense of
threat coming from Islam, or at least of a
challenge to be faced. But there is another
dimension that has little if anything to do
with fear or confrontation: it involves curios-
ity, be it intellectual or of a seemingly less
elevated nature. Curiosity presupposes dif-
ference, which in anthropology and oriental
studies more specifically has fallen into such
disrepute that many dare not use the word
without visible signs of distaste. My initial
motivation to study Islam was precisely the
assumption that it was somehow different
from the life I was familiar with. I wanted to
know to what extent that was true and in
which way – if it was true at all. There was in-
cidentally little romanticism involved: orien-
talist painting held no attraction for me, nor
did I feel any desire to go native in the
desert. My interest had to do with the possi-
bility that there might be alternative ways of
living and of thinking and of organizing so-
ciety, and I assume that many of our stu-
dents feel the same (unless, of course, they
are looking for their roots…).
We are constantly faced with questions
which are not predicated on a sense of dis-
tance or superiority that is so often associat-
ed with the notion of difference, or not nec-
essarily so. If Muslims believe that there is
such a thing as Islamic values, what are
they? If Islamists advocate an ‘Islamic order’,
what is so specific or possibly unique about
it? Unlike many Islamists, I do not think that
it has to be unique in order to merit atten-
tion. If the critics of modernization theory
(simplified, unilinear modernization theory)
consider the possibility that there might be
several paths towards modernity, or that we
should think in terms of plural modernities
that transcend the Western model (of
which, again, there are several), what exact-
ly does this plurality exist of? Is it possible to
distinguish a stable core of Islam, constitut-
ing its essence and foundation, from its
more malleable elements that can adapt to
the most diverse circumstances in order to
make Islam, as the well-known formula has
it, relevant to all times and places? And how
does this correspond to the familiar claim
that whereas techniques can be freely
adopted from non-Islamic sources, Islamic
values must by all means be preserved in-
tact? It is certainly important to analyse the
function of these claims and convictions.
However, I do not think we should stop
there, but look at content as well. Human
rights, good governance or social justice
provide excellent examples of what is at
s t a k e .
These are big questions, and they must be
approached with modesty. But then, if I may
be allowed a moral note at the end of my re-
marks, modesty may be a crucial prerequi-
site if we are to continue the study of Islam
in all its rich diversity without falling into
the trap of culturalism. This particular mod-
esty code does not apply to women only,
nor is it restricted to non-Muslims. The study
of Islam is a joint venture. We all share the
risks and the benefits – and the doubts. ♦
A consortium of the International Institute for Asian Studies (IIAS),
T h e Institute for the Study of Islam in the Modern World (ISIM) and
t h e Research School of Asian, African and Amerindian Studies (CNWS)
h a s initiated a project on
‘The Dissemination of Religious Authority in 20t h Century Indonesia’ .
The project is part of the programme of the Netherlands-I n d o n e s i a n
Co-operation, funded by the Netherlands Minister
o f Education, Culture and Sciences.
The research project will deal with the study of four major themes:
( a ) Traditional religious authority: u l a m a and f a t w a;
(b) Mystical associations (t a r e k a t) in urban communities;
(c) D a k w a (Muslim propagation) activities in urban communities; and
(d) Education and the dissemination of religious authority.
The project seeks:
4 Part-time Post-docs (each 0.5 fte)
to do research in one of the four themes 
(a combination of two themes in 1.0 fte is negotiable).
R e q u i r e m e n t s :
Applicants should:
¶ hold a PhD degree in Islamic studies,
the social sciences or another relevant discipline;
¶ have a solid disciplinary background
which guarantees competent research on the subject;
¶ be familiar with Islam in Indonesia;
¶ have a good command of Indonesian.
A p p o i n t m e n t s :
¶ As soon as possible;
¶ Salaries will be according to Dutch faculty regulations;
¶ Appointments will be for a maximum of four years
Further information on these positions can be obtained from
P r o f e s s o r D r W.A.L. Stokhof (phone: +31-71-527 22 27;
e-mail: iias@rullet.leidenuniv.nl).
Applications (including a curriculum vitae) should be sent
before 1 August, 2000, to Professor Dr W.A.L. Stokhof,
Director IIAS, P.O. Box 9515, 2300 RA Leiden, The Netherlands.
Continued from page 6
V A C A N C I E S
This article is an adapted version of Gudrun Krämer’s
lecture given in Utrecht, the Netherlands, for the
occasion of the ISIM Annual Lecture, 15 March 2000.
Professor Gudrun Krämer is professor of Islamic
Studies (Chair), Free University of Berlin, Germany.
E-mail: gkraemer@zedat.fu_berlin.de 
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L a w
L É O N  B U S K E N S
The installation of large numbers of Muslim immi-
grants in Western Europe and the United States has
contributed to a renewed interest in Islamic law in
these countries. Knowledge of Islamic law is consid-
ered necessary in order to understand the behaviour
of Muslims, especially in cases in which it conflicts
with indigenous norms in Western societies. In addi-
tion to the emphasis on Islamic law, it is important
also to study the diversity of norms governing the
behaviour of Muslims. Apart from s h ar-ı ca, norms re-
lated to state law and to local customs are also signf-
icant as is the relationship between these different
sets of norms considered in a historical perspective.
An Islamic Triangle
Changing Relationships
between S h a r-ı ca, State
Law, and Local Customs
The attention on the plurality of norms in
Muslim societies has a tradition of more than
a century in the Western study of Islamic law.
Instead of the binary opposition of theory and
practice, as can be found in the work of
founding fathers like Goldziher, Snouck Hur-
gronje and Schacht, I propose a triangular
model, related to an approach in the anthro-
pology of law, which stresses the plurality of
legal norms.1 The three domains in this trian-
gular model are the shar-ı ca, state law as de-
veloped by the government, and a rather dif-
fuse complex of local customs. This last do-
main is the most difficult to define, also be-
cause of the problematic character of notions
such as ‘folk law’ and ‘customary law’. Consid-
ering the dominance of an Islamic idiom in all
three domains, as well as in the discourse on
legal norms in general, it is possible to speak
of an ‘Islamic’ triangle.
In this model, the emphasis is on the neces-
sity of considering the different domains in
relationship to each other, instead of viewing
them as isolated entities. Study of the process
of state formation, in which a central govern-
ment claims the monopoly on the imposition
of uniform and generally valid legal norms,
offers a key to understanding the constantly
changing relationships between the three
domains. The model provides a better under-
standing of the diversity of norms in Muslim
communities. As a starting point for discus-
sion, a schematic overview of the develop-
ment of legal norms in Islamic societies and in
immigrant communities in Western Europe is
presented below.2
A triangle in development
In pre-modern Islamic states, the central
government generally had rather limited
control over the contents of Islamic law. The
cu l am -a ' were the main agents in the interpre-
tation of God’s will and thus developed legal
rules. The state could try to direct the course
of legal thinking, as in the Ottoman Empire,
but in general this did not lead to indepen-
dent state legislation. Furthermore, the state
hardly had the power to impose these official
interpretations of the s h a r-ıca on the popula-
tion. In practice, local customs often played
an important role in the regulation of daily
life. cu l am -a ' did their best to integrate these
customs in official Islamic legal thinking in as
far as they did not conflict too flagrantly with
orthodox norms.3 This condition of accom-
modation between state and Islamic law, and
local customs, was characterized by consid-
erable flexibility and dynamism.
Colonial rule pretended to aim at a so-
called modernization and rationalization of
the state. Generally this meant strengthening
the central government and importing legal
norms from the European ‘mother country’.
However, it was also often part of colonial
policy to strengthen the plurality of legal
norms by transforming local customs into
folk law.
Elevating customs to that status of law
went hand in hand with a marginalization of
Islamic law, which allegedly did not work ‘in
practice’. The role of the s h a r-ı ca was limited
and placed in the framework of the state
legal system. A government-led confronta-
tion between Islamic law and local customs
replaced the pre-colonial situation of accom-
modation. The opposition to this colonial
policy joined forces with Islamic purification
movements that developed in the same peri-
od. These nationalist puritans wanted to
cleanse Islamic orthodoxy from local, ‘un-Is-
lamic’ practices. Their struggle for a pure
Islam was simultaneously a struggle aganist
colonialism and customary law. According to
this view, the s h a r-ı ca should be the law of the
independent state for which they were fight-
i n g .
After independence, the new power-hold-
ers readily took over the colonial legacy of a
strong, centrally-governed state. State law
functioned in these new states as an ideolo-
gy of national unity. There remained hardly
any space for diversity of legal norms. Cus-
tomary law was abolished as a colonial inven-
tion, even if it lived on in daily practice. Nega-
tion of other legal norms replaced the colo-
nial tradition of confrontation.
However, the creation of a national legal
system did not mean (re)introduction of Is-
lamic law as it existed before colonization. In
the view of many independent governments,
the classical learned law books were not suit-
able instruments to administer a modern
state. Only legislation could perform this new
task. Only in the 1970s was a further Islamiza-
tion necessary in some states to legitimize
existing regimes. A favourite symbol with
which to create such a new legitimacy was
the invention of an Islamic penal law with
ample attention for corporal punishment
and public executions. Another popular mea-
sure was the creation of Islamic banks. Even
in Iran, the revolution of 1979 did not mean a
direct return to the rich sh ic-ı legal literature,
but a large-scale codification of Islamic law
according to Western textual forms.
Post-modern Islamic law
There are many indications that nowadays
the relationship between s h a r-ı ca, state law
and customs is again drastically changing. In
Indonesia, the limits of the power of the cen-
tral government has become obvious. Mili-
tant Muslims no longer accept the pluralism
of p a n c a s i l a ideology and demand an Islam-
ic state. At the same time Indonesian intel-
lectuals dare to think in an unorthodox way
about the contents of this ‘post-modern’ Is-
lamic law. Increasing literacy and the intro-
duction of new means of communication af-
fect the monopoly of the traditional scholars
on the interpretation of Islamic law. On the
Internet, Muslims from all over the world dis-
cuss – in English – these new forms of Islam.
Cheap CD-roms of classical texts produced
by m u l l a hs in Qum enable ordinary believers
to browse, in an unorthodox manner, in
what was until very recently an enclosed
garden for initiates.4
Muslims in Western Europe and North
America play an important role in the devel-
opment of these post-modern forms of
Islam. Not only do they have easier access to
schooling and modern communication tech-
nologies, they also enjoy in most cases a
greater freedom to exchange their religious
and political ideas. In Western societies,
Muslims from all parts of the world meet,
and get to know their diverse customs and
beliefs. For Muslim immigrants of the first
generation, their mutual differences are
often of great symbolic importance, but the
governments of their European host coun-
tries take another view. For these govern-
ments, these strangers are all Muslims, and
they should organize themselves in one
group, with one clear set of opinions. Reli-
gious young persons of the succeding gen-
erations seem to be willing to comply with
this wish for unity. Many of them seem to
give more importance to a shared Islamic
identity than to differences in law schools
and customs. They consult modern ‘restate-
ments’ of Islamic law, such as a l - Z u h a y l-ı ’ s a l -
Fiqh a l - i sl -a m-ı w a - a d i l l a t u h u (fourth edition,
1997), instead of the classical manuals of the
respective m a d h h a bs .
Customs in the diaspora
In the ‘diaspora’, state law and customs
change as well. In addition to the state law
of their countries of origin, the immigrants
are faced with the state law of their country
of residence, partly in the form of private in-
ternational law.5 At the same time, their cus-
toms can no longer be described as local. In
these new communities of immigrants, nor-
mative customs are not tied to one locality.
The members of the ‘moral community’ are
scattered all over Western Europe. In the
well-known cases of ‘crimes of honour’, the
behaviour of people living in Western Eu-
rope is governed by considerations of pub-
lic opinion in the villages of origin, thou-
sands of miles away. The killing of a daugh-
ter might be meaningless in the eyes of Ger-
man neighbours, for example, but in-
evitable and honourable according to the
standards of grandparents and cousins in
T u r k e y .
Research on these legal customs is of great
importance to understand the behaviour of
Muslims living in Western Europe. Many Is-
lamic immigrants come from societies in
which customary law traditionally played an
important role, such as the Rif in Northern
Morocco, Kabylia, Anatolia, Kurdistan, and
recently also Somalia and Albania. Special
attention should be paid to changes in these
customs which are linked to the context of
migration. Do Islamic or state norms replace
these ‘older’ values and norms? Knowledge
of these issues can be of great importance in
order to properly prosecute behaviour
which is defined as ‘criminal’ by the laws of
Western European countries. This research is
also of scholarly value, because this kind of
research is often difficult to conduct in the
countries of origin where their governments
prefer to deny the existence of other, non-
official norms.
A plea for comparative
s t u d i e s
The triangular model which is presented
here is not intended as a general outline of
the ‘nature’ of Islamic legal systems. On the
contrary, this contribution is a plea for re-
search on the diversity of legal systems and
their historical development. In my own
work on the genesis of the modern Moroc-
can legal system since the 19t h century, at-
tention is paid to the interaction of the
three domains of legal norms.6 A compara-
tive perspective is vital in order to under-
stand the pecularities of the different legal
systems of the Islamic world. Our discipline
might greatly benefit from a comparative
essay which might be entitled, as a pun on
Clifford Geertz’ famous book, Islamic Law
O b s e r v e d. ♦
N o t e s
1 . See, for example, Dupret, Baudouin, Maurits
Berger, and Laila al-Zwaini, eds. (1999). 
Legal Pluralism in the Arab World. The Hague, etc.
2 . See Messick, Brinkley (1993). The Calligraphic State:
Textual Domination and History in a Muslim Society
(Berkeley, etc), for a study of the transformation of
the Islamic legal system in Yemen, to which I am
greatly indebted.
3 . See Johansen, Baber (1999). ‘Coutumes locales et
coutumes universelles aux sources des règles
juridiques en Droit musulman hanéfite’, in his
Contingency in a Sacred Law. Legal and Ethical
Norms in the Muslim Fiqh. Leiden, etc; and also
Masud, Muhammad Khalid (1995). Sh -a i b-ı ’ s
Philosophy of Islamic Law; Islamabad, especially
chapter 10.
4 . See, for example, Eickelman, Dale F., and Jon W.
Anderson, eds. (1999). New Media in the Muslim
World. The Emerging Public Sphere. B l o o m i n g t o n :
Indiana University Press, especially John Bowen’s
contribution ‘Legal Reasoning and Public
Discourse in Indonesian Islam’.
5 . See, for example, Strijbosch, Fons, and Marie-
Claire Foblets, eds. (1999). Relations familiales
interculturelles. Séminaire interdisciplinaire juridique
et anthropologique / Cross-Cultural Family Relations.
Reports of a Socio-Legal Seminar; Oñati, especially
Fons Strijbosch’s contribution, ‘The
Anthropological Study of Customary Law for
Practical-Juridical Ends: Some Remarks on
M e t h o d o l o g y ’ .
6 . For example, in my Islamitisch recht en
familiebetrekkingen in Marokko (Islamic Law and
Family Relations in Morocco). Amsterdam: Bulaaq,
1 9 9 9 .
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N o t e s
1 . This article has been adapted from ideas
presented in my latest book: Patrick Chabal &
Jean-Pascal Daloz, Africa Works: Disorder as Political
I n s t r u m e n t (Oxford: James Currey, 1999).
2 . To take but one example, an African academic
with an American PhD in engineering will not find
it inconsistent to defer to the demands of
witchcraft in his village.
3 . African leaders, for example, may well combine
the most modern polling techniques with
a consultation of their village ancestors
( b yw a yo f the local medium).
4 . On the concept and implications of political
Africanization, see Patrick Chabal, Power in Africa:
an essay in political interpretation ( B a s i n g s t o k e :
Macmillan, 1992 & 1994), Chapter 12.
5 . See here chiefly Jean-François Bayart, L’Etat en
Afrique: la politique du ventre (Paris: Fayard, 1989).
6 . See here John Lonsdale, ‘Ethnicité morale et
tribalisme politique’, Politique Africaine, 61,
M a r c h1 9 9 6 .
7 . Though it is fair to say that, since our notion of
t h e modern is very largely determined by the
experience of the West, it is difficult at this stage
to know precisely in which ways Asian modernity
will eventually differ from that of the West.
Patrick Chabal is professor of Lusophone African
Studies at King’s College London. He is the author of
several books, the most recent of which is Africa
Works: Disorder as Political Instrument.
E-mail: patrick.chabal@kcl.ac.uk
D e b a t e
P A T R I C K  C H A B A L
Events in Africa over the last two decades have puz-
zled many. Worsening poverty, corruption, as well as
the repeated occurrence of coups or extreme civil vi-
olence, all conspire to give a cheerless, if not down-
right frightening, image of the continent. Are the
causes of this crisis to be found in Africa’s place in
the world economy or in the continual disorder
which afflicts the continent? Is the present turmoil a
temporary setback or has it become a permanent
condition? Why is there such breakdown of society?
Will the present efforts for democratization ensure
an improvement in the living conditions of the vast
majority or merely benefit the elites? Has the conti-
nent been ‘left behind by the rest of the world’, as
some have argued? Taken together, these issues
raise the more general question of modernization.
A f r i c a :
M o d e r n i t y w i t h o u t
D e v e l o p m e n t ?
1
The chief challenge facing the analyst of
contemporary Africa is to explain how the
continent can be both ‘modern’ and unde-
veloped – that is, what modernization
might mean in a context where there is no
development as is normally understood in
the West. What we observe in Africa is para-
doxical from this point of view: nowhere
else is the juxtaposition of the obviously
‘traditional’ with the patently ‘modern’
more striking. Africans are not slow in
adopting the latest technological aids, com-
puters or mobile phones, but at the same
time they seem locked into what outsiders
all too readily tend to see as ‘backward’ so-
cial or psychological conventions – such as
ethnicity or witchcraft. Above all, their gov-
ernments seem unable, or unwilling, to de-
vise and implement policies favouring sus-
tained economic growth. There is no devel-
opment, as it is commonly understood in
the West.
What is modernization?
The common assumption of existing par-
adigms in the social sciences is that mod-
ernization is the coherent outcome of the
combined and self-reinforcing effects of so-
cial and economic development as we have
experienced them in the West. This is an-
other way of saying that modernization is
perceived as the form of development
which makes it possible to evolve an eco-
nomically dynamic, technologically sophis-
ticated and politically open society. It is ac-
cepted that non-Western societies may
have different cultural attributes. However,
so long as they meet the two criteria of eco-
nomic success and technological advance,
they are considered to have modernized –
even if, as in some contemporary Asian so-
cieties, their record on human rights and in-
dividual freedoms is less than impressive.
What is perplexing about Africa is the ex-
tent to which, unlike most of the rest of the
world, it fails on both counts. In such condi-
tions does it make sense to claim that Africa
is ‘modern’?
I do not approach the question of mod-
ernization from a normative or teleological
perspective – seeking to explain why Africa
has not followed the same path as other
parts of the world. I want instead to make
sense of what is happening on the conti-
nent from the viewpoint of the logic of
those concerned. If Africans believe that
being ‘modern’ is compatible with being
‘traditional’, then we must understand not
just what this means but precisely how it is
possible. In so doing, we might well be
called upon to consider the possibility that
there are different types of modernity –
though they might not all be endowed with
the same potential for scientific and eco-
nomic development. My concern is thus not
to dispute existing notions of modernity but
merely to assess the texture of Africa’s own
path towards modernization.
Modernity, as I see it, is a dynamic process
rather than a state of equilibrium. As such, it
is pointless to deem one part of the world
categorically ‘modern’ and another irre-
deemably ‘traditional’. They are simply
‘modern’ and ‘traditional’ in different ways.
What it is important to distinguish is the in-
strumental quality of distinct types of
modernity. Western modernization has
been uniquely effective in combining sci-
ence and technology with bureaucratic and
managerial efficiency, thus establishing the
benchmark for what is commonly labelled
‘modern’ society. East Asia seems today to
be in the process of developing its own type
of modernity, based on an equally impres-
sive admixture of engineering sophistica-
tion, business acumen and organizational
c a p a b i l i t y .
What is noteworthy about Africa is that
modernization has not engendered the
same forward movement, in terms of eco-
nomic progress, as in Europe, America or
the Far East. The continent appears to have
evolved a form of modernity which provides
for the ability both to utilize the implements
(technological and scientific) of Westerniza-
tion and to remain obdurately ‘traditional’
in what we would qualify broadly as social
and cultural terms. What is more, there is
scarcely any evidence that the use of ‘mod-
ern’ technological instruments has made
Westernization more likely. The reverse
seems to be true – as though Western
modernity was being Africanized.2
Politics in Africa
This approach helps us to understand a
world in which politics, for example, is dri-
ven by considerations that range from the
most decidedly contemporary to the most
obviously archaic.3 What it makes clear is
that, far from behaving randomly or irra-
tionally, African political actors make sound
and shrewd instrumental use of the differ-
ent registers upon which they can legiti-
mately draw. Two complementary logics
bind the ‘modern’ and ‘traditional’ in Africa
t o d a y .
The first consists in what can be called the
re-Africanization of Western concepts or
customs according to local socio-cultural
n o r m s .4 This has led to a re-shaping of West-
ern political institutions and political ac-
tions by more informal and personalized
(infra-institutional) African codes of prac-
tice. Nevertheless, an interpretation of
African politics based simply on a notion of
the hybridization of Western norms is mis-
leading, unless it is made clear that the graft
did not have the intended results.5 To pur-
sue the biological analogy, African genes
proved dominant while the imported Euro-
pean ones turned out to be recessive. It is
for this reason that, as argued in A f r i c a
W o r k s, the realm of politics in Africa is very
largely informal.
The second centres on the ways in which
Africans operate simultaneously on what
can be described as different, and largely
discrete, registers. What is meant here is
that Africa’s political modernity is character-
ized by a combination of attitudes and
habits which draw from a singular fusion of
what we would identify as ‘modern’ or ‘tra-
ditional’ rationalities. Understanding poli-
tics in Africa, therefore, is to understand the
ever-changing recourse to the logic of dif-
ferent rational registers – and thereby to re-
alize the extent to which it is profitable to
operate within such a range of ‘modern’ and
‘traditional’ approaches. Thus, for example,
the resort to ethnicity may appear to us to
be ‘traditional’ or even backward, but the
ways in which elites employ such an instru-
ment must also be seen as a ‘modern’ face
of African politics. Ethnicity is, in this way,
both ‘modern’ and ‘traditional’, part of the
modernity of the continent.6
In the West, societies are organized, regu-
lated and run on principles of instrumental
modernity which brook very little dissent.
The realm of the ‘traditional’ is very largely
left to individual preferences, desires and
beliefs. The ‘modern’ and ‘traditional’ do not
have the same status. Westerners behave in
society on the assumption that they are all
in agreement with the rules of modernity
which govern their lives. The ‘traditional’
has no legitimacy in this respect and it is of
limited practical use in their professional en-
vironment. The same is broadly true of the
Far East where, cultural differences notwith-
standing, societies are similarly regulated.7
An appeal to ethnicity, to pursue the same
example, is not considered politically legiti-
m a t e .
This is not the case in Africa. My point is
that on the continent, it is both legitimate
and advantageous to operate according to
different logics of modernity and tradition
in all areas of life and work. It is thus not a
question of Africans being more ‘traditional’
(meaning backward) than others. Rather it is
the much more pertinent fact that being
both ‘traditional’ and ‘modern’ is at once
justifiable and instrumentally profitable.
Having recourse to ‘modern’ and ‘tradition-
al’ rationalities, as discussed above, is the
norm rather than the exception: it is the re-
ality which any framework of analysis must
take into account. We thus need to concep-
tualize Africa’s modernization as embody-
ing a constantly evolving dynamic of appar-
ently disconnected, though in reality over-
lapping, registers.
Understanding ‘disorder’
Such an analytical framework makes it
clear why Africa’s present modernity en-
courages the creative use of the ‘tradition-
al’. To speak of the ‘traditional’ in this way,
however, is not to imply that this approach
is culturalist. Although careful attention is
given to the political significance of culture,
I do not in any way maintain that politics in
Africa is to be explained solely in cultural
terms. My argument is that cultural dynam-
ics, which are most often subsumed under
the label of ‘tradition’, need also to be ex-
amined from their ‘modern’ instrumental
perspective. Cultural factors are no more
and no less significant in Africa than they
are elsewhere. What is important to analysis
is the way in which they are utilized politi-
cally in a modern setting.
The paradigm developed in Africa Works
shows that what is distinct in Africa is the
creative manner in which this overlap of
‘modernity’ and ‘tradition’ combines to cre-
ate a form of political accountability which
is rooted in the instrumentalization of disor-
der. By providing a coherent framework for
what might otherwise appear merely as
chaos or anarchy, we establish the founda-
tions for an analysis of politics in Africa
which is open to meaningful comparison.
This re-interpretation thus helps to explain
how the continent might be modernizing
whilst at the same time failing to develop
economically in the ways we normally
would associate with ‘modernity’. ♦
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D e b a t e
H E N R Y  M U N S O N
Islamism and nationalism are conventionally
thought of as antithetical ideologies, yet there is in
fact often a nationalistic dimension to Islamism. One
is reminded of the relationship between Marxism
and nationalism. In principle, Marxists condemn na-
tionalism, as do Islamists. Yet the revolutions waged
in the name of Marxist ideology since World War II
were all fuelled by nationalistic resentment of for-
eign domination. Such resentment, among other
things, also fuelled the principal Islamist movements
of the late 20t h century. In both cases, an ostensibly
universalistic ideology has actually often had a more
parochial nationalistic character in practice.
Islamism 
a n d
N a t i o n a l i s m
Religious and national identity tend to be
fused in many parts of the world. One
thinks, for example, of the linkage between
Eastern Orthodoxy and Russian and Serbian
national identity, between Roman Catholi-
cism and Croatian, Irish, and Polish national
identity, and between Hinduism and Indian
national identity. To be a Serb is to be Or-
thodox, to be a Croatian is to be Catholic,
and, from the point of view of Hindu nation-
alists at least, to be an Indian is to be Hindu.
In all these cases, religion serves as a badge
of national identity. This has also been true
in the Islamic world.
Arab nationalism in the 20t h century usually
had an implicitly Sunni Islamic hue to it. To
be sure, Christians played a prominent role
in creating the concept of Arab nationalism,
based upon common language and culture
rather than religion (a point invariably
stressed by Islamist critics of national-
ism). But the fact remains that in the
popular imagination all over the Arabic-
speaking world, to be an Arab is to be a
Muslim – a Sunni Muslim. Similarly, to be
an Iranian, a ‘real’ one, is to be a Shici t e .
When the European empires subjugated
the Islamic world in the 19t h and early
2 0t h centuries, anti-imperialist resistance
was articulated in Islamic terms. Most
Muslims thought of their wars against
European imperialism as forms of jihad.
The distinction between Muslim and infi-
del became intertwined with the distinction
between the colonized and the colonizer,
the oppressed and the oppressor. Thus, tra-
ditional hostility toward the unbeliever qua
unbeliever was now infused with new
meaning. This had unfortunate conse-
quences for religious minorities in the Islam-
ic world. Christians were suspected of sym-
pathizing with Christian Europe. Jews were
suspected of sympathizing with Zionism
and, after 1948, with Israel.
Secular nationalism did of course play an
important role in the Middle East in the
middle of the 20t h century. One thinks,
for example, of Mossadegh and the Na-
tional Front in Iran, Nasser and ‘Nasser-
ism’ in Egypt, and the emergence of the
PLO among the Palestinians. But all
these forms of nationalism eventually
failed to produce liberation from foreign
domination, not to mention the various
other social and economic problems
found in most of the ‘Third World’. More-
over, all these forms of ‘secular’ national-
ism were in fact imbued by Islam at the
grassroots level. At the height of their
power in the early 1950s, Mossadegh
and the National Front depended on the
support of the Ayatollah Khashani and
the m u l l a hs. Nasser may have opposed
the Muslim Brotherhood’s goal of a
strictly Islamic state, but his public per-
sona was that of a Muslim fighting to
free Muslims from Western imperialism. Had
his first name been Butros, Nasser would
never have become Nasser. As for the Pales-
tine Liberation Organization, its core group
was al-Fatah, which always made extensive
use of traditional Islamic concepts such as
jihad and s h a h i d, ‘martyr’. The more secular
Marxist Palestinian movements led by the
Christians George Habbash and Nayif
Hawatmeh never had anything like the pop-
ular appeal of al-Fatah.
Nationalistic resentment
o f foreign domination –
t h e Iranian case
Islamists tend to lament the Western
domination of the Islamic world as a whole
and portray the emergence of nationalism
as part of a Western and Jewish conspiracy
to divide and conquer the Islamic world. Yet
the rhetoric of these fiery critics of national-
ism often has a decidedly nationalistic ring
to it.
In 1964, the Ayatollah Khomeini gave a
speech in which he criticized the Iranian
parliament, or Majlis, for passing a bill grant-
ing diplomatic immunity to American mili-
tary and civilian personnel:
This statement articulates resentment of
foreign domination in an earthy, populist
idiom that both an illiterate labourer and
a well-educated secular nationalist could
understand. Khomeini’s reference to ‘the
Iranian people’ is quite striking given his
condemnation of nationalism in his later
w r i t i n g s .
It must be recognized, however, that
Khomeini often spoke of the Western
domination of the Islamic world in gen-
eral, not just Iran. In 1972, he declared:
Passages like this are commonplace in Is-
lamist literature, though we do find some
variation in this respect from country to
country and group to group. In many cases,
the resentment of foreign domination artic-
ulated in such passages is expressed in
terms of preposterous theories that at-
tempt to blame ‘crusader’ and Jewish con-
spiracies for all the problems of the Islamic
world. As illusory as these explanations may
be, the resentment they reflect is real. And
it is a major source of the appeal of Is-
l a m i s m .
For Khomeini and many Islamists like him,
the idea of a ‘return to Islam’ and the estab-
lishment of a strictly Islamic state and soci-
ety are linked to the goal of overcoming
foreign domination. The underlying logic of
the Islamist argument is familiar: The be-
lievers are suffering because they have de-
viated from the laws of God. To end their
suffering, they have to conform to God’s
laws. God has allowed the infidels to domi-
nate the believers because they have devi-
ated from His laws. Once they conform, He
will grant them victory. Such reasoning is
often meshed with more subtle themes, no-
tably that of cultural authenticity. The re-
turn to Islam becomes a means of re-
gaining one’s true cultural identity – as
opposed to mimicry of the dominant
W e s t .
Nationalistic resentment
o f foreign domination –
t h e case of Hamas
We have already noted the Islamic
rhetoric employed by al-Fatah, the prin-
cipal group in the PLO. Equally striking is
the nationalist rhetoric of Hamas, the
principal Islamist opposition to the PLO.
We find the following passage in a flyer
distributed by Hamas in January 1988, at the
beginning of the Intifada:
The phrase ‘Muslim people’ in this pas-
sage clearly refers primarily to the Pales-
tinian people. And the passage focuses
primarily on the liberation of Palestine.
Hamas leaders and supporters do of
course condemn the PLO for its failure to
fight for an Islamic state, but they also
frequently condemn it for having capitu-
lated to Israel by signing the Oslo Ac-
c o r d s .
The Oslo Accords of 1993, and the var-
ious agreements that followed them,
created a plethora of little urban islands
ruled by the Palestinian National Author-
ity. To go from one such island to anoth-
er entails humiliating interrogations and
searches at Israeli checkpoints. When Is-
raeli soldiers prevented him from travel-
ling from Gaza to his home on the West
Bank, Ahmad Qureic (Abu al-Ala), one of the
principal negotiators of the Oslo Accords
and president of the Palestinian parliament,
declared: ‘Soon, I too will join Hamas.’
Q u r e ic did not really mean this. But his
words reflected the fury of a man outraged
by the subjugation of his people. Such fury
fuels Hamas.
C o n c l u s i o n
It would be absurd to argue that national-
istic resentment of foreign domination is
the sole source of the appeal of Islamism. An
adequate explanation of Islamism must also
take into consideration the dire economic
situation in much of the Islamic world. One
must also recognize that many of the secu-
lar grievances that fuel Islamist movements
also exist elsewhere in the Third World with-
out resulting in the creation of militant reli-
gious revivalism. There are specific aspects
of Islamic doctrine that encourage the emer-
g e n c e of such movements. Once must also
recognize that Islamism is at least partially
fuelled by moral outrage provoked by the
violation of traditional religious values. The
outrage provoked by Salman Rushdie’s S a-
tanic Verses cannot simply be attributed to
resentment of Western domination or eco-
nomic discontent. But while all these points
are important, the fact remains that the
Iranian revolution of 1978-79 was, among
other things, a nationalist revolution. And
Hamas is, among other things, a nationalist
m o v e m e n t . ♦
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’Do you not know that this agreement re-
duces the Iranian people to a level lower than
that of an American dog?
If someone [an Iranian, that is] runs over an
American dog with his car, he is subject to in-
vestigation and prosecution even if he is ‘the
shah’ himself. But if an American cook runs
over ‘the shah of Iran’ himself, or any other
important person, he will not be subject to
p r o s e c u t i o n . ’
’What has happened? The awakening of a
people. The Muslim people avenges its hon-
our and renews the glories of the past, this
people that refuses to give up the smallest
piece of its homeland [shibr min watanihi],
that rejects Camp David, that rejects the in-
ternational conference and humiliating
peace, that rejects imprisonment and banish-
ment, that rejects capitulation of all kinds.’
’If the Muslim states and peoples had relied
on Islam and its inherent capabilities and
powers instead of depending on the East (the
Soviet Union) and the West, and if they had
placed the enlightened and liberating pre-
cepts of the Quran before their eyes and put
them into practice, then they would not
today be captive slaves of the Zionist aggres-
sors, terrified victims of the American Phan-
toms, and toys in the hands of the accommo-
dating policies of the satanic Soviet Union. It
is the disregard of the noble Quran by the Is-
lamic countries that has brought the Islamic
community to this difficult situation full of
misfortunes and reversals and placed its fate
in the hands of the imperialism of the left and
the right.’
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F o r u m
S A D I K  J .  A L - A Z M
Responsibility for the future is very often a matter of
foresight and foresight is always based on insight, as
we all know. What does my insight tell me about this
whole issue or problem? It informs me that the mod-
ern Arabs are truly the Hamlet of the 20t h c e n t u r y .
Like the endlessly celebrated prince, they seem able
continually to join the underlying passion of the ele-
mental to the brooding intellectuality of the cerebral
to the lyrical sensitivity of the poetic but only to end
up in unrelieved tragedy. The tragedy consists of un-
ending hesitations, procrastinations, oscillations and
waverings between the old and the new, between
a s a l a h and muca s a r a h (authenticty and contempo-
raneity), between t u r a t h and tajdid (heritage and re-
newal), between h u w i y y a h and h a d a t h a h ( i d e n t i t y




In this way, the 21st century can only belong
to the conquering Fortinbrases of this world
and never to the Hamlets hung up on inter-
minably rehearsing that classic – but now
totally d e p a s s é – European p i è c e called L a
querelle des Anciens et des Modernes. No
wonder, then, to quote Shakespeare’s most
famous drama, that ‘the times seem out of
joint,’ for the Arabs and ‘something looks
rotten in their state.’ No wonder as well if
they keep wondering, like the fabled Prince
of Denmark himself and with as much tragic
intensity, ‘whether they are the authors of
their woes or there is a divinity that shapes
their ends.’
This analogy leads me to dig deeper in-
side ourselves and to think that for us Arabs
to own our future, to hold ourselves respon-
sible for it, we have to come to terms with a
certain image of ourselves buried very
deeply in our collective subconscious. What
I mean is the following: As Arabs and Mus-
lims (and I use Muslim here in the purely his-
torical, cultural and civilizational sense), we
continue deep down to image and imagine
ourselves as conquerors, history-makers,
pace setters, pioneers and leaders of world-
historic proportions.
Reconciling self-image
a n d r e a l i t y
In the marrow of our bones, we still sense
ourselves as subjects of history not its ob-
ject, as its agent and not as its patient. We
have never come to terms realistically with,
let alone reconcile ourselves to, the margin-
ality and reactiveness of our position in
modern times. In fact, deep down in our col-
lective soul, we find intolerable this mon-
strosity of a supposedly great u m m a h l i k e
ourselves standing helplessly on the mar-
gins not only of modern history in general
but even of our local and particular histories.
We find no less intolerable the condition
of being the objects of a history made, led,
manipulated and arbitrated by others, espe-
cially when we remember that those others
were (and by right ought to be) the objects
of a history made, led, manipulated and ar-
bitrated by ourselves. Add to that a no less
deeply seated belief that this position of
world-historical leadership and its glories
was somehow usurped from us, f i g h a f l a h
m i na l-t a r i k h as we say in Arabic, by modern
Europe. I say usurped – and usurpation is at
the heart of Hamlet’s tribulations and trials
– because it is supposed to belong to us by
right, by destiny, by fate, by election, by
providence or by what have you.
With this belief goes the no less deeply
seated conviction that eventually things will
righten themselves out by uncrowning this
reigning usurper, whose time is running out
anyway, and by restoring history’s legiti-
mate leaders to their rightful place, former
station and natural function.
This kind of thought and yearning comes
through loud and clear in the work of au-
thors like Egypt’s Hasan Hanafi and the later
work of someone like Anwar Abdel-Malek,
as well as in the tracts, analyses and propa-
ganda of the more sophisticated Islamist
thinkers and theoreticians.
The constellation of ideas that they lean
on for a crutch may be summarized in the
tittle of a most famous European classic:
Spengler’s The Decline of the West, the false
implication being, if the West is declining
then the Arabs and Islam must be rising. Or,
to put it somewhat differently (i.e. in terms
of the title of Abdel-Malek’s book R i h a l -
S h a r q, The Wind of the East), if the wind of
history is abandoning the sails of the West,
then it must be automatically filling those of
the East and East means principally, here,
Islam and the Arabs. If we use the title of an
equally famous Islamist classic by Muham-
mad Kutb, Jahiliyyat al-Qarn a l-cI s r i n (T h e
Jahiliyyah of the 20 t h C e n t u r y ), then the im-
plication would be: now that European
Modernity has come full circle to the j a h i l i
condition, the Arabs and the Muslims must
be on the verge of leading humanity once
more out of the j a h i l i y y a h created by Europe
and defended by the West in general.
Arab nationalism: retrieving
the usurped role of world
l e a d e r s h i p ?
But this is not the end of the story. Re-
viewing the classics of Arab nationalism, it
now often appears to me that the deeper
objective of these works was not so much
Arab Unity as an end in itself, but as a means
for retrieving that usurped role of world-his-
torical leadership and of history making. In
fact, I can easily say that the ultimate but
unarticulated concern here was not so
much colonialism, imperialism, foreign oc-
cupation, liberation, independence, pros-
perity, social justice, equality, freedom as
such, but the restoration of a right usurped
from this great u m m a h to exercise the
world-historical role and function naturally
and/or providentially suited to its nature
and mission. After all, the historic civiliza-
tions of our part of the world have always
been of the conquering and extroverted
type: Ancient Persia descending on Greece,
Alexander conquering Persia and every-
thing else within reach, Hannibal, Rome,
Islam, the Ottomans, European modernity
and so on.
Now, when this unexamined, unexor-
cized, highly potent and deep-seated self-
image collides with the all-too evident
everyday actualities of Arab-Muslim impo-
tence, backwardness, frustration and in-
significance, especially at the level of inter-
national relations, then anything becomes
possible on the Arab side. This includes at
least grand illusions, massive inferiority
complexes, huge compensatory delusions,
wild adventurism, heedless political reck-
lessness, desperate violence, and so on. Ob-
viously, this is a recipe for owning neither
the present nor the future. In fact, it is a
recipe for the abdication of all responsibility
v i s - à - v i s both the present and the future.
The contradiction that I have been trying
to delineate and that I think we have to
openly come to terms with if we are going
to have any future at all is perhaps best cap-
tured – quite gently but very ironically – in
the title of Hussain Ahmad Amin’s pointed
and lively book, Dalil al-Muslim al-Hazin ila
M u q t a d a al-Suluq fi a l - Q a r n a l -cI s r i n. The au-
thor is a well-known Egyptian historian and
high-ranking diplomat and the son of
Ahmad Amin, the great historian produced
by what the late Albert Hourani called the
Arab Liberal Age. Interestingly enough, the
title of Amin’s book hints at the great classic
of Moses Maimonides, D a l a l a h a l - H a ' i r i n
(The Guide for the Perplexed.) So a free trans-
lation of Hussain Ahmad Amin’s title would
read: A Guide for the Sad and Perplexed
Muslim concerning the sort of behaviour re-
quired by the 20t h c e n t u r y .
The contemporary Arab: sad,
melancholic, perplexed and
v e x e d ?
The contemporary Muslim and/or Arab
and/or what have you is so sad, melan-
cholic, perplexed and vexed in Amin’s ac-
count because his instinctive convictions,
profound self-image and cherished illusions
about his u m m a h, religion, culture, civiliza-
tion, providence, their role and function in
modern history are all given the lie by the
hard realities and harsh actualities of the
contemporary world at every waking
minute of his life. Furthermore, the radical
transformations, revolutions, sacrifices,
changes, losses, etc., required to transcend
this contradiction continue to be deemed
unbearable, unacceptable and undesirable
by Amin’s totally frustrated Arab and/or
Muslim. So what else is left for him to do ex-
cept to muddle through his sad, melan-
cholic perplexity right into the 21s t c e n t u r y
carrying with him the pious conviction that
perhaps one day God or history or fate or
the revolution or the moral order of the uni-
verse will undo the usurper and again raise
his u m m a h to the status of world-historical
leadership. Meanwhile, the Fortinbrases of
this world will have inherited the earth at his
e x p e n s e .
Modernity is basically a European inven-
tion. Europe made the modern world with-
out consulting Arabs, Muslims or anyone
else for that matter, and made it at the ex-
pense of everyone else to boot. There is no
running away from the fact that the Arabs
were dragged, kicking and screaming into
modernity, on the one hand, and modernity
was forced on them by superior might, effi-
ciency and performance, on the other.
The Crusades were ultimately repulsed,
but Bonaparte’s militarily insignificant expe-
dition and adventure in Egypt and Palestine
not only won the day but actually made a
clean sweep of all that had historically lost
the ability to live and continue on our side
of the Mediterranean. The massive differ-
ence between the results of the Crusades
and the results of the French expedition of
1798, distills the essence of European
modernity as far as we are concerned and
puts it on show for our chastisement and
e d i f i c a t i o n .
In fact, the modern European violent in-
trusion into Islamdom and Arabdom creat-
ed, in my view, a final, decisive and defini-
tive rupture with the past that I can only
compare with the no less final and definitive
rupture effected by the violent Arab-Muslim
intervention into the history of Sassanid
Persia. And just as the history of post-con-
quest Persia stopped making sense without
the Arabs, Islam and their eruption on the
local Farsi scene, similarly, the post-Bona-
parte history of Arabdom stopped making
sense without Europe, modernity and their
eruption on the local Arab scene as well. In
my view, there is no running away from this
reality no matter how many times we re-it-
erate the partial truth and often lame ratio-
nalization to the effect that Modern Europe
got it all from us anyway: Averroes, Andalu-
sian high culture and civilization, Arabic sci-
ence, mathematics, philosophy and all the
r e s t .
Without finally coming to terms, seriously
and in depth, with these painful realities
and with their so far paralyzing contradic-
tions, tensions, paradoxes and anomalies,
there is neither an owning of the future for
the Arabs, nor any real responsibility for the
present on their part. In other words, either
we come to terms critically with this deep-
seated, ritualized and stratified complex of
highly emotional beliefs, valuations and im-
ages that in their turn give the sanction of
sacredness, taboo and immutability to in-
herited illusions, archaic institutions, dys-
functional attitudes and arrangements,
anachronistic but cherished modes of living,
thinking and governing, or, again, the Fort-
inbrases of this world will win the day and
have the final say.
In any case, in Mamdouh Adwan’s adapta-
tion of Hamlet, staged some years ago in
Damascus, by the time the Prince wakes up,
it is already far too late. ♦
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H e a l t h
S Y L VI A  W I N G  ÖN DE R
Research conducted in five interconnected villages
on the Black Sea Coast of Turkey has shown that gen-
eral cultural ideas about family and social relations
combine with traditional and clinical medical theo-
ries and techniques to shape health care practices.
By studying the health care choices of patients and
their families, cultural values can be observed in ac-
tion. Studies of health care institutions in rural areas
have typically treated traditional healing and indige-
nous theories of health as obstacles to be overcome
in the pursuit of maximum health benefits for the
population. On the other hand, efforts to validate in-
digenous techniques and knowledge often present
clinical medicine as an unmitigated threat to tradi-
tional ways. The following demonstrates how tradi-
tional and clinical healing practices interact and
combine in a system which is actively negotiated and
consumed by patients and their families. 
Indigenous Evaluations 
o f Health Care
i n T u r k e y
Examples of how social values and family
ideals shape the ways in which people
judge health care practices, thus influenc-
ing future decisions, can be delineated into
three culturally specific concepts: b a k m a k ,
ilgi, a n d t o r p i l. These are cultural values
which relate to all realms of social interac-
tion, including relationships between indi-
viduals and state-run institutions such as
clinics and hospitals. Although these con-
cepts were found to be important in the
Black Sea village context, it can be said that
they are also current in the wider Turkish
context. The following aims to show the
ways in which cultural standards for appro-
priate family behaviour determine the crite-
ria by which clinical medical professionals
and institutions are judged. The family is
considered the primary care unit, and all
other health care is judged by the standards
of the family. Although there is no direct
mention here of the interactions between
patients and traditional healers, many in-
stances in which traditional healers were
judged by similar standards have been ob-
s e r v e d .
’Looking after someone’
(b a k m a k)
The first concept can be called b a k m a k,
which translates simply as ‘to look’ but is
used also in the sense of ‘to look after some-
one’, ‘to watch out for someone’, or ‘to take
care of someone’. In common parlance, the
term expresses a sense of family responsibil-
ity. Traditionally, in the case of an illness, the
patient is expected to become passive, leav-
ing to others the decisions about measures
to be taken. The person who assumes re-
sponsibility for the pursuit of care for the pa-
tient is the grammatical subject of the verb
b a k m a k. The actions described by the term
range from bringing a glass of tea and show-
ing concern, to finding a medical expert and
paying for treatment. The person who looks
after the patient is most likely to be a close
female relative, although decisions about
transporting the patient or paying for care
tend to involve male relatives. In a waiting
room of a clinic, I observed individuals work-
ing aggressively as advocates for a seated
and silent patient, trying to secure attention
and efficiency for their charge, often in com-
petition with those responsible for other pa-
tients. In a doctor’s examining room, tradi-
tional and modern medical expectations
may clash when a doctor wants the patient
to respond directly to questions about
symptoms, but is answered instead by the
accompanying person.
’Concern’ (i l g i)
The second term used is i l g i , which means
‘interest’, ‘concern’ and ‘compassion.’ It is re-
lated to b a k m a k in that one of the most im-
portant ways to look after a person is to
demonstrate i l g i. I
.
l g i requires an intensifica-
tion of physical contact with a suffering fam-
ily member or friend, in contrast with the
avoidance behaviour observable in cultures
which base theories of illness on ideas of
contagion. The traditional Turkish theory
does not allow for illness to spread between
family members. At home, a patient should
be shown plenty of i l g i, and a family mem-
ber’s willingness to display i l g i is carefully
watched by all. Daughters-in-law often have
a heavy burden of health care responsibili-
ties for their husbands’ parents, especially in
cases of chronic illnesses, and are socially
judged for their i l g i. I
.
l g i is also expected of
medical professionals. The most commonly
heard complaint about the state-run hospi-
tals is i l g i l e n m i y o r l a r or ilgi göstermiyorlar –
meaning, ‘they don’t pay (enough) atten-
tion’, or ‘they don’t show interest’. People
express approval of medical professionals
demonstrating i l g i, and compare them on
this basis.
’Social influence’ (t o r p i l)
The third term is t o r p i l, which can be
translated as ‘social influence’, ‘pull’, or
‘networking’. To get anything done which
involves an official institution and the relat-
ed bureaucracy, connections are crucial.
Family connections are the most reliable
and powerful forms of t o r p i l, but almost any
relationship can be drawn upon for influ-
ence. Addressing an unrelated person in fa-
milial terms is a strategy used to build t o r-
p i l. The term relates to what Jenny White
calls ’a web of mutual support’, ‘reciprocity’,
or ‘indebtedness’ and which she finds im-
portant in Turkish family relations and so-
cial interactions.1 In daily life on the Black
Sea Coast, during contact with any govern-
ment officials, be they police, school teach-
ers, tax collectors, or doctors, t o r p i l is cru-
cial. Lack of personal connections can result
in harsher penalties, longer waits, and big-
ger fines. In the pursuit of health care, t o r p i l
can have life-or-death significance. In sum,
when a patient is taken to a health clinic or
hospital, the family members responsible
for the action b a k m a k will try to make the
most of t o r p i l in order to increase the
chances of appropriate demonstrations of
i l g i.
The state hospital and
t h e f a m i l y
A basic provincial state-run hospital in
Turkey is not set up to provide the patients
with the comforts of home. A hospital stay,
unless it is in an expensive, private room,
means that family members feel obliged to
bring food, sheets and towels, changes of
clothing, and visit with the patient to pass
the time. A patient who has no family in evi-
dence in a hospital room is greatly pitied and
often brought into the circle of a more fortu-
nate patient with gifts of food and conversa-
tion. The most frequently heard criticisms of
the local hospitals are that they are dirty, de-
pressing, and smelly; that they are a source
of illness because sick people are all thrown
in together, and that the staff is uncaring or
rough. In contrast, home care is considered
much more sanitary, comfortable, gentle,
and healthy.
The doctors and nurses in the hospitals real-
ize the benefits that family visits can bring
to the patient. They recognize the lack of re-
sources such as food and bedding for pa-
tients, although they consider hospital con-
ditions to be much more sanitary than those
in the village home. A compromise is con-
tinuously being worked out as the hospital
staff tries to restrict the numbers and noise-
levels of visitors, while each patient’s family
and friends try to maximize the benefits of
the stay for the patient. As in all Turkish in-
stitutions, most official rules are flexible, ac-
cording to the social connections of the pa-
tient and his or her family.
The hospital as family
In Turkish culture, the hospital is judged in
direct relation to family care at home. The
strongest critiques of hospital care are those
which find it lacking in the emotional sup-
port, wholesome food, cleanliness, and i l g i –
which can be found at home. When hospi-
tals are praised, it is generally for their tech-
nologies and for the skills of specialists, not
for their atmosphere or sympathetic care.
White has noticed that ‘[r]elations of
obligation in society beyond the family are
often represented metaphorically as family
relations, as for example between the citi-
zen and what the Turks call “Father State”
(Devlet Baba) . ’2 In terms of the state-run
hospitals, it is no wonder that the institu-
tions of the d e v l e t (State) are seen as lacking
the i l g i required to become well – the patri-
arch is meant to be aloof from the day-to-
day care which is the province of women.
The state builds physical structures, like
hospitals and clinics, and stocks them with
technological equipment, concrete exam-
ples of the patriarchal ability of the state to
provide care for the ‘family’ of citizens. What
goes on in the daily routine inside the hos-
pital is of less concern to the state, which is
meant to maintain a dignified and elevated
s t a t u s .
In contrast, the women within the state-
run hospital are criticized by patients for
their lack of i l g i, as if they were members of
the family, bad daughters-in-law or un-
grateful daughters. The irony is that they
have no family obligation, and their rewards
are meagre for the work they do. Like all
state employees, they can consider them-
selves secure in their jobs but have no moti-
vation to provide anything but the absolute
minimum of service. If the nurses within the
devlet hospital do not show enough i l g i,
then the families must step in.
New cash-based health care
Recent years have brought about an in-
crease in private clinical medical care
throughout Turkey.3 Paying for health care
has added a new standard for judging a
medical professional or procedure: if it costs
more, it should be better. Private facilities
put much stronger controls on the visitors
to patients – keeping strict hours, limiting
the number of visitors allowed, and regulat-
ing or prohibiting items brought from
home. The understanding is that the patient
will be well taken care of in exchange for the
high price of care. In conversations about
private health care, people still use tradi-
tional concepts to choose professionals, ar-
ticulating t o r p i l connections and judging
them from their demonstrations of i l g i. With
the new economy, however, family mem-
bers are now likely to perform duties related
t o b a k m a k by sending money, especially
from distant cities or from outside of Turkey;
t o r p i l is often ‘bought’ with a kind of bribery;
and i l g i is expected as a part of the services
of a paid professional. Another new means
of judging Turkish heath care is comparison
with European practices which are increas-
ingly familiar throughout Turkey. ♦
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Sabine Strasser is a research fellow at the Institute of
Social and Cultural Anthropology, where she also
teaches feminist theory, postcolonial and migration
studies, University of Vienna, Austria.
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The Bo dy
S A B I N E  S T R A S S E R
Essays on gender relations in rural Turkey end up all
too often in the pitfall of fixed ascriptions that por-
tray women mainly as victims of their own society.
The following is an attempt to challenge this dis-
course of victimization and fixity by drawing on fe-
male bodily expressions. Women in rural Turkey1
counteract social expectations and male dominance
through bodily crises. This case study shows the po-
tential for change that is inherent in spirit posses-
sion, which is commonly considered backward or tra-
ditional. Bodily crises in this sense are conceptual-
ized not only as an expression of weakness, but also
as a female counter-hegemonic potential to express
the unspeakable.
Impurity as Criticism
Reports from a Black
Sea Village in Turkey
Canım sıkılıyor! (My soul is bored!) is the
term by which women in rural Turkey de-
scribe their bodily crises. H a s t a (being ill) or
r a h a tsı z (restless) are other terms used to
express suffering and anxiety. Villagers, es-
pecially the elderly, are convinced that doc-
tors are not able to do anything about these
conditions. In their opinion, there is no bio-
logical or medical cause, and these crises
are considered c i n c i l i k, an issue for a h o c a
(healer). Men and women who experience
such attacks are mainly seen as p e r i l e n m iş
(possessed by demons) and since they no
longer meet social expectations, they are
sometimes referred to as a k ı l s ı z ( u n r e a s o n-
able, crazy) and not t e m i z (decent, clean), or
even as too akıllı (intelligent, clever).2
Dilek: a woman from
t h e t o w n3
Dilek did not feel welcome in her hus-
band’s house: because she had been
brought up in a nearby town, she was con-
sidered a stranger (y a b a n c ı) in her new vil-
lage. Having to stay with her widowed
mother-in-law, with whom she did not at all
get along, Dilek suffered terribly – not from
village work but from loneliness and desire.
Her husband was then working outside the
village and sometimes did not return for
weeks at a time. After being married for
about two years and still without child, Dilek
worried that she would never conceive. She
was convinced that a child would have sup-
ported her in overcoming the difficult situa-
tion in which she was living. She could not
turn to her own family either, because she
had run away from her father’s house to fol-
low her husband (kız kacırmak) to the vil-
l a g e .
Dilek’s ‘attacks’ began after a dispute with
her mother-in-law for not allowing her to
visit her parents. While retrieving water
from the well, she suddenly had a vision of
her mother and as she ran over to welcome
her, fell to the ground and lost conscious-
ness. From then on Dilek is said to have be-
haved strangely: it appears that she would,
at times, lay her head on her husband’s lap
in public, cursing or crying for her mother
like a child. She began to talk to invisible
people and often lost consciousness. Oddly
enough, after such an episode, she could
not recollect disrespectful or strange behav-
iour, but could only remember feelings of
relaxation once she came to.
Finally, her own father (though her hus-
band’s family was ultimately responsible for
her) took her to a h o c a where she was exam-
ined and received treatment. The hoca c o n-
cluded that there was a m u s k a (spell) affect-
ing her, which was also preventing her from
having a baby. The m u s k a was put on her by
her first fiancé, whom she had rejected.
Dilek explained that the hoca was told by
the peri (demons) that she should stay with
her parents for a while and not be brought
back to her husband’s village immediately.
After several weeks, she nevertheless decid-
ed to go back to join her husband’s family,
where she again began to feel lonely and
eventually suffered a relapse.
Dilek was convinced that living in town
with her parents would have been the best
remedy, and that a baby would have been
supportive, since she would have someone
for whom to live. She strongly believed in
the hoca’s treatment, but was still afraid of
becoming ill again. The hoca’s rituals, Dilek
stated, strengthened her so as to cope with
the situation, but of course could not
change it. Her seizures continued.
Several months later, her husband came
back home from his military service and de-
cided to rent a house in a town close to
Dilek’s family. She became pregnant for the
first time soon after.
Gül: a girl on her own
Gül was 19 years of age. She had always
known that her father’s support and control
would be very important at that age, but her
father had died years before. His death not
only meant suffering from the loss and eco-
nomic shortages, but also suffering from the
strict social control by her brothers and
a m c aoǧlu (father’s brother’s son). Girls with-
out a father are believed to show less re-
spect to elderly people and men.
Gül was actually very much concerned
about her behaviour and thus rejected
these ascriptions. Seen as unprotected by a
father, she herself felt instead unprotected
from public opinion. Women looking for a
suitable bride for their sons would not pre-
fer girls such as Gül, who in turn feared the
very idea of being married to a poor farmer
in need of a labourer, or a widower looking
for a woman to bring up his children.
When feeling insulted or excluded, Gül
would initally become angry and aggres-
sive, but would then faint. People began to
say she was p e r i l e n m i s (possessed by
demons) since she was under shock at her
father´s funeral. She, on the contrary, was
convinced that the anxiety about her repu-
tation, the brother’s strict control and her
fear of being married to somebody she did
not love had caused the crises. She went to
a hoca and kept stressing that she felt better
after the treatment. However, she also in-
sisted on a medical examination, which her
family could not afford. Several years later
she was married to a young man in the city
of Trabzon. Since that time Gül´s body has
remained quiet.
Hatice: a woman abroad
Hatice had been married to a relative liv-
ing in Vienna, Austria, where she was staying
for about 10 years when her bodily problems
began. At the climax of her crises she fre-
quently suffered from cardiac arrhythmia
and numbness of the limbs. She was
brought to a doctor several times and once
even to the hospital. Medical examination,
however, did not lead to any results but
rather confirmed that Hatice was physically
healthy. Hatice’s husband was convinced
that ‘there’s nothing wrong with her, she’s
calgılı, perilenmiş (possessed by demons)
and the whole affair is a matter for the h o c a.
I will send her to Turkey, there is nothing
they can do about it here.’
I accompanied her to Turkey and she in-
sisted on seeing a h o c a in the area of Ada-
pazarı, where we were staying in the house
of her father-in-law. This was surprising be-
cause I knew that Hatice usually used these
trips to Turkey to see her sisters and aunts in
Trabzon. It was, as I realized later on, not the
outstanding capacity of the hoca which led
us to this area but Hatice’s capacity to nego-
tiate a delicate situation.
The h o c a’ s interpretation after the Islamic
treatment of the c i n ( d e m o n ) was clear
enough. He first explained the fear, which
led to these crises, he spoke about the suf-
fering of women in foreign countries
(g u r b e t t e). And in the following interpreta-
tions of this suffering it turned out that Hat-
ice’s husband ‘had left the way of God’ and
was involved in a relationship with an Aus-
trian woman. Hatice´s mother-in-law got
the point, took her responsibility and called
her son to account. Two months later Hatice
was pregnant again and gave birth to a third
son. Since then she did not have any bodily
expressed problems anymore. Hatice could-
n’t talk about her husband’s behaviour to
anybody, she was too scared of getting di-
vorced. But she found a way to let her body
and the h o c a t a l k .
C i n c i l i k: 
confirmation or criticism?
At that time, most villagers believed that
demons could cause various complaints.
Women are much more often affected by
crises than men, a c i n c i - h o c a once stressed,
because they menstruate, become preg-
nant and give birth. In Islam, these events
are all signs of fertility but also of gender-
specific impurity. Body fluids are connected
to demons in general. Sperm, menstrual
blood, vaginal fluids, urine and faeces are
considered impure and, when leaving the
body, may attract demons. But whereas
men are able to control their body-fluids
and may restore their state of purity at any
time through purification rituals, female im-
purities must be suffered cyclically for a pe-
riod of time. Spirit possession occurs mainly
after the first menstruation, before or after
marriage and before the first pregnancy, pe-
riods during which respect for social rules is
particularly important.
Narratives on cincilik in this sense not only
report about women’s bodily crises but also
express their criticism of normative values
and their longing for social change. All
women mentioned in this contribution are
married today and all, even Dilek, have chil-
dren. The crises passed by, as soon as the
women changed the social situation they
were living in. These women were using the
languages of their bodies to express their
suffering. We do not yet know what kind of
language the next generation in Turkish vil-
lages will use facing new challenges in an
ongoing global integration after the Cold
War. But I am convinced the body will be im-
portant in finding a language for counter-
hegemonic strategies. ♦
Hoca designates several social functions but always indicates
well-educated and literate persons: teachers, imams, people
who are able to read and interpret the Koran and also different
kinds of healers. Depending on the urgency and duration of
the case, local healers (reading the Koran) or distant but well-
known cinci-hoca (masters of demons) are consulted. Their ser-
vices are demanded in the case of infertility, impotence, faint-
ing and other bodily expressed crises.
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D a n c e
AI S H A  AL I  
During the 19t h century, Algeria became familiar to
the Western world through the paintings of the
French Orientalists and, towards the end of the cen-
tury, through photographs of the elaborately
adorned dancers of the Ouled Naïl. A confederation
of tribes, the Ouled Naïl originate from the high
desert region and can be found living in towns such
as Bou Saada, Biskra and Chellala.
In the Middle East and North Africa it is gen-
erally assumed that a woman who dances
professionally is of questionable reputa-
tion. The dancers of the Ouled Naïl, howev-
er, were born into a tribe where the arts of
the entertainer were not only condoned,
but also valued and their young girls ap-
proached this profession free of inhibitions.
Their earnings in the form of gold and silver
coins were made into necklaces and other
jewellery that both ornamented their cos-
tumes and provided tangible evidence of
wealth. Once a sufficient dowry had been
amassed, they found no difficulty in finding
a suitable marriage partner among their
own people and raising a family.
The fame of the Ouled Naïl reached a high
point during the time of the French occupa-
tion, when they attracted a large patronage
from among the military personnel. After
Algeria’s independence, however, their
good fortune was not to last as demands
for their talents were once again limited to
performances at weddings and festivals for
a mainly local clientele.
Today there are fewer young women enter-
ing into the profession, and although their
costumes are still traditional, they have
changed to a certain extent. The silk bro-
cades, golden diadems and festoons of
coins are rarely seen. Now layers of di-
aphanous dresses are worn, sometimes
covered with a p a l l a, and their turbans and
headscarves are usually made of synthetic
materials. Some dancers completely cover
the face with a transparent veil, while oth-
ers wear no veil at all. Dancers who also
sing command a higher fee and their ca-
reers may continue to an advanced age.
The best known troupe of Ouled Naïl dan-
cers and musicians is located at Bou Saada,
where occasional tourists may still visit.
Many performances begin with a proces-
sion led by the musicians. The exciting call
of the g h a i t a (a folk oboe) and the women’s
high-pitched zaghareet (ululation) an-
nounce to all that there will be a perfor-
mance, and the audience gathers. When
they arrive at the stage area, the dancers
and musicians sit together on a platform
while the soloists and groups take their
turns. The men of the tribe also perform,
their repertoire including a rifle dance.
When dancing, the men of the Ouled Naïl
cover the lower part of their faces with a
portion of their head wraps in the manner
of the Tuaregs.
Some of the preceding material appears in Aisha Ali’s
contribution to the International Encyclopedia of
D a n c e (Oxford University Press), published in 1997 
as well as the booklet accompanying the ARAF
(Associated Research Arabic Folklore) CD, Music of the
Ouled Naïl.
Aisha Ali is a dancer, choreographer, dance
researcher, and producer of dance documentaries.
E-mail: aisha@aisha-ali.com
M I S C E L L A N E O U S
Dances of
t h e Ouled Naïl
In Chellala, tribes gather to set up their
tents at the times of festivals and holidays.
During the rug festival, the Ouled Naïl per-
form informally for the buyers and sellers of
carpets. Each tent shelters a different group
of singers, dancers and musicians. Some-
times a man sits at the entrance to encour-
age passers-by to enter. Here the dancers
are mostly women presenting the danse du
v e n t r e. As in the past, dance performances
continue to be an occasion for displaying
the attractions of the dancers to potential




M o r g e n l a n d e s ,
Z ü r i c h .
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N o t e s
1 . This article is based on research conducted with
the framework of a PhD in political science at
t h e Institut d’Etudes Politiques in Paris, under
t h e direction of Prof. Jean Leca. It is based on
interviews held with the employees and
management of Islamic relief organizations
i n France, the United Kingdom, Sudan, Egypt,
Bosnia, and Pakistan.
2 . Sometimes placed within the same category as
Islamic relief NGOs, the Red Cross societies have
nonetheless a specific status in that they belong to
the International Federation of Red Cross Societies
and the Red Cross and are expected to obey the
principles of the movement founded by Henry
Dunant in 1863: ‘humanity, impartiality, neutrality,
independence, voluntary service, unity,
u n i v e r s a l i t y . ’
3 . Brochure IIRO (in French).
4 .I b i d .
5 . This universality of action implies developments
a t the level of interpretation of the usage of
t h e z a k a t. For certain organizations like Islamic
Relief, the solution consists in differentiating
funds: the z a k a t funds are destined for Muslims
and other funds are allocated to projects that aim
at mixed populations.
6 . Tariq al-Kheir (1995), Summer (2), p. 7.
Jérôme Bellion-Jourdan is a PhD candidate in




J É R Ô M E  B E L L I O N - J OU R D A N
The predominant conception of international aid re-
mains anchored in a dualistic vision of the world: a
‘North’ considered wealthy and developed comes to
the rescue of a poor and under-developed ‘South’.
The ‘civilizing’ missions that justified 19t h- c e n t u r y
imperialism were substituted by themes – such as
‘third world-ism’ and development aid – of the sec-
ond half of the 20t h century. After the Biafra war, de-
fence of fundamental human rights begins to justify
claims to the ‘right to intervene’ as practised by non-
governmental organizations, such as Doctors with-
out Borders, setting the tone for what humanitarian
action should be. 
Islamic Relief




Despite its heterogeneity, the field of inter-
national aid seems to function according to
the North-South principle, the North often
being assimilated with the West and the
Judeo-Christian tradition. However, it should
be noted that this vision of international hu-
manitarian aid is incomplete: from the
Sudan to Afghanistan, to Bosnia, Kosovo, or
Chechnya, Islamic organizations have estab-
lished emergency programmes and devel-
opment projects. Generally ignored in the
numerous publications of international non-
governmental organizations, the activities
of these Islamic organizations also remain
unanalysed in the abundant and irregular
literature devoted to Islamist mobilizations.
In the latter type of publications, the role of
charitable associations of Islamic reference
has at times been dealt with, but the em-
phasis is placed on local associations that
have taken charge of activities that the
State does not fully assume (e.g. health care,
e d u c a t i o n ) .
Of particular interest are organizations that
develop activities at the trans-national level
and that are found in different zones in
‘ h umanitarian crisis’, and more generally,
w h e r e there are populations in need of as-
sistance. Thus, in Khartoum just as in Islam-
abad and Sarajevo, one obviously finds of-
fices of both Doctors without Borders and
the International Islamic Relief Organiza-
tion (IIRO). Created in 1978 in Jeddah as a
branch of the Islamic World League, the
IIRO is one of the many Islamic relief organi-
zations (al-ighatha al-islamiya) that have
come into existence since the late 70s. It
was then that those Islamic organizations
whose principle activity was oriented to-
wards teaching and the d a ’ w a (call to Islam)
invested in the field of humanitarian aid so
as to respond to two different situations.
On the one hand, there was the need to
face up to the humanitarian consequences
of famines and the wars affecting the
African continent. The Islamic African Relief
Agency (IARA) was created for this reason in
1981 in Khartoum as a humanitarian branch
of the Organization of the Islamic Call
(Da’wa Islamiya) to come to the aid of the
Ethiopian and Eritrean refugees in Sudan.
On the other hand, it was also necessary to
face the consequences of the war in
Afghanistan that broke out after the Soviet
invasion in 1979.
The Afghan war
The Afghan war incited numerous mobi-
lizations in the Muslim world, notably
amongst movements that advocate the es-
tablishment of an Islamic society, such as
the Muslim Brotherhood or the Jama’at i-Is-
lami. In the mid-1980s, several relief organi-
zations were created to come to the aid of
the Afghans: in 1985, the Egyptian Union of
Doctors created a humanitarian branch, the
Lajnat al-Ighatha al-Insaniya (Human Relief
Agency); in 1986, the Organization for Social
Reform in Kuwait created the Lajnat ad-
Da’wa al-Islamiya (Islamic Mission Agency)
to collect funds for Afghanistan; and in
1987, Yusuf Islam (formerly Cat Stevens –
pop singer converted to Islam) took the lead
of a collective of associations in England
and founded Muslim Aid. These organiza-
tions and others such as IIRO, the Islamic Re-
lief Agency (international network of the Su-
danese organization IARA), and Human
Concern International regrouped them-
selves in Peshawar as the Islamic Coordina-
tion Council, in which also Kuwaiti and
Saudi Red Cross associations take part.2
In order to analyse the development of
these organizations, one must place value
judgements aside and avoid the simple im-
plicit or explicit oppositions in which praise
is given to humanitarian aid and conde-
scension to Islamism: humanism / obscu-
rantism, liberalism / holism, political disin-
terest / interest. From all sides, the reality of
the situation is obviously more complex,
and the Islamic relief organizations do not
escape this complexity. It is a question of
looking at how they developed and en-
tered the field of international humanitarian
action. Would Islamic relief organizations be
irreducibly different from their Christian or
secular homologues? These organizations
constituted themselves in reaction to ‘West-
ern’ hegemony in the field of humanitarian
action: for that reason, they claim specifici-
ty, a rooting in the Islamic tradition. But si-
multaneously, their insertion in the field of
humanitarian action contributes to a refor-
mulation, even a re-interpretation, of this
tradition to be able to compose with the
dominant norms. Also, to analyse the prac-
tices of these organizations allows one to
see how they combine various registers of
a c t i o n .
They look to inscribe their action in the
heritage of the Islamic tradition of charity.
The emphasis is placed on the Qur’anic in-
junctions or the texts of the h a d i t h, which
call upon Muslims to do charitable works:
whether it be by the donning of z a k a t a n d
the s a d a q a, or the q u r b a n i, donation for the
occasion of sacrificial festival. With the ex-
ception of several Muslim countries that
have reintroduced an official system of
z a k a t collection (principally Pakistan and
Sudan), the practice of z a k a t is largely left to
private initiatives. It is in this ‘empty space’
that different types of z a k a t-collecting insti-
tutions have multiplied: from Islamic banks
to local z a k a t-collecting committees (such
as the lajnat al-zakat in Egypt) affiliated with
a mosque or an Islamic association. On their
side, the Islamic relief organizations intend
to re-develop a z a k a t practice at the level of
the u m m a: by a form of transnationalization
of the z a k a t, they become intermediaries
between donors and beneficiaries that are
culturally and geographically distant. Hence
organizations such as Islamic Relief or Mus-
lim Aid instil a policy of fundraising to con-
vince, for example, the practising Muslims
of France that it is legitimate to offer their
z a k a t to an organization based in England
for projects in Sudan, Kosovo, or Pakistan.
Universality of aid
Do only Muslim populations benefit from
the aid of these organizations? The question
is recurrent and points to the problem of
the universality of aid. This principle is rec-
ognized as fundamental in the field of con-
temporary international humanitarian ac-
tion: each and every human being should
be aided unconditionally. The universality
of aid reveals itself difficult to realize: the
logic of preference and the conditioning of
aid have not disappeared from the field of
international humanitarian aid. Most Islamic
relief organizations do not conceal the fact
that they develop projects in which priority
is given to those that benefit Muslim popu-
lations. This is based on three reasons: polit-
ical, pragmatic, and dogmatic. The political
reason has to do with the fact that the con-
cerned organizations hold a worldview that
identifies ‘Islamic causes’, from Bosnia or
Kashmir to Palestine, where the victims are
Muslims and (it is often added) are victims
precisely b e c a u s e they are Muslims. This
form of ‘martyrologie’ justifies an aid that
gives priority to the Muslim ‘brothers’. This
political dimension is supported by a prag-
matic one: it is often repeated, as in the
brochure of the International Islamic Relief
Organization, that ‘more than 80% of the
refugees and victims of war and disaster in
the world are Muslim’.3 Finally, the dogmat-
ic reason: according to certain interpreta-
tions, the z a k a t should be collected and dis-
tributed within the Muslim community.
These three dimensions seem to justify a
particularistic aid in which only members of
the Muslim community may benefit.
Nevertheless, according to their brochures,
the organizations’ intentions are to offer aid
‘according to purely humanitarian criteria
devoid of any ethnic, linguistic, or religious
d i s t i n c t i o n ’ .4 The idea of non-differentiation
of beneficiaries of aid which characterizes
modern humanitarian aid seems to have be-
come the norm for Islamic relief organiza-
tions. In fact, they do not exclude coming to
the aid of non-Muslims. Intervening in
zones where there are groups of various ori-
gins (e.g. refugee camps), the organizations
are more and more concerned with demon-
strating the universality of their actions: for
Islamic Relief, the beneficiaries are all those
populations in need, whether it be for pro-
jects in Bosnia or in Africa, or for the distrib-
ution of warm meals for the homeless in
F r a n c e .5
However, the displayed universality of aid
does not necessarily have the same signifi-
cance. Three explanatory types for this
demonstrated universality can be retained.
Within the Islamic relief organizations, the
‘d a ’ w a-ist’ attitude towards aid is always
present: it justifies the universality of aid by
the universal ambition of Islam as a religion
destined for the whole of humanity. The
principal of non-differentiation of beneficia-
ries is thus distorted in the sense that a dis-
tinction amongst beneficiaries is in fact op-
erated between Muslims and the others, for
whom there is hope of conversion. In cer-
tain organizations, universality rejoins more
the problematic of the notion of ‘third
world’: compassion for human misery marks
most notably the workers who have been ‘in
the field’ and is sometimes accompanied by
bitter criticism of the inequalities and the di-
vision of resources at the global level. An ex-
ample of this caricature was published in
Tariq al-Kheir, information brief produced
by Islamic Relief: an obese man struggling
on his stationary bicycle to try and lose
weight, is shown in front of a television re-
port displaying an image of a rachitic
A f r i c a n .6 The demonstrated universality is
equally a question of marketing: just as their
Christian or secularized homologues, Islam-
ic relief organizations do not escape the
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Southe ast  As i a
AH MA D  F.  Y O U S I F
The Sultanate of Brunei Darussalam, located on the
island of Borneo, has a small but diverse population.
The majority of the population adheres to Islam,
which is manifest at many levels of Brunei society. In-
deed, this monarchy is founded upon the teachings
of Islam and the state supports the institutional de-
velopment of the faith. A third of the population,
however, belongs to various non-Muslim faiths, with
their own religious institutions and organizations,
particularly among the ethnic Chinese community. 
Religious Life and
Institutions in Brunei
The Sultanate of Brunei Darussalam has a
population of 323,600. Slightly over two-
thirds of this number comprise ethnic Malays,
the majority of which are Sunni Muslims who
follow the Shafici madhab. Other ethnic Malay
groups include, amongst others, the Muruts
and Dusuns, most of whom practice animism
and shamanism – although a few have con-
verted to Christianity and Islam. Ethnic Chi-
nese account for 15% of the population and
generally adhere to Buddhism, Taoism, Con-
fucianism, or to Christianity, a handful having
converted to Islam.
The 1991 census indicated that 67% of the
population of Brunei Darussalam identified
themselves as Muslims, 13% Buddhists, 10%
Christians, and the remaining 10% as ‘other’
(including free-thinkers, Hindus, Sikhs, Bahais,
or undeclared.) Although Islam is the official
religion, religious minorities have the right to
observe their religious values and traditions.
In this regard, the Constitution of the State of
Brunei (1959) holds that ‘the religion of the
State shall be the Muslim religion, provided
that all other religions may be practised in
peace and harmony by the persons profess-
ing them in any part of the State.’
Islamic values, traditions and ethics have
been incorporated and manifested within
Brunei culture, society and politics. The con-
cept of the MIB (Melayu Islam Beraja or Malay
Muslim Monarchy) has been the cornerstone
of the religio-political philosophy of Brunei,
which stresses the importance of maintaining
the Malay race, language, culture and Muslim
religion of the nation.
The significance of the MIB concept was af-
firmed during the reign of Sultan Haji Omar
Ali Saifuddien (1950-1967), when it became
officially recognized in the 1959 Brunei Con-
stitution, and even more so upon Brunei’s de-
claration of independence on 1 January 1984.
On this occasion, Sultan Haji Hassanal Bolkiah
asserted that Brunei Darussalam would be
‘forever a sovereign, democratic and inde-
pendent Malay Muslim Monarchy [founded]
upon the teaching of Islam according to Ahli
al-Sunnah wa al-Jamaah and […] the princi-
ple of liberty, trust and justice.’
Religious institutions and
o r g a n i z a t i o n s
Religious institutions for both Muslims and
non-Muslims are scattered around the coun-
try. According to the Department of Mosque
Affairs, there were 102 mosques and prayer-
halls as of 1999, including two major state
mosques, Masjid Omar Ali Saifuddien and
Jame’ Asr Hassanal Bolkiah , both of which are
considered major tourist attractions. There
are seven Christian churches, most of which
are Catholic. There are also three Chinese
temples and two small Indian temples. Al-
though the small Sikh community in Brunei
(approximately 500 people) has no official re-
ligious institutions, weekly services are held in
member’s homes.
The majority of Islamic organizations or
departments in Brunei are established and
maintained by the government. The Min-
istry of Religious Affairs, established in 1986,
is comprised of five different departments,
namely, Mosque, Hajj, Islamic Studies, Islam-
ic Law, and Islamic Da’wah (propagation)
C e n t r e .
The Islamic Da’wah Centre is responsible
for the propagation and expansion of Islam-
ic teachings among both Muslims and non-
Muslims in Brunei. It also undertakes re-
search and studies on Islam-related sub-
jects, publishes Islamic books, pamphlets,
and periodicals and networks with other
Muslim countries by exchanging informa-
tion and organizing conferences, seminars
and meetings on various Islamic issues. The
Centre’s Publication Control and Censor
Unit censors books, periodicals, journals,
and newspapers which contradict Islamic
belief and teachings.
In recent years, a number of Islamic eco-
nomic institutions have been established in
Brunei, supervised by specialists in the
sharia, Islamic economics and finance.
Among these institutions are the Tabung
Amanah Islam Brunei (TAIB), an Islamic trust
fund founded in 1991, the Islamic Bank of
Brunei (IBB) and Insurance Islam TAIB, both
of which were established in 1993. The IBB
provides a variety of financial and commer-
cial services and transactions such as a l - w a-
d i a h (savings deposit), and a l - m u d h a r a b a h
(profit sharing), which function according to
sharia principles. Insurance Islam TAIB pro-
vides and facilitates different kinds of Islam-
ic insurance for individuals, families and
groups, including coverage
for accidents that may take
place during Hajj and
U m r a h .
The government also es-
tablished the Mulaut Abat-
toir in August 1990, under
the auspices of the Agricul-
ture Department. The Abat-
toir provides slaughtering
facilities to local farmers and
butchers to enable them to
slaughter their livestock ac-
cording to the requirements
of Islamic law. The Abattoir
also offers services for vari-
ous Islamic rituals. Certif i c a-
tion by the Abattoir guar-
antees that all meat prod-
ucts sold, bought, or
cooked, fulfil Islamic re-
quirements. Furthermore,
the newly established Ha-
laqah Food store markets
all kinds of halal meat
products, while the Brunei Meat Company
(BMC) maintains several branches in the
country to sell halal meat to the public.
There are, however, a number of non-halal
restaurants in the country that cater to non-
Muslims. In addition, most supermarkets have
a partitioned section for non-halal meat and
food products.
N o n - g o v e r n m e n t a l
o r g a n i z a t i o n s
There are only a few non-governmental Is-
lamic religious organizations in the country.
These include the National Association of
Qur’anic Reciters and Memorizers (IQRA),
which trains and assists members in reading
and memorizing the Qur’an, the New (Mus-
lim) Converts Association and the Ikhwan al-
Muslimeen, based in the district of Kuala Be-
lait. Of these groups, only the first two are
genuinely active.
In addition to the above organizations, Sufi
groups or tariqahs (mystical orders), particu-
larly al-Ahmadiyyah and al-Naqshabandiyyah
have also established themselves in the coun-
try. Some of these tariqahs trace their roots di-
rectly to the Middle East, while others entered
Brunei via neighboring countries such as In-
donesia and Malaysia. Many of these groups
engage in Mawlud Dhikir, a socio-religious
ceremony in which religious poems are read
and chanted.
Non-governmental organizations are more
numerous amongst non-Muslim communi-
ties: more than 40 socio-religious and cultural
Chinese associations have been established
in Brunei. These include dialect locality
groups, trade-occupational, cultural-recre-
ational, mutual help/benevolent, religious
and community-wide associations. The pri-
mary Christian association in Brunei is the
Borneo Evangelical Society, which is an um-
brella organization operating on behalf of
Christians on the Island of Borneo (i.e. includ-
ing the East Malaysian states of Sabah and
Sarawak). In addition, there are two Indian-re-
lated associations in Brunei. The oldest is the
50-year-old Hindu Welfare Board, which func-
tions as a Hindu religious organization with
approximately 3000 members. The second
major Indian organization is the 43-year-old
Indian Association, which is a social organiza-
tion for the Indian community and has 300
registered members.
Religious education
The 20th century witnessed the growth and
development of Islamic religious education in
Brunei. In 1956, seven full-time Islamic
schools were officially opened. Since then,
the number of religious schools has increased
to 115 (1999 figures).
Religious (ugama) classes are also taught in
the public schools. The majority of students
have four hours a week of Islamic studies at
the elementary level and three hours at the
secondary level. Under the ‘new system’,
which is presently in operation in fifteen
schools in the country, Islamic instruction has
been increased to eight hours per week for el-
ementary students and six at the secondary
level.
Islamic education is also promoted in
schools and colleges affiliated with the Min-
istry of Religious Affairs where traditional Is-
lamic subjects are taught in both Malay and
Arabic. Some of the more renowned religious
institutes in the country are the Sultan Haji
Hassanal Bolkiah Tahfiz al-Qur’an Institute,
the Brunei College of Islamic Studies (Ma’had)
and the Religious Teachers Training College
(Maktab Perguruan Ugama). The Sultan Haji
Hassanal Bolkiah Tahfiz al-Qur’an Institute, lo-
cated in the heart of the capital of Brunei, op-
erates under the Ministry of Education, and
presently accommodates 105 male and 40 fe-
male students. The Institute was established
to produce Qur’anic prodigies who could fur-
ther their studies in academic institutions
overseas, particularly Arab countries.
The Brunei College of Islamic Studies
(Ma’had) in Tutong and the Religious Teach-
ers Training College (Maktab Perguruan
Ugama) operate under the auspices of the
Ministry of Religious Affairs. The Ma’had is an
Islamic secondary school which accommo-
dates approximately 500 students, who study
for a duration of five years. The Maktab offers
a three-year training programme for more
than 400 students in an effort to qualify them
to teach in religious schools around the coun-
try. At the tertiary level, the Sultan Haji Omar
Ali Saifuddin Institute of Islamic Studies at the
University of Brunei Darussalam (UBD) pro-
vides three different areas of specialization –
Islamic Law, Theology and Propagation, and
Arabic Language. Presently, more than 300
students are registered in its undergraduate
and postgraduate programmes.
A number of Christian-based schools, es-
tablished during the colonial period, are still
in operation today. Such schools include St.
George’s and St. Andrew’s in BSB, and St.
Michel’s and St. Angela’s school in Seria.
There are eight Chinese schools in Brunei
managed by the Chinese community, includ-
ing the well-known Chung Hwa Middle
School in the country’s capital. It should be
noted that non-Muslim students at St.
George’s, St. Andrew’s, and Chung Hwa, have
recently been required to take a Kefahaman
Islam (Islamic understanding) course, on a
trial basis.
M e d i a
Islam is well represented in the local print
and electronic media. For example, Radio-
Television Brunei (RTB) devotes more than 20
hours a week to religious or religious-related
television programming. Religious input in-
cludes a short Qur’anic recitation to begin
and close broadcasting every day, daily
broadcasts of the Azan (call to prayer), cover-
age of the weekly Friday khutbahs or religious
sermons, congregational prayers, lectures
and forums, the annual Qur’an competition,
Islamic entertainment shows and songs, and
Muslim festivals and celebrations.
The government also funds Nurul-Islam
(Light of Islam) radio station and the National
Radio Station (Rangkaian Nasional). Both sta-
tions broadcast Qur’anic recitations, the call
to prayer, Friday prayers, and other cere-
monies and activities.
Islamic values, traditions and ethics contin-
ue to be incorporated and manifested within
Brunei culture, society and politics in the
modern period. Although the government
has played a significant role in creating and
developing Islamic religious, educational and
financial institutions, as well as supporting Is -
lamic programmes in the media, religious mi-
norities have maintained the right to observe
their own religious values and traditions. ♦
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So uth As ia
A N N E - H É L È N E  T R O T T I E R
Ever since Islam came to Bengal in the 13t h c e n t u r y
(and probably earlier, through individual Muslims’
interaction with local bearers of other traditions) it
participated, via a merging of Sufi inputs with ver-
nacular strands of Vaisnavism (Vishnuism), tantrism
and local folk cults, in a very rich blend of religious
beliefs and practices in the lower strata of society.
The Fakir, as a sub-section of the Bengali B-a u l with a
more or less defined Muslim identity, are at present
the largest group in Bengal perpetuating this form of
‘Islamic syncretistic tradition’, to use Asim Roy’s
p h r a s e .1 In the complex picture of present-day reli-
gious politics of East and West Bengal, and in the
context of Bangladesh as the second largest Muslim
country in the world, these Fakir seem, somewhat
paradoxically, to be both under threat and very
much alive as contributors to local spiritual and cul-
tural vitality at a grassroots level.
A Case of Grassroots
Syncretic Sufism
The Fakir of Bengal
In territorial Bengal (i.e. the area comprising
present-day Indian West Bengal and
Bangladesh), folk religious syncretism has
over the centuries produced a variety of
cults and sects, amongst which the B-a u l
emerged in the late 15t h century as a major
group strongly influenced by Caitanya Vais-
nav devotion and (post?–) Buddhist s a h a j iy-a
tantrism. After Caitanya, the next figure of
historic importance for the B-a u l was that of
L-alan Shah or L-alan Fakir (?1774-?1890).
Whereas Caitanya belongs to a sectarian
Hindu movement that extends far beyond
Bengal and has its focal mythological an-
chorage outside Bengal (in Vrindavan and
Mathura), L-a l a n is a product and proponent
of purely Bengali syncretism. His hagiogra-
phy and his teachings tell a story of merging
Hinduism and Islam into a universalistic reli-
gion transcending the boundaries of any
single religion. As such, he is par excellence
the B-a u l figure that all present-day B-a u l a n d
Fakir identify with, to a greater extent than
with Caitanya. The K u s h t i-a district (now in
Bangladesh) where he spent most of his life
and where his tomb is located, is in the
heartland of territorial Bengal, and very
much a central point in the geographical
distribution of the B-a u l.
Before addressing B-a u l/Fakir syncretism in
the present religious configuration of the
two Bengals, brief reference should be
made to the past development of Bengali Is-
lamic syncretism.
The development of Bengali
Islamic syncretism
The spread of Islam in Bengal2 was largely
rural, village-based, and the result of the in-
teraction of immigrant Sufis with local pre-
Aryan and Hindu cults and yogic and tantric
practices and beliefs. Such interaction con-
tributed, as early as the 13t h- 1 4t h c e n t u r i e s ,
both to the development of local forms of
what would later be termed ‘heterodox
cults’ and ‘folk Islam’, and to the expansion
of agriculture over a largely untouched ter-
ritory of jungle, marshes and waterways.
Islam thus extended its presence as a reli-
gion of the axe and plough, creating settle-
ments and producing something of a ‘civi-
lizing’ effect. It was, however, far removed
from canonical Islam and far more a matter
of saint cult. Bengali grassroots syncretism
was a case of assimilating a new form of di-
vine force, or grace, into an already multi-
form substratum and a case of this addition
– Islam – not being intrinsically or transcen-
dentally powerful, but one of its being rele-
vant through the charisma of individual
leaders. The latter were the Sufi saints who
were living embodiments and mediators of
the new divine grace, and who did not claim
this to replace the older substratum as a
new religion. The case is thus not one of
straight conversion to Islam, but of
active/interactive forms of syncretism that
depend not on the pre-eminence of a tran-
scendent divinity but on the latter’s merg-
ing with, and thereby enriching, another
pre-existing ordaining of the universe. In
this process it is the living saint as a human-
and-divine person who is the crucial actor,
crystallizing and catalyzing people’s aspira-
tions and beliefs in both the other-worldly
and this-worldly dimensions of human life.
These saints were simultaneously spiritual
leaders, warlords and rulers for their con-
stituencies, who would recognize allegiance
only to them.
Such local forms of Islamic syncretism
flourished in rural Bengal, particularly in the
eastern areas, until a new development ap-
peared on the scene of Bengali Islam a cou-
ple of centuries ago. Under British rule,
there emerged amongst the elites of the In-
dian subcontinent a sense of religious iden-
tity – both Hindu and Muslim. In the 19t h
century, the Muslim upper classes of Bengal,
who had clung to an idealized and frozen
self-image of ethnic and Islamic purity con-
nected with their immigrant (Turkic,
Afghan) origins and deliberately discon-
nected from the ethnic and religious reali-
ties of the local populations, woke up to the
reality of their having somehow taken root
in the land of Bengal and to the fact that the
people over which they ruled were dread-
fully un-Islamic by their Koranic criteria.
Vigorous efforts were launched by ortho-
dox Muslim leaders to eradicate the impure
vernacular from Bengali Islam. The conver-
sion to ‘pure’ Islam often went hand in hand
with laudable efforts at improving the social
and economic conditions of the lowest stra-
ta. In some places, open persecution hit the
more heterodox groups, calling for total an-
nihilation of all cults of a B-a u lt y p e .3 Such re-
formist movements continued into the 20t h
century, and are still at work today. Fatwas
specifically against the B-a u l and Fakir are
documented in the literature.
The current situation
What is the picture now, considering that
in Bangladesh the Muslim population has
grown to 90% of the total – the Hindu popu-
lation having dwindled due to emigration
and considering that in Indian Bengal, com-
munal hostility is alive as elsewhere in
northern India? More than ever, B-a u l a n d
Fakir tradition-bearers invoke the anti-com-
munal teachings of L -a l a n, whose time was
precisely that of growing reformist action in
Bengal encouraging in both communities a
sense of religious identity fraught with po-
tential for conflict. L-a l a n was a child and
lover of his particular motherland, Bengal,
where the ‘little people’ had traditionally
been mutual integrators of creeds and rites
rather than opponents on communalistic
g r o u n d s .
Of the many syncretistic heterodox
groups and movements of the past docu-
mented in 19t h and 20t h-century literature,
many seem to have disappeared. Members
of such groups have gone more or less un-
derground under pressure and persecution,
so it is difficult to assess what remains alive.
But L-a l a n and Fakir presence is very much a
reality alongside that of another universalis-
tic group, the K a rt-a b h a j-a (in central Bengal).
The B-a u l and Fakir remain the largest extant
group at present, numbering perhaps sever-
al hundred thousand persons.
The Hindu B-a u l and the Muslim Fakir share
the same tenets of an esoteric quest based
on the intimate human-divine connection
within every human being, cultivated
through a philosophy and practices that
emphasize the human body as locus and
means for finding the essence of God. The
path is taught in the traditional guru-disci-
ple relationship where the guru is like the
figure of the above-mentioned Sufi saint, in
whom the divine is accomplished, merged
with the human.
The Fakir call themselves B-a u l. The B-a u li n
a Hindu setting do not call themselves Fakir
but Vaisnav – it may be that the differentia-
tion is connected with the influence of the
respective surrounding mainstream reli-
gions. At any rate, and significantly, it ap-
pears empirically that there is more syn-
cretism on the Fakir side than on the B-a u l;
the latter, in West Bengal at least, leaning
more towards a strongly Vaisnav type of de-
votion, while the Fakir of central territorial
Bengal bring together the different strands.
As one Fakir of K u s h ti -a told me: ‘There is
Allah in every human being. Caitanya is the
synthesis of R-a dh-a and Krisna, thereby there
is Allah in Caitanya.’
Continued syncretism?
There is still considerable interaction in
northern Bangladesh4 between the hetero-
dox Fakir and more mainstream imams,
Sufis and m o l l a h s (figures of authority in the
mosque and the m a d r a s a). All-night de-
bates are held between leading proponents
of the two approaches. Some orthodox
Muslims are known to have substantial
affinities with the heterodox tradition.5 I n
the lower strata of the population, but also
increasingly in the educated urban elite,
many people can be attracted to a charis-
matic B-a u l guru, learn B-a u l songs, and seek
initiation. Thus the syncretic approach with-
in the context of an Islamic country still ex-
i s t s .
However, the syncretic tendency, appar-
ently the ‘natural’ one of the children of the
Bengali motherland, is not the only factor at
hand: there is the continued reformist aspi-
ration of mainstream Islam. Many B-a u l a n d
Fakir have been subjected to harassment
and persecution in recent decades and, at
another level, there is the appropriation by
institutions of the vivid folklore surrounding
the figure of L-a l a n, increasingly taken over
by cultural authorities as part of an official
Bangladeshi identity and heritage. The
shrine of L-a l a n at K u s h ti-a is no longer in the
hands of the Fakir wise men; L-a l a n ’ s a n-
niversary festival is now officially organized
by the local authorities. The food, tradition-
ally given free to Fakir and B-a u l initiates, had
to be paid for at the 1999 festival, a major
breach of an age-old rule. The local govern-
ment has a construction plan underway for
a big cultural complex near the shrine. By
turning L -a l a n into a ‘respectable’ part of
Bangladeshi heritage, will the political and
religious powers-that-be succeed in steriliz-
ing this still lively force of counterculture in-
herent in Bengali syncretism? Bangladesh is
still a frontier land, from an Islamic, cultural,
economic, and developmental point of
view. As long as the spirit of L -a l a n is alive,
say the Fakir, there is much this countercul-
ture can contribute. ♦
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Theories of cultural stagnation and decline or of
modernization’s devastation in the realm of Sufism
have not only figured in orientalist or social science
repertoires. Conversing with contemporary Iranian
Sufis, one comes across a remarkable consensus: the
Safawid rise to state power coincided with the
eclipse of Sufism’s radiant sun in Iran, and it has
never since regained its former brilliance. Whether
such views hold true in the history of ideas or at the
strictly literary level remains for specialists to decide.
However, various social and political transforma-
tions that have conditioned Iranian Sufism as it is
presently known, contradict the idea of Sufism’s
stagnant and therefore negligible religiosity.
Roots of modern
S hicite Sufism in Iran
The long-term survival and modern devel-
opment of Sufism in Iran has its foundation
in the N ecm a t o ll -a hı̄ order’s 18t h - c e n t u r y
socio-political renaissance, after the fall of
the Safawids. In the 19t h century, religiously
influential Sufis found royal patronage in
the courts of the late Qajar shahs. Sufi spiri-
tual authority was sometimes conceptual-
ized as a worldly realm, autonomous from
royal or jurist power. These Iranian develop-
ments were contemporaneous with increas-
ing repression of Sufis by reformist jurists
elsewhere in the 18t h and 19t h-century Is-
lamic world. While Sufism in Turkey and
Egypt suffered from 20t h-century modernist
regimes and subsequently declined, the
S ol.tā nca lı̄šā hı̄ - N ecm a t o l lā hı̄ order redefined
its traditional, S h ici t e Sufi religiosity in the
face of 20t h-century modernity, and ex-
p a n d e d .
Sufism and the nation-state
Nationalist modernization in the early
Pahlavi polity (1921-1941) has been associ-
ated with the repression of Sufism as a com-
ponent of anti-religious policy. However,
there are also different accounts that defy
the alleged incongruity of religion and na-
tionalist modernization. While the national-
ist historian Ahmad Kasravi proclaimed that
all books of the Sufis had to be thrown into
the fire, Sufism made its way into school-
books. The shah himself, Reza Shah, is re-
ported to have been closely associated with
the Sufi member of parliament Sheikh ol-
Molk Owrang.
In the S ol .tā nca lı̄šā hı̄ order, the state con-
text of nationalist modernization made its
impact upon Sufi religiosity. Where formerly
the community of believers in general had
been a target audience, Sufi leaders now
specifically targeted the Iranian nation. In
order to support his claim for the
S ol.tā nca lı̄šā hı̄ leadership, Nū rca lı̄šā h ( d . 1 9 1 8 ) ,
for instance, ‘issued a proclamation […] in
which he called upon the nation to accept
him as its head.’1 His claim was challenged
by K e y vā nQ a z vı̄nı̄ (d.1938), who in 1926 de-
parted from the Sufi path as it was predom-
inantly known in Iran.2
While Q a z vı̄nı̄ witnessed the shah’s de-
molition of the traditional clergy’s religious
institutions, it is unlikely to have eluded him
that ‘some audacious thinkers attempted to
reconcile […] intellectual modernism with a
renewal of religion.’3 The sermons of the in-
fluential ayatollah S a n g e laǧı̄ ( 1 8 9 0 - 1 9 4 4 ) ,
for instance, attracted many from the state
and societal elite. Central among his ideas
was the need for a more rigorous monothe-
ism that would do away with the belief in sa-
cred intermediaries, i.e. the imams, and
their ‘intercession’ (š e fā 'a t ). The ‘emulation’
(t a q l ı̄ d) of moǧ t a h e ds ought to be replaced
by everyman’s direct ‘interpretation’
(eǧ t h eā d) of the sacred sources.
While S a n g e laǧı̄ attacked S h ici t e t a q lı̄ d,
Q a z vı̄nı̄ assaulted the traditional authority
structure of master and disciple, and juxta-
posed the ‘formalist’ (r a s mı̄) Sufism of Sufi
orders to ‘true’ (.h a qı̄ qı̄ ) Sufism. At its core
lay the idea that mysticism could be a mod-
ern scientific enterprise. The 1930 version of
his Book of Mysticism (cE r fā n - nā m e) used the
measure of the modern age: the Gregorian
c a l e n d a r .
Q a z vı̄nı̄ ’ s Sufism was strongly con-
demned by the S ol.tā nca lı̄šā hı̄ s: ‘One cannot
count this to be Islamic Sufism anymore, it
was a new religion.’ They furthermore
protested that ‘sometimes [Q a z vı̄nı̄ w a s ]
particularly interested in the Wahhabi reli-
gion’ and that ‘like the Sunnis, he did not
recognise “being divinely chosen” (na .s.s)
and “authorisation” (eǧā z e) as necessary
c o n d i t i o n s . ’4 In other words: in attacking all
established S h ici t e bases of spiritual author-
ity, Q a z vı̄nı̄ was a heretic unbeliever.
Q a z vı̄nı̄ ’ s challenge presents a distinctly
modernist struggle: not only personal
claims to spiritual authority were ques-
tioned, but also the nature of authority it-
self. In addition, his questioning of Sufi au-
thority had the nation-state as an organiz-
ing motif. He outlined a vision of ‘classes in
society [that] are like organs in the body,
[and] that must be present in the society to
the extent that they are necessary, not too
much and not too little, otherwise [society]
would become defective like the man with
four eyes and one hand, or four feet and one
tooth’. Of the clergy, few were functional. If
there were many clergymen, there would be
more corruption (cE r fā n - nā m e, p. 313). Even
less leniency was left over in his considera-
tion of Sufism. In Q a z vı̄nı̄ ’ s f u n c t i o n a l i s t
mode of reasoning, the organ of traditional
Sufism was not only un-Islamic, but nation-
ally dysfunctional (p. 311).
Admonitory advice
After Nūrca lı̄ šā h died in 1918, his son
.Sā le .hca lı̄šā h (d.1966) assumed the order’s
leadership. His position was enhanced by
well-to-do and influential affiliates, includ-
ing the premier Q avā m o s - S al .t a n a. There
are, moreover, several narratives of direct
contacts between the S ol .tānca lı̄šā hı̄s a n d
Reza Shah, which concerned one son
.Sā le .hca lı̄ šā h ’ s sheikhs, Ayatollah cA b d o llā h
H. a ' e rı̄ Mazanderani. Before his ascent to
power, Reza Shah had been impressed in an
encounter with Hā ' e rı̄ , who predicted: ‘You
will be shah’, and added that the king-to-be
ought to treat the people right.5
The present leader of the order, 
Maǧ-zūb
ca lı̄ šā h, recollected three reproach-
es during the Reza Shah era: the
S ol .tānca lı̄ šā hı̄s were accused of smoking
opium, of bribing judges, and Q a z vı̄nı̄ h a d
written that son .Sā le .hca lı̄šā h pretended to
kingship. Maǧ-zūb
ca lı̄ šā h also recollected a
visit by Reza Shah during which the king re-
quested – to the background of these alle-
gations – the writing of an instruction from
which it would become manifest what con-
stituted legitimate Sufi behaviour. The man-
uscript that resulted in 1939 was ‘ .Sā le .h ’ sA d-
vice’ (Pand-e .Sā le .h), a booklet which more
than any other established the
S ol .tānca lı̄ šā hı̄s as a legitimate religious
force in modern Iran. According to another
manifesto, the booklet became ‘a house-
hold word amongst the religious of Iran.’
The order’s respectable mission aimed at
the broadest possible audience, as P a n d - e
Sā le .h ‘makes clear for the ordinary man and
woman how to practice this moral and spiri-
tual discipline [of Sufism], and so to enjoy
the fruits of the spirit in daily life in this
w o r l d . ’6 Pand-e Sā le .h was recently observed
to be ‘a work filled with platitudes and hack-
neyed moral exhortations, the mystical con-
tent of which is insignificant.’7 Whether or
not one accepts this qualification, there is
indeed nothing in it that would put
S ol.tā nca lı̄šā hı̄ Sufis up against the national,
societal or stately order. When son
Sā le .hca lı̄ šā h did call upon the state, it was in
a bid for support of traditional crafts and in-
dustries, a token of the (great) nation of
I r a n .8
C o m m u n a l i s m
National integration had been a cause of
great concern for Kasravi, who had ‘focused
on the question of communalism in [his
treatise] S u f i g a r i’, and held Sufism, as a reli-
gious sect, among the primary causes of na-
tional disintegration.9 But Nūrca lı̄ šā h h a d
promised ‘to remove all discord from the
nation in the space of two years’ (if only the
nation would recognize him as its spiritual
l e a d e r ) .1 0 Son Sā le .hca lı̄ šā h had not verbally
countered Kasravi’s assault, but Sā le .h ’ s n a-
tional advice (Pand-e Sā le .h) contradicted
any potential challenge in Sufi authority
and developed the S ol.tā nca lı̄šā hı̄ order in
ways to make it seem idle.
One finds traces of modern S h ici t e S u f i s m
in the S ol.tā nca lı̄šā hı̄ order, then, not only in
the conspicuously revolutionary innova-
tions of Q a z vı̄nı̄ . It is also to be found in
Nūrca lı̄ šā h ’ s nation-wide appeal for spiritual
recognition and national unity, and in the
streamlined religiosity which stories sur-
rounding Pand-e .Sā le .h claim was commis-
sioned by the (state’s) leader of the nation.
Thus, the S ol .tā nca lı̄šā hı̄ order evolved from
being a powerful but localized f e r q e ( s e c t )
into, to some outward extent at least, be-
coming a subdued but nationally integrated
socio-religious organization. ♦
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So uth As ia
Y O G I N D E R  S I K A N D
The more than a decade-old civil war in the disputed
region of Jammu and Kashmir, which till today shows
no sign of abating, has resulted in the death of an esti-
mated 40,000 people. Inter-community relations,
which have historically been relatively cordial as com-
pared to the rest of South Asia, have sharply deterio-
rated, and today a gulf of hostility and suspicion sepa-
rates Hindus and Muslims. However, despite this hard-
ening of communal boundaries, at the popular level
many Muslims, Sikhs and Hindus in the Jammu
province continue to share a common religious cul-
ture, centred round the shrines (dargahs) of Sufi saints. 
The Sufi Shrines 
of Jammu
Jammu is popularly known as the ‘City of
Temples’, owing to its large number of
Hindu shrines. However, Jammu is also
home to numerous Sufi d a r g a h s, which are
important centres of pilgrimage, bringing
together people of different castes and
communities. In this, these shrines play a
unique role, there being no other such
structures which perform a similar function.
In a society where caste and religious differ-
ences are so marked, this role of the shrines
is a particularly important one. For the Hin-
dus and Sikhs who flock to the shrines, the
buried Sufis are seen as powerful spiritual
beings (d e v t a s) that can grant them their
wishes. For the Muslim devout, they are
considered to be intermediaries (w a s i l a h o r
z a r i y a), who can plead with God on their
behalf in times of need, to have their re-
quests fulfilled.
The following article deals, briefly, with
the principal Sufi d a r g a h s of Jammu town.
It may be noted here that although these
are Muslim shrines, they are today, for the
most part, frequented more by Hindus than
by Muslims. Muslims form only a very small
proportion of the population of Jammu
town. In the 1947 Partition riots, Jammu
saw a large-scale slaughter of Muslims, with
thousands killed and many more forced to
flee to Pakistan. Jammu town was almost
completely depleted of its Muslim popula-
tion, and it was only from the 1950s on-
wards that small numbers of Muslims
began settling here from other parts of the
s t a t e .
We now turn to a brief discussion of the
major Sufi d a r g a h s in Jammu town.
Pir Raushan cA l i S h a h
The first major Sufi to come to the Jammu
region was Pir Raushan cA l i Shah, whose
d a r g a h is located at Gumat, in Jammu town.
Some believe him to have been one of the
Prophet’s companions (s a h a b i) ,1 but Kardar
estimates his arrival to have been in the
1 3t h century, before Timur’s invasion of
North India.2 He is said to have performed
many miracles, by which the Raja was so
impressed that he became his devotee and
requested him to settle in his city. When the
Pir died, the Raja laid him to rest with full
honours and had a grave of stone and mud
constructed for him. The grave is a simple,
dome-less structure some 20 feet (9 g a z)
long, hence its name, Maqbara Naugazan.
The saint is also remembered as Naugazi
Pir, apparently because he measured 9 g a z
in height. Today, his d a r g a h is a major place
of local pilgrimage. Both Hindus and Mus-
lims light little clay lamps and place them in
an alcove adjacent to the grave, in the hope
of the Pir being able to help them. His cu r s,
the festival commemorating his death,
which attracts thousands of people from
Jammu, Kashmir and Punjab, is held every
D e c e m b e r .
Pir Lakhdata
The name l a k h d a t a literally means ‘the
giver of hundreds of thousands’. It signifies
this Pir’s status as a giver of Sufi wisdom.
The d a r g a h of Pir Lakhdata is located in a
bazaar named after him in the heart of
Jammu town. The life of Pir Lakhdata is
shrouded in mystery. He is said to have been
a close associate of Guru Nanak, the first
guru of the Sikhs. The cult of Pir Lakhdata is
particularly popular among the agriculturist
castes of Punjab and Rajasthan, both Hindu
as well as Muslim. This tradition is linked
with the cult of Guga Pir, said to be a Rajput
chieftain who converted to Islam. In some
versions of the account of Guga Pir’s life, he
and Pir Lakhdata are presented as one and
the same person. According to local tradi-
tion, after his death, half of Guga Pir’s body
was taken by his Muslim followers and
buried according to Muslim rites, and to
them he is known as Zahir Pir. The other half
of his body was cremated by his Hindu fol-
lowers, who revere him as Pir Lakhdata.3
Some writers hold that Pir Lakhdata never
actually came to Jammu and that the shrine
that stands today at Lakhdata Bazar was
later built in his name by some of his follow-
e r s .4
Baba Budhan cA l i S h a h
Another noted Sufi whose shrine is locat-
ed in Jammu and who is associated with
Guru Nanak was the Qadri Baba Budhan cA l i
Shah. His real name is said to have been
Sayyed Shamsuddin, but he is known more
popularly as Baba Budhan (‘The Old Baba’)
because he was blessed with a very long life.
Baba Budhan was born near Lahore in the
village of Talwandi, the birthplace of Guru
Nanak. Tradition has it that he was a very
close friend of Guru Nanak, and the two
would often meet to discuss spiritual mat-
ters. The d a r g a h of the Baba is visited every
day by scores of people, mainly Hindus and
Sikhs. On Thursdays, several thousands
gather here, and at the cu r s, held on the first
Thursday of the local month of Har, the
crowds are enormous.
Pir Mitha
Pir Mitha’s d a r g a h is located on a hillock
on the banks of the river Tawi. According to
local tradition, he came to Jammu from Iran
in 1462 CE during the reign of Raja Ajaeb
Dev. It so happened that one day the Raja’s
wife fell seriously ill.5 The Pir is said to have
cured the queen, as a result of which the
king and many of his subjects became his
disciples. An entire Hindu caste group, the
‘low’ caste b h i s h t i s (water-carriers), accept-
ed him as their spiritual preceptor. Soon,
the Pir’s fame spread far and wide, and
many began converting to Islam under his
influence. Because of this, the Pir was faced
with stiff opposition from some Hindu
priests. His most vehement opponent was
Siddh Garib Nath, a Shaivite Gorakhnathi
yogi. However, as the story goes, the two
soon became friends.6
The association between Pir Mitha and
Siddh Garib Nath is particularly interesting.
Banihali writes that after the yogi overcame
his initial opposition to the Pir, the two ‘de-
veloped a great respect for each other’.7
They decided to settle down together in
the cave where Pir Mitha lived. This cave is
known as Pir Khoh or the ‘Cave of the Pir’.
According to one writer, ‘[t]his clearly
shows that in God’s court there is no ques-
tion of caste and creed’.8 Legend has it that
the yogi entered the cave and travelled all
the way to Matan in Kashmir, never to re-
turn. After he disappeared, his disciples
came to the Pir and requested him to ac-
cept them as his followers. The Pir declined,
saying that they should be faithful to their
guru. When this failed to satisfy them, the
Pir said that they could, if they wanted, take
his title of ‘Pir’ along with theirs. That is why
the cave is today called as Pir Khoh and the
heads of the Nath yogis who reside there
are known as Pirs.9
Pir Mitha died in 1476 CE and is buried in
a locality in the heart of Jammu town
named after him. Like the other Sufi shrines
in Jammu town, Hindus vastly outnumber
Muslims at his d a r g a h. The majority of the
pilgrims belong to the k a s h p caste, a Hindu
community traditionally considered ‘low’ in
the caste hierarchy. Some believe that the
k a s h p s are descendants of the early b h i s h t i
disciples of Pir Mitha. Although they are all
Hindus, they regard Pir Mitha as the guru of
their community. It is the custom for the
k a s h p s of Jammu to visit the d a r g a h e v e r y
morning after having a bath. All their auspi-
cious ceremonies are conducted only after
paying respects at the shrine.
Baba Jiwan Shah
Baba Jiwan Shah was born in 1852 at
Salehpur Chaprar in the Sialkot district of
Punjab, to a Hussaini Sayyed family known
for its piety. At the age of 23, upon the ad-
vice of his preceptor, the Chishti Pir Sain
Baqr cA l i Shah, he left his village, spending
12 years in meditation and austerities at
Akhnoor on the banks of the river Chenab.1 0
He then went to Jammu town, where he
took up residence in a graveyard, meditat-
ing inside the grave of the Sufi Sher Shah
Wali for 12 years. After this, he spent the rest
of his life in the region around Jammu,
preaching Islam and acquiring disciples.1 1
His d a r g a h is found in Jammu town at a lo-
cality named after him.1 2
Baba Jiwan Shah’s disciples came from all
backgrounds and included Hindus, Muslims,
Sikhs and others. Notable among his follow-
ers were Maharaja Pratap Singh, ruler of
Jammu and Kashmir (1885-1925) and his
brother Amar Singh. The king fixed a regular
monthly stipend (w a z i f a) for him and would
often invite him to the royal palace.
Baba Jiwan Shah died on 25 December
1919. His cu r s is celebrated every year on
this day. For the occasion, food is distrib-
uted to the poor and the Holy Qur'an is re-
cited. In addition, every Thursday several
hundred followers visit his d a r g a h, Hindus
outnumbering Muslims. The oil that burns
in the clay lamps there is taken as a special
ointment to cure ailments. Many childless
mothers come here to request the Baba to
plead with God for a son for them.
Panj Pir
At Ramnagar, in the outskirts of Jammu
town, is the shrine of the Panj Pirs, or ‘Five
Pirs’. The Panj Pir cult is widespread all over
northern India and Pakistan. The composi-
A f a q i r at a
Jammu Dargah,
medicines in the
b a c k g r o u n d .
Continued on page 20
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Pir Mitha d a r g a h,
J a m m u .
tion of the Panj Pirs varies from place to
place. In some cases, it includes both Mus-
lim as well as Hindu figures. The origins of
the cult have been traced back to the Hindu
cult of the five Pandava brothers, heroes of
the Hindu epic, the Mahabharata, as well as
the S h ica tradition of revering the five mem-
bers of the a h l - u l - b a y t, the ‘holy family’ con-
sisting of the Prophet Muhammad, his
daughter Fatima, her husband cA l i and their
sons Hasan and Hussain.
Little is known about the history of the
Panj Pir shrine in Jammu. Legend has it that
five brothers of a Muslim family spent many
years there in meditation and austerities
and then they all left to go their own ways.1 3
According to local tradition, one day the
five Pirs appeared in a dream to the Mahara-
ja and admonished him for sleeping with his
feet pointing to their c h i l l a h, the placed
they used to meditate. The next morning,
the Maharaja ordered the spot to be exca-
vated, and an umbrella and five kettledrums
were found. Believing this to be a holy
place, he ordered the construction of a d a r-
g a h t h e r e .1 4 He then appointed his royal
charioteer, Alif Shah, and a Muslim woman,
Khurshid Begum, as custodians of the shrine.
The great popularity of the Panj Pir d a r-
g a h, especially among the local Hindus, is
believed to be a largely post-1947 phenom-
enon. It is said that following the Partition
riots in which thousands of Muslims in
Jammu lost their lives and many more were
forced to flee to Pakistan, some Hindus at-
tempted to take over the shrine, claiming
that it was actually a temple of the five Pan-
davas. They went so far as to forcibly install
a Shiva l i n g a1 5 on top of the grave-like struc-
ture inside the d a r g a h. Local legend has it
that the next morning the people discov-
ered that the l i n g a had cracked into pieces
on its own. The Hindus took this as a sign
that the shrine was actually a Muslim d a r g a h
and so withdrew their claims.
At present, the d a r g a h is looked after by a
Hindu Rajput, Kuldip Singh Charak. He is the
husband of Shamim Akhtar, the daughter of
Khurshid Begum, the first custodian of the
s h r i n e .1 6 He took over this responsibility fol-
lowing Khurshid Begum’s death in 1986.
Like a Muslim Pir, Kuldip Singh Charak also
hands out t a w i z , or amulets, for cures to
those who come to him in need. These
amulets are made of what is called pir ka
p a n c h r a t n a (‘the five jewels of the Pir’), con-
sisting of marigold flowers placed on the
grave-like structure inside the shrine, a
piece of white thread, soot and oil from the
P H O T O :  Y .  S I K A N D
The Hinduized
d a r g a h of a
S u f i saint at
C h a r m a l i y a l ,
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clay lamps that burn at the shrine and the
ash of incense sticks.
The Panj Pir shrine in Jammu is particular-
ly popular among the local Hindus. It is cus-
tomary for drivers and travellers in buses,
cars and trucks who pass by the shrine to
stop there, bow their heads in respect and
to offer token sums of money. Large crowds
gather here every Thursday. As at other d a r-
g a h s at Jammu, they place little balls of
sugar (p r a s a d or t a b a r r u k) on the grave-like
structure, light incense-sticks, rub the oil
from the clay lamps on their bodies and
apply a small dot (b i n d i) on their foreheads
with the soot from the lamps. They also
press the grave-like structure with their
hands as if massaging the body of the Pir.
From this description of the history of the
major Sufis and Sufi shrines of Jammu, it ap-
pears that Sufism has played multiple social
roles in this region and is still a vibrant force
and a deep-rooted part of people’s cultures
and traditions. By far, the most important
role of these shrines today is to bring people
of different castes and communities togeth-
er in worship. Furthermore, as in much of
the rest of South Asia, in the Jammu area,
too, many Sufis have played an important
role in the process of social reform, with
their message of ethical monotheism, love
for all creatures of God and the equality of
all human beings. This is why, in particular,
as the case of Pir Mitha’s d a r g a h s h o w s ,
large numbers of ‘lower’ castes were attract-
ed to the Sufis, and in the process many of
them embraced Islam. The remarkable egal-
itarianism of the cults of the d a r g a h s is read-
ily apparent in the case of the Jiwan Shah
shrine, where a ‘low’ caste Chamar, regard-
ed as a saint, is buried alongside his spiritual
preceptor. It is because of this great legacy
of the Sufis that, centuries after their deaths,
they continue to play such an important
role in the lives of their followers, irrespec-
tive of religion and caste. ♦
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Following the Iranian Revolution of 1979 and the re-
introduction of s h a r ica law relating to gender and the
family, women’s rights suffered a major setback.
However, as the implementers of the law have faced
the social realities of women’s lives and aspirations,
positive changes have gradually come about. Since
the late 1980s there has been a growing debate in
Iranian books and journals between proponents of
different approaches to gender in Islam. During
1995, a series of discussions were held with clerical
contributors to the debate in which clarification was
sought for the jurisprudential bases for their ap-
proaches to gender issues.
Debating Gender
with Ulema in Qom
Qom is the main centre of shici r e l i g i o u s
learning and power in Iran. After the foun-
dation of the Islamic Republic, clerics were
charged with establishing the religious
basis of the new regime’s programme and
its social, economic and political order. Be-
sides, they had to manage the difficult tran-
sition from a standpoint of opposition to
one of power. As the regime has increasing-
ly faced the real contemporary issues of so-
cial policy and practice, the religious schol-
ars have had to make accommodations in
many key areas of Islamic doctrine and law.
One of the key areas has been that of gen-
der relations, and the legal, social and polit-
ical rights and roles of women. The process
of accommodation intensified after Ayatol-
lah Khomeini’s death in 1989, and has been




I have been following these debates as an
anthropologist and a student of Islamic law.
My aim is to understand the varying notions
of gender that lie at the root of s h a rica f a m i-
ly rules, and how the custodians of the 
s h a rica in Iran today – the shici clerics – at-
tempt variously to perpetuate, modify, de-
construct and reconstruct these notions of
gender. At first, the main sources used were
a number of books and journals, published
in Qom and Tehran, which clearly formed
part of a public debate in which highly diver-
gent perspectives were being aired. Two
journals of particular interest and signifi-
cance were found. Both were launched in
1992, but they took radically different posi-
tions. One, Payam-e Zan (Women’s Mes-
sage), based in Qom and run by male clerics,
defended the s h a rica and the gender in-
equalities inherent in its legal rules. The
other, Z a n a n (Women), based in Tehran and
run by women, argued for gender equality
on all fronts.
Z a n a n advocated a brand of feminism that
takes Islam as source of legitimacy. Each
issue had a legal section which examined
and discussed the restrictions placed on
women by s h a rica laws. From May 1992, the
tone and style of these legal articles began
to change, slowly but surely taking issue
with the very premises on which the official
shici discourse on the position of women is
based, and laying bare their inherent gender
bias. These articles were unprecedented:
first, they made no attempt to cover up or to
rationalize the gender inequalities embed-
ded in s h a rica law. Secondly, they had some-
thing new to say, a thesis. There was consis-
tency in the approach and the progression
of the arguments. Each article built upon the
premises and arguments established in earli-
er ones. They were published under differ-
ent male and female names, but it was evi-
dent to me that they were written by a single
person, someone well versed in the sacred
sources and in the sh ici art of argumentation.
Before long I found out who the author
was: a young cleric, Hojjat ol-Eslam Seyyed
Mohsen S aci d z a d e h. In April 1995, two
women activists I knew, the lawyer Mehran-
giz Kar and the publisher Shahla Lahiji, orga-
nized a meeting for me with him. I had just
finished a paper in which I analysed Z a n a n’ s
legal articles, pointing out their novel ap-
p r o a c h . We discussed my paper and
S aCi d z a d e h agreed with my analysis of his
writings; we began a programme of collabo-
rative research. He provided me with his un-
published manuscripts to study and com-
ment. He also introduced me to gender de-
bates in Qom and facilitated my research
t h e r e .
This was my first experience of the clerical
way of life and thinking. The strict codes of
gender segregation and h e j a b that organize
time and space meant that I spent most of
my time with women. S aci d z a d e h ’ s t e e n a g e
daughter, Zahra, was always present. In
Qom, I stayed in the house of a pious
preacher of modest means; his home was
small, consisting of three connecting rooms
and a courtyard housing the washing and
toilet facilities. He had six children, one of
them a boy of eighteen, yet gender segre-
gation was so effectively maintained and
the space so innovatively divided by cur-
tains that I never set eyes on this young man
– nor he on me, as I was told. I also spent
long hours with the women of this family
and many others in Qom, many of whom
saw no contradiction between Islam and
their rights as women, wholeheartedly be-
lieving in and drawing power from all the
rules that I saw as limiting and oppressive to
w o m e n .
Traditionalists, neo-
traditionalists and modernists
Between September and November 1995,
and then in winter 1997, I met and inter-
viewed a number of leading protagonists of
gender debates in Qom, including the cleri-
cal editors of Payam-e Zan. I also searched
for books, pamphlets, and tape recordings
of sermons that dealt with women and gen-
der relations. I found three main perspec-
tives: ‘traditionalists’ insisted on patriarchal
interpretations based on ‘complementarity’
but ‘inequality of rights and duties’ between
women and men; ‘neo-traditionalists’ at-
tempted to introduced ‘balance’ into tradi-
tional interpretations; and ‘modernists’
sought a radical rethinking of the jurispru-
dential construction of gender.
In my book Gender and Islam: The Religious
Debates in Contemporary Iran ( P r i n c e t o n :
Princeton University Press, 1999: London, I.
B. Tauris, 2000) I relate the three perspec-
tives and place them in their social, cultural
and political contexts. I examine key pas-
sages in written and oral texts and narrate
my discussions with the authors, presenting
them in an order that reflects the chrono-
logical development of the concepts and
conveys something of their context, while
relating my engagement, as a Muslim
woman and a social anthropologist educat-
ed and working in the West, with shici M u s-
lim thinkers of various backgrounds and
v i e w s .
There are three parts to the book. The
structure and format of chapters in each
part differ, reflecting the nature and extent
of my engagement with the texts and their
authors. The two texts discussed in Part One
represent the viewpoint of clerics who see
the gender model in s h a rica law as im-
mutable and their mission to be to convince
others of this truth. One is by Ayatollah
Madani Tabrizi, a senior Qom cleric, the
other by Ayatollah Azari-Qomi, a govern-
ment cleric who played an important role in
the first decade of the Islamic Republic. Al-
though I talked with both ayatollahs, my en-
gagement with their texts is limited to se-
lecting passages for full translation, and
paraphrasing and summarizing the rest: our
views on gender and our understandings of
Islam were so different that there was little
room for a constructive dialogue.
The four chapters in Part Two recount my
discussions with the clerics of Payam-e Zan
and their mentor Ayatollah S a n eci – known
for his progressive views on women’s issues.
Although they too staunchly defend the im-
mutability of the gender model manifested
in Islamic law, they admit the need for
change in practice and seek new interpreta-
tions. They published transcripts of these
discussions in their journal in 1996. I use
them to shed light not only on the gender
debates but also on clerical modes of think-
ing and argumentation. Unlike Part One,
where the authors of the texts and I could
only repeat our positions, here the clerics
and I managed to engage critically with
each others’ premises and arguments.
These four chapters are, in effect, co-au-
t h o r e d .
The two chapters in Part Three concern
texts which represent a theoretical break
from conventional legal wisdom, and my
engagement with them goes further than
with those discussed earlier. One deals with
lectures by Abdolkarim Sorush, the most
prominent among contemporary Islamic in-
tellectuals in Iran. Although he is neither a
cleric nor an exponent of gender equality, I
devote a chapter to his ideas for two main
reasons. First, his approach to sacred texts
has not only enabled women in Z a n a n t o
place their demands within an Islamic
framework, it has encouraged clerics for
whom gender has become a ‘problem’ to
address it from within a legal framework.
Secondly, it is in response to the challenge
implicit in Sorush’s ideas that some clerics
have had to admit that their understanding
of the s h a rica is subject to change and that
they must find new arguments, or else they
must abandon the claim to rule in the name
of s h a rica. Sorush’s ideas undermined the
very basis of their exclusive right to religious
a u t h o r i t y .
In the final chapter, I discuss the work of my
guide S aci d z a d e h, whose articles in Z a n a n
provided the impetus for my research. He
calls his approach the ‘equality perspective’,
contending that it is found in the work of
some eminent jurists, alongside the domi-
nant approach, which he calls the ‘inequali-
ty perspective’. He sees his achievement to
be in articulating the ‘equality perspective’
coherently and shaping it to accord with
current realities. S aci d z a d e h was the only
cleric I could find who had radical ideas on
gender and was willing to air them in public.
He later became a victim of the struggle be-
tween modernists and traditionalists, which
took a new turn following the 1997 presi-
dential election that brought Mohammad
Khatami in power. In June 1998, following
the publication of an article in the liberal
daily newspaper J a m ece h (now closed), in
which he compared the gender views of re-
ligious traditionalists in Iran with those of
the Taliban in Afghanistan, he was arrested.
Five months later he was released; his crime
was never announced, but he lost his cleri-
cal position and is now forbidden to publish
his writings.
The three parts are framed by an Introduc-
tion and a Conclusion, placing Iranian texts
and debates in the context of religious poli-
tics and approaches to gender in Islam. Each
part begins with a brief introduction to a
defining text on women, and each chapter
builds on and adds a new dimension to the
arguments presented in the preceding one.
Chapters in the first two parts begin and
end with narratives of my visits to Qom in
1995 and 1997 and meetings with the au-
thors whose texts are discussed. These ac-
counts are intended to draw attention to
the taken-for-granted, shared meanings
that underlie life in Qom, the familiar rou-
tines that inhabitants take as natural. By
narrating an ethnography of my personal
engagement with a series of texts and their
authors, I aim to provoke other Muslim
women to write more revealingly of their
changing trajectories. We need to know
more about these personal trajectories if we
are to understand the relationship between
feminism and religious politics. ♦
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Mid dl e Ea st  /  No r th Af ri c a
S O N J A  H E G A S Y
In 1999 two young Arab kings succeeded their fa-
thers to the throne: King Hussein of Jordan had
reigned for 46 years and King Hassan of Morocco for
38 years, when their eldest sons, Abdullah and Mo-
hammed (both born in the first half of the 60s) suc-
ceeded them. The new kings have a European educa-
tion and distinctly westernized behaviour. It is for
this reason that many observers were expecting a le-
gitimacy crisis. But thus far, the two monarchs seem
to propose a different conception of political order
which has gained widespread support: they are re-
garded as the new heralds of Moroccan and Jordan-
ian youth. The support of the youth is one of the
major challenges in societies where more than half of
the population is under 25 years of age.
T r a n s f o r m a t i o n
through Monarchy
in Morocco and Jordan
The new kings of Morocco and Jordan both
benefit on the national level from the inher-
ited royal legitimation, on the international
level from the support of the Clinton-ad-
ministration and on the personal level from
an effort to introduce a new concept of au-
thority. The rumour that King Abdullah
went around the country in disguise talking
to people in a government hospital or in the
bureaucracy in order to avoid being isolated
from the complaints of the masses is not un-
substantiated. Mohammed VI is called by
teenagers ’M 6’ or ‘King of the Poor’. In 1987
he received his diploma in political science
from the University of Rabat. Six years later
he submitted his doctoral thesis at the Uni-
versity of Nice on the cooperation between
the Maghreb and the European Union.
Meanwhile he accompanied Jacques Delors,
in his capacity as President of the European
Commission, for eight months in order to
learn EU diplomatic policy making. Contrary
to many comments after the death of his fa-
ther, Mohammed VI was prepared to suc-
ceed him but did not play an important
public role within the court ceremony nor
had he voiced any political opinions prior.
What was formally known as the ‘reign of
h i b a’ (fear) is now being transplanted by a
wave of trust.
New values or better public
r e l a t i o n s ?
It is too early to evaluate the sustainability
of the introduction of new norms and values
and the direct influence of this discourse on
R e a l p o l i t i k. It was, without a doubt, a coura-
geous act when Mohammed VI ousted long-
term Minister of Interior, Driss Basri, after 25
years. This event supports the hypothesis
that the more humble behaviour of the
heads of states and a new etiquette at the
royal palaces is not merely a masquerade or
political tactics. Further research is neces-
sary, however, to analyse the effectiveness
of the changing images of Mohammed VI
and Abdullah II in order to assess their influ-
ence on the collective cultural identity.
One important historical study on Moroc-
co has been presented by Abdellah Ham-
moudi, who has examined ‘the exact ways
in which these abstract principles of legiti-
mation are vested with an emotional impact
sufficient to foster action’ (Hammoudi 1997:
2). The author looked at the ideological and
cultural foundations of the persistent au-
thoritarianism from an anthropological
point of view. From a political science ap-
proach, new questions arise in order to ex-
plore whether and how the images of both
kings foster legitimacy among the youth. It
needs to be assessed whether and how Mo-
hammed VI can still be the sacred comman-
der of the faithful and at the same time
break through the authoritarian style of
rule. The recent web chats among Moroc-
cans that have appeared – with the
anonymity of the Internet – containing
questions about the possibility that a de-
scendant of the Prophet be gay, show the
sensitivity of this debate.
Hassan II: the last king of
divine right in Morocco?
The relationship between the Moroccan
king and his subjects is one of direct alle-
giance. The televised ceremony of alle-
giance, performed every year on March 3,
equals the submission of the whole popula-
tion in one instant. The monarchy becomes
the one point of reference for the vast ma-
jority of Moroccans. The opposition journal-
ist Hamid Berrada pointed out that when
the people mourned the loss of their father
in July 1999 this was not a metaphor; they
had been literally turned into orphans. The
strength of the monarchy lies in its direct re-
ligious ties between the king-sultan-caliph
and the subject-believer-citizen. ‘[A]ttack-
ing him would be both a crime and a sacri-
lege – inseparable notions in this logic – at
once a violation of divine law and the de-
sacralization of a figure of Islamic piety’,
notes Hammoudi (1997: 13). The identifica-
tion with the leader is not only based on di-
vine authority and sharifian descent, but
also derived from the anti-colonial stance of
the monarchy. Due to Moroccan colonial
history, identification with the regime is
much greater than in any other Arab coun-
t r y .
What constitutes legitimacy?
The point of departure here is the as-
sumption that religious conceptions of
order and legitimacy do not only have a
dogmatic dimension but are also part of a
changing social praxis. Legitimacy is not un-
derstood as an inherent characteristic of
monarchical rule as such, but as the result of
a process of bargaining and counterbalanc-
ing. The Alawite dynasty that has ruled Mo-
rocco since the 17t h century has relied on
very flexible conceptions of order and legit-
imacy, which partly explains their continu-
ous and stable rule. The Makhzen’s (literally
‘storehouse’ – centre of power, state) strate-
gy to counterbalance urban and tribal soci-
ety, Arab and Berber, and reformers and the
orthodoxy, has a long successful history in
M o r o c c o .
The sacralization of the monarchy in the
post-colonial constitution of 1962 (Art. 23)
can be seen as one example of the (re-)con-
struction of religiously founded concep-
tions of political legitimacy in contemporary
Morocco. The constitution, originally a secu-
lar instrument, now establishes the sacred-
ness of the person of the king – an idea
completely alien to classical Islamic law.
Hereditary monarchy is another concept
that is highly controversial among Muslim
scholars. Even the ceremony of the b a yca
(oath of allegiance to the sultan/king) does
not mean a return to Muslim traditions, but
is very much a backward production. Today
high officials from the Ministry of Interior
and members of parliament are swearing al-
legiance – and the ulema as well. The com-
bination of traditional form with modern
content is supposed to constitute historical
continuity and therefore legitimacy.
A new challenge for Islamist
opposition groups
Whereas their fathers had been proponents
of an authoritarian cultural symbolism, their
young successors depict themselves as citi-
zens among citizens. The mosque of Hassan II
in Casablanca is an architectural manifesta-
tion of the former tradition-bound authority
(see ISIM Newsletter 3/99). In Morocco, streets
and public buildings are either named after
Hassan II or Mohammed V but never after or-
dinary citizens. Mohammed VI is still consid-
ered to be a direct successor of the prophet in
the 36th generation. This line of legitimation is
not being erased now, but is mixed with ele-
ments of modern popular culture.
The young king’s new semiology repre-
sents a cultural re-evaluation in the Middle
East. It is being debated whether the obvious
metamorphosis of the holy will end in a posi-
tion of the king comparable to the Spanish
monarch after Franco. Or is Mohammed VI
just trying to secure the position of the crown
above the constitution by applying a modern
outlook?
In both cases, the new symbolism means a
different challenge for the Islamist opposition
than the types of regime with which they
were formerly confronted. So far they had
presented themselves as the ‘voice of the
poor’. Faced with a choice, many young peo-
ple now prefer the cosmopolitan outlook of
their young leader to the inward looking
worldview of the Islamists who demand not
to listen to music or to separate the sexes.
The importance and profundity of certain
actions can best be deciphered by the reac-
tions they call forth: In November 1999, Ab-
dessalam Yassine, the leader of the most im-
portant Moroccan Islamist group al-cAdl wal-
Ihsan (Justice and Welfare) wrote a remark-
able letter addressing Mohammed VI. Yassine
depicts the young monarch as highly ad-
mired by Moroccan youth. ‘[They] regard him
as a friend, a symbol of liberation and a
promise for a better future. During the first
weeks of his reign, and wherever his inaugur-
al campaign took him, the young king is
greeted with genuine and youthful enthusi-
asm. The Makhzen machinery, which organ-
ised the funeral of the late Hassan II, plays a
full role to present to the crowd, overcome
with cheers, a young man having great pres-
ence, smiling and gesturing benevolently to
the warm welcome of the public.’ *
Despite Yassine’s proposal to repatriate the
royal family’s fortune in order to reduce Mo-
rocco’s foreign debt, poverty and the unem-
ployment rate – a proposal considered offen-
sive by the king and therefore censured – Yas-
sine in his letter does not suggest that Mo-
hammed VI is not to be trusted or that his mis-
sion has already failed. ‘In this beginning of
November 1999, the young king has won the
first round in his glorious battle against “l’em-
pire du mal”. He has dismissed the central pil-
lar of the Makhzen. Hassan’s odd-job man.
Hassan’s right-hand man. Public enemy 2…
In his speeches, the new king talks about a
“new concept of authority”. He has brilliantly
proven that he intends to act accordingly.
However, does he really intend to break off
with the past? Can he do so? When is the
great revolution to take place?’ (Yassine:
1999)
The old generation of leaders in the Middle
East chose to counter the growing tide of Is-
lamism with more and more public space for
a paternalistic interpretation of what were
deemed to be Muslim traditions and prac-
tices. With the death of Hassan II, many ob-
servers doubted whether Mohammed VI
would acquire the spiritual authority as com-
mander of the faithful and the theological au-
thority as highest religious scholar that would
guarantee him the support of the ulema. Now
it seems that this might not even be his
strongest asset against the Islamist opposi-
tion. It will be of interest for the whole Arab
world to see which notions of legitimacy and
type of power will be put forward in a society
which is heavily struck by a crisis of religious
and political meaning. ♦
N o t e
* Yassine explained that he had originally written
the Memorandum in French in order to reach
Morocco’s westernized French-speaking elite who
regard Arabic as a ‘”vernacular” language used
only to communicate with illiterate people.’
R e f e r e n c e s
– Hammoudi, Abdellah (1997). Master and Disciple:
The Cultural Foundations of Moroccan
Authoritarianism. C h i c a g o .
– Yassine, Abdessalam (1999): Unpublished
M e m o r a n d u m .
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T u r k e y
K R I S Z TI N A K E H L - B O DR O G I
In the past decade, Turkey’s official image as a coun-
try of Sunni Muslims has been vigorously challenged
by the ‘coming out’ of the Alevis, a large heterodox
Islamic minority, which consists of approximately 15
million Turkish- and Kurdish-speaking members.
Until that time, due to the official definition of
Turkey as an ethnically and religiously homogenous
nation, public expressions of deviating collective
identities had been banned by law. However, a shift
in government policy in the early 1990s enabled the
Alevis to come to the fore and to inaugurate an




The politicization of Alevi identity is accom-
panied by a religious revivalism which – re-
garding the nature of traditional Alevism –
appears to result in a re-construction of
community structures, beliefs and rituals.
Concealment and secrecy
Expelled by the larger society as heretics
and afflicted with the stigma of immorality,
the Alevis practised for centuries t a q i y y a, the
concealment of one’s own religious identity.
They guarded their doctrines as mystery (s ı r) ,
not to be disclosed to anyone but those born
into the community. The esoteric knowledge
was handed down orally in a number of holy
lineages (o c a k) – which claim descent from
the Prophet – and passed on to the laymen
(t a l i p) in special initiation rites. Though a kind
of hierarchy existed among the o c a k, none of
them exercised the role of a central religious
authority. This segmented organization
along with the lack of a binding script fore-
stalled the development of a single and
uniquely valid religious tradition among the
A l e v i s .
Aside from strong Shi’i (and extreme-Shi’i)
influences, the Alevis preserved several non-
Islamic religious traditions. What brings them
into sharpest contrast with Islamic orthodoxy
is the rejection of the shari’a. Rather, the Ale-
vis claim that as they possess the esoteric (ba-
tini) meaning of the faith, they are exempt
from the observance of its external (zahiri)
laws. The ‘hidden truth’ appears to be the
doctrine of vahdet-i mevcut, which denies the
separateness between Creator and creatures.
The Alevis express this by saying that there is
no man without God and no God without
man. An outstanding feature of Alevism is the
veneration of the fourth caliph Ali, who, along
with Allah and Mohammed, forms part of a
trinity. Ali and Muhammad are regarded as
pre-existent, the former of the two often be-
lieved to be God himself. Further beliefs refer
to metempsychosis (tenasüh) and the incar-
nation of God in man (hulul). The Alevis fast
12 days in Muharrem, in memory of the mur-
der of Ali’s son al-Husain at Kerbala. In addi-
tion, there exists a wide range of local beliefs
and customs in accordance to the various
sub-groups or a given region.1
Secularization and
p o l i t i c i z a t i o n
The manifold transformations of republi-
can Turkey put an end to the spatial and so-
cial marginality of the Alevis. However, their
gradual integration into the majority society
– migration to the towns, school attendance,
state employment and the involvement in
the national economy – led in the long run to
a secularization of the community. As a re-
sult, the social-religious system collapsed
and religion as a whole lost its previous im-
portance. This development reached its peak
in the 1970s, when the overwhelming major-
ity of the Alevis devoted itself to leftist and
universal ideologies. In this period a whole
generation had grown up without being ini-
tiated into the secret doctrines and the Holy
Men (d e d e) lost their function and authority.
The oral transmission of knowledge was in-
terrupted and mostly fell into oblivion.
Back to the roots or toward
a new Alevism?
Local and global developments in the
1980s – disintegration of the Left, Islamism
and the world-wide collapse of socialism –
led to a re-discovering of Alevism as a main
source of collective identity, accompanied by
a reawakened interest in its cultural and reli-
gious traditions. Manifold efforts have been
made to adapt Alevism – which is actually a
village phenomenon – to the conditions of
urbanity and modernity, the most significant
among them being the scripturalization of
the oral traditions, the abandonment of con-
cealment and secrecy, and the transition of
authority from the Holy Men to members of a
new middle-class elite, who in majority be-
long to the traditional ‘laity’. They take over
leading functions in the community-based
associations, which since 1990 have been es-
tablished all over the country and carry out
manifold political activities in the name of
Alevism. Under the motto ‘We have nothing
to hide’, educated members of this new elite
openly discuss beliefs and rituals of the com-
munity in the print media, on TV, and in hun-
dreds(!) of book publications.2 The renewed
interest in religion becomes apparent in the
rapidly growing number of houses of wor-
ship (cem evi), being erected in the towns.
After an interruption of nearly 30 years, reli-
gious ceremonies (c e m) are observed again.
The manner in which the cem are currently
carried out marks a gradual transition of Ale-
vism into an open community of belief with
more or less formalized forms of ritual. C e m
ceremonies are offered weekly by the wor-
ship houses as a religious service and last
about 2 hours (in contrast to the past, where
they went on the whole night). They are now
open to the public, not only because an ex-
clusion of non-Alevis would be politically un-
wise, but given the anonymity of urban life, it
could not be controlled anyway. Also, secre-
cy would contradict the new self-image of
the Alevis, which represents a universally
valid and modern form of faith. In addition,
the cem in the towns have lost their former
function as a social regulative and control-
ling trial and even as an instrument of reli-
gious education. Thus they lack former indis-
pensable elements such as initiation (i k r a r)
and the ritual of g ö r ü l m e, a kind of ‘trial’ in
w h i c h quarrels among the disciples were set-
tled and those who committed an offence
called to account. If they are carried out at all,
they appear to be merely a symbol of be-
longing. (In a case recently witnessed in Is-
tanbul, more than 70 men were questioned
and initiated within 4 hours.) Under such
conditions, the function of the Holy Men – a
part of them becoming active again – is limit-
ed to the observance of ceremonies which
consist of special prayers (gülbenk, dua) ,
hymns (n e f e s), music, and ritual dance (s e m a) .
The Holy Men are no longer the only – and
not even the most important – transmitters
of knowledge. Often uneducated and unable
(or reluctant) to speak on religious matters in
a way accessible to the new urban genera-
tion, they can hardly gain back their previous
authority. The post-Marxist generation does
not consider descent as a value in its own
right and demands scientifically trained and
‘ e n l i g h t e n e d ’ d e d e s . ‘Acquired’ knowledge is
increasingly taking precedence over ‘inherit-
ed’ knowledge and written sources over oral-
ity. However, the demand for a textbook on
Alevism with a clear explanation of its essen-
tials is out of sight at the present. Competi-
tions among the new community leaders
and among the Holy Lineages, as well as ide-
ological divergences forestalled, until now,
serious attempts to develop a coherent belief
system out of the components of Alevi syn-
cretism. In this situation the books of Alevi in-
tellectuals become the main source of infor-
m a t i o n .
However, the more books are published
the more confusion increases. Most of the au-
thors are ‘laymen’ and belong to the genera-
tion which had no access to the sacred
knowledge. Their books are generally based
on second-hand information and strongly re-
flect ideological and political orientations.
Thus the authors make a selective use of
Alevi beliefs and rituals: they stress elements
which underline their position and neglect
others. Some emphasize the Islamic features
while others bring the mystical elements to
the fore. While the majority of the authors
declare Alevism as part of Islam, some define
it as a religion in its own right. Again others
divest Alevism of its religious dimension,
defining it as a social movement, humanism
or even atheism. Authors affected by Turkish
or Kurdish nationalism interpret Alevism as
being based on Shamanism or on Zoroastri-
anism. Thus scripturalization has not yet re-
sulted in fixed and unified doctrines.
For different reasons, however, the lay au-
thors as well as the Holy Men avoid treating
some of the most heterodox elements in
public. Themes such as the deification of Ali,
incarnation or metempsychosis are equally
not touched in the cem held in public, which
are rather dominated by the Shi’i compo-
nents of the faith (although without paying
any reference to the shari’a). And there are
strong hints that certain essentials, today
known only to some Holy Men and their
close adherents, are still hidden. Alevism as
it is presently offered to the public (Alevi
and non-Alevi), appears to be filtrated of
most of its gnostic and extreme Shi’i ele-
ments. It is improbable that the esoteric
teachings will completely disappear. Ale-
vism is more likely to become divided into
two parts: the one being a public religion,
purified of its extreme elements and exer-
cised by the majority, the other being hid-
den from the masses and limited to a small-
er number of initiated members. Thus Ale-
vism could bring out a t a r i k a t from itself,
analogue to Bektashism. ♦
Singing n e f e s
in a c e m
in Istanbul
(February 2000).
One of the new erected houses of worship (c e m e v i), Ankara.
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T u r k e y
I M AD  F .  S A B I ’
The two devastating earthquakes that hit Turkey last
year, resulting in more than 17,000 deaths and caus-
ing extensive material damage to the country’s in-
dustrial heartland, triggered continuing debates in
which the state, state-society relations, and civil soci-
ety are all being questioned. Particularly in the west-
ern press, popular anger with the state’s slow and in-
efficient response to the disaster was portrayed as
having reached an unprecedented level, de-deifying
the Turkish state which had historically commanded
unquestioned trust and fear. In contrast to a state de-
picted as heavy, shackled and corruption-riddled,
the western media and parts of the Turkish press cel-
ebrated the birth of a new and vibrant civil society in
Turkey. Responding much faster than the state to re-
lief needs, Turkish associations and foundations
were hailed as the expression of a new civic con-
sciousness and as an emergent social force driving
for democratization. 
Islamic Associations
in the Politics of the
Turkish Earthquakes
Disasters are complex and dialectical social
phenomena. They are also political events
and need to be recognized as such. Post-dis-
aster situations are usually marked by politi-
cal manipulation of the disaster for short-
term gains (either by the state, political par-
ties, or both), by struggles over the distribu-
tion of aid and the benefits of reconstruction
plans, and by local power contestations.
Inasmuch as a disaster uncovers pre-existing
economic, social and political structural mal-
adies, it creates an arena for political strug-
gle in which multiple actors are involved
(e.g. Guatemala 1976, Mexico City 1985, and
Cairo 1992).
Another aspect of disasters that is politicized
in certain contexts is how they are explained.
Divine wrath is often invoked as the cause of
an earthquake, flood, or hurricane. Voltaire’s
famous poem in response to the 1755 Lis-
bon earthquake is part of a centuries-old
polemic between religious and non-reli-
gious explanations of causality. The rise of
political Islam renders these polemics
deeply political as the post-earthquake situ-
ation in Turkey (and before it the Cairo earth-
quake of 1992) clearly show.
How to explain the earthquake?
The earthquake as a manifestation of di-
vine wrath was a frequent depiction by the
Islamic media and Islamic figures. Necmettin
Erbakan, the historic leader of the Turkish Is-
lamic movement, described it as ‘a warning
signal’. In a clear reference to the meeting
held at the Gölcük naval base on 28 February
1997, when the army issued an ultimatum
for the immediate curtailing of Islamic ac-
tivism, the thesis that Gölcük (rather than
I
.
z m i t) was the epicentre of the earthquake
was advanced. This had the clear political
meaning that the quake was divine retribu-
tion against anti-Islamic measures decided
in that location. In that meeting, which ulti-
mately led to the downfall of the Welfare
Party-led government, a list of measures
against Islamists was drawn up to be pre-
sented to the National Security Council
(MGK). The measures included a stricter im-
plementation of the Kemalist dress code, es-
pecially for women students in institutions
of higher education.
Particularly controversial were the state-
ments of Mehmet Kutlular (leader of the Nur
Cemaati and owner of the Yeni Asya n e w s p a-
per) directly connecting the earthquake to
the February 28 meeting. According to
newspapers, Kutlular said: ‘When Allah is de-
nied, the prophet questioned, and believers
persecuted, the Quran says that such disas-
ters will follow. Quite naturally, Allah will
send disasters to those who do not believe
in Him and are disrespectful of His laws.’1 I m-
mediately, three separate state bodies
launched investigations. Bülent Ecevit, the
Prime Minister, described the statements as
‘primitive thinking’ and ‘an ugly exploitation
of religion’.2
Distancing itself from the controversy, the
Virtue Party (in the person of Deputy leader
Veysel Candan) stressed that the recovery
process should be the focus of discussion: ‘Is
[the earthquake] a divine warning or not? I
do not approach the issue from this angle. If
you do not put the required amounts of ce-
ment and reinforced concrete in buildings,
some disaster will inevitably follow. We need
to comprehensively assess where we erred
and what mistakes were made in the con-
struction and building-technology sectors’.3
The army saw in statements, such as those
made by Kutlular, a direct attack on it and a
smearing of its name. In September 1999, the
MGK reacted against what it termed ‘reac-
tionary forces’ seeking to exploit the earth-
quake and warned them of immanent consti-
tutional and administrative measures.4 S u p-
port for the army was supplied by Kemalist
NGOs, led by the Association in Support of
Contemporary Living (ÇYDD). Pointing out
that Islamists blame Turkey’s secularism for
the earthquake, ÇYDD’s director spoke of the
imperative to ‘prevent Islamic sects and radi-
cal groups that disguise themselves as civil
society organizations from hunting down
our children in the reigning chaotic situa-
t i o n . ’5
Islamic associations 
in the earthquake
The past decade witnessed a significant in-
crease in the number of registered Islamic
associations and foundations in Turkey. By
1995, they accounted for 10.4% of the Istan-
bul associations. In addition to the tradition-
al associations engaged in building
mosques and teaching the Quran, a new
breed of Islamic associations providing di-
verse social services spread, targeting poor
urban neighbourhoods in particular. The
body of Islamic associations is large and di-
verse in its composition. It includes women’s
and human rights organizations, founda-
tions that engage in research on Islamic and
Ottoman themes, and two prominent associ-
ations of industrialists and businessmen
(M Ü SI
.
A D and I
.
Ş H A D) .6 M Ü SI
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A D in particular
is significant as the organizational expres-
sion of the Islamic business sector that
boomed in the aftermath of post-1980 eco-
nomic liberalization. It is now one of the
more important ‘new alternative spaces’ to
the hegemonic Kemalist state ideology and
i n s t i t u t i o n s ,7 and is a major financial contrib-
utor to Islamic associations, mirroring and
guiding their focus on social justice-oriented
grassroots work.
In general, the diversity and sophistication
of the Islamic associations parallels the rise
of both Islamic business activity and the
electoral successes of political Islam at the
national and local levels. They also benefit
from the proliferation of Islamic media. The
richness of this new Islamic associational ac-
tivity is also a manifestation of the weight
accorded to the issue of ‘civil society’ by Is-
lamic groups. The Welfare Party had first in-
troduced the theme of a system of ‘multiple-
legal orders’ as a promotion of an Islamic un-
derstanding of civil society against the mod-
ern, totalitarian Turkish nation-state.8 T h e
theme was subsequently taken up by the
Virtue Party, which formulated an agenda
for Quality Management in Politics.9 An im-
portant component of the agenda is
strengthening Turkish civil society and es-
tablishing links between the party and
C S O s .1 0 Recognizing the significance of a
broad human rights and legal reform agen-
da for the party’s own survival and uninter-
rupted activity, the Virtue Party – even if out
of self-interest – has taken the issue of ‘civil
society’ to heart.
Following the earthquake, Islamic associa-
tions formed special task forces and dis-
patched volunteers to the disaster area. Co-
ordination centres were established to chan-
nel information about needs and distribute
assistance to victims. In addition to handing
out relief assistance, Islamic NGOs set up
communal kitchens and childcare centres,
established fixed and mobile medical units,
and provided tents – some of which had
originally been bought for the Kosovo Alba-
nians. A number of these NGOs had plans to
erect new tent-camps or prefabricated hous-
ing sites.
The contribution of Islamic associations
can be summed up as follows: focused on re-
lief and visible, but not dominating the post-
quake non-governmental scene. Islamic as-
sociations were one of an array of Turkish
NGOs active in the disaster area. The earth-
quake’s proximity to Istanbul, the magni-
tude of the disaster, and extensive media
coverage, had all brought forth unprece-
dented civic activism and volunteerism. The
rush of NGOs to the scene, together with
hundreds of individual volunteers, was nev-
ertheless accompanied by factional compe-
tition, most notably between the antithetical
Islamic and Kemalist associations. Islamic re-
lief was also criticized by a number of Turkish
NGOs for being partisan and discriminatory,
and deliberately oppositional to the state.
M Ü SI
.
A D complained of ‘bureaucratic hur-
dles’ in the face of assistance delivery. In this
it was reiterating what other Turkish NGOs
and international aid agencies were experi-
encing. The state’s unease with criticisms of
its inefficiency and its discomfort with the
portrayal of civil society as a better alterna-
tive, led it to centralize all aid and relief oper-
ations in state organizations (measures that
were later eased). Restrictions – which were
uneven and discriminatory – were placed on
the collection and distribution of aid by in-
dependent and voluntary organizations. Is-
lamic associations in particular were target-
ed. The bank funds of I
.
H H and Mazlum-Der
were confiscated, and those of HakYol V a k f ı
blocked and minutely scrutinized. In Gölcük,
Islamic NGOs were asked to cease their activ-
ities and to physically leave the area. Islamic
associations, however, show sophistication
and tenacity in dealing with state restric-
tions. Many employ a legal expert who
‘clears’ their documents of any problematic
terms. They are also experienced in re-form-
ing themselves and camouflaging their ac-
tivities. Activists in the disaster area said that
this is what they will continue to do and that
they will stay as long as the humanitarian
emergency situation deems.
Concluding words
The two earthquakes in Turkey generated
a significant collective questioning of the
state establishment and institutions. It also
increased the visibility of a ‘civil society’ that
has resources and potential, but is fragment-
ed, conflictual and often elitist. As civil soci-
ety activism came into public and state at-
tention, the strength and sophistication of
Islamic voluntary associations also became
evident. The ‘cat and mouse’ game between
the Turkish state (led by the army) and vari-
ous Islamic groups will no doubt continue,
but the proliferation of diverse Islamic asso-
ciations with strong grassroots linkages is a
testimony to the embeddedness of political
Islam and its multiple sources of power. It is
also one expression of broader processes
within Turkey pressurizing the state to be-
come responsive, accountable, and to open
up democratic spaces. ♦
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C a u c a s u s
VL AD I M I R  B O B R O V N I K O V
The discourse on re-enacting Islamic law in the post-
Soviet North Caucasus uses key terms such as sharia
courts, highland Muslim traditions, and Islamic in-
surgency. What seems important here is to shed light
on these notions by answering such questions as: To
what extent do these terms reflect the post-Soviet
legal reality or diverge from it? What can be said of
the sharia mythology shared by both adherents and
opponents of re-Islamization in the North Caucasus?
What is the historical background of discourse on
sharia courts?




Public debates on and attempts at introduc-
ing Islamic law have become characteristic
of post-Soviet Muslim and non-Muslim
areas, and are especially vivid in the North
Caucasus. In recent years, the so-called
‘sharia courts’ or mahakim shar’iya were es-
tablished de facto by reopened mosques in
a number of villages and towns in Dagestan,
Chechnya, Ingushetia, North Ossetia-Alania,
Karachaevo-Cherkessia and Kabardino-
Balkaria. The majority of mosques are locat-
ed in Northern Dagestan and Southern
Chechnya. They settle small inheritance and
criminal cases including divorce, theft,
drinking alcoholic beverages, and the like.
The decisions of these courts are final and
not subject to appeal. They usually impose
both fixed sharia and non-Islamic penalties.
Dagestani chairmen of village and district
administrations often call upon local q a d i s
to settle family and land trials.
Articles 212 and 235 of the Soviet criminal
code of the Russian Federation prohibiting
the application of sharia norms regarding
marriage and inheritance practices were
abolished in its new version passed in 1996.
But sharia courts have not been legalized in
post-Soviet Russia with the exception of
Chechnya and Ingushetia. In December
1997 the Ingush president Ruslan Aushev
enacted mediating judges who are to follow
‘the a d a t (i.e. local customary law) and sharia
norms’ while settling criminal and civil
cases. Sharia norms relating to marriage
(z a w a j) and feuding (q i s a s) were legalized in
the republic in 1996-1999. The Chechen Re-
public of Ichkeria officially proclaimed itself
an independent Islamic State in 1996. The
preamble of the Chechen Constitution was
amended such that it then read: ‘Quran and
sharia are the principal source of legislation’.
In September 1996, acting president Ze-
limkhan Yandarbiyev brought into force the
new criminal code copied from the 1983
sharia criminal code of Sudan. The Supreme
Sharia Court and corresponding district in-
stitutions were created. Public punishments
with fixed penalties (h u d u d) were intro-
duced for selling alcoholic beverages, illegal
sexual intercourse and severe criminal of-
fences like robbery and homicide. In reality,
few death sentences and corporal punish-
ments sentenced by Chechen sharia courts
have been applied to date.
Sharia and state-building
As soon as the first death sentence of the
Supreme Sharia Court of Chechnya was
given in Grozny in April 1997, vigorous de-
bates on sharia began in the North Cau-
casian and Moscow media. One can identify
two competing attitudes towards this issue.
The majority of Muslim clergy are in favour
of introducing Islamic law, regarded as the
tool of national liberation and social mod-
ernization. They consider sharia as the
magic solution to the problem of growing
criminality and social instability caused by
the collapse of Soviet rule.
It is amazing, that many Moscow journalists
and academic scholars, quite unfamiliar with
Islam, also support re-enacting the sharia
law in the North Caucasus. They believe that
it is the only means to maintain order and to
prevent Chechnya and neighbouring Cau-
casian republics from anarchy. As a former
member of the Soviet Union Communist
Party Central Committee and now political
scientist, A.S. Tsipko, put it: ‘Let’s take a
sober view of things. The sharia laws pro-
tecting the Chechens from self-degradation
are much more progressive than other laws
and culture (i.e. neo-liberal) stipulating self-
destruction of the people’. This view is wide-
spread among Moscow intellectuals. A jour-
nalist, A. Fedin, expressed it as follows: ‘The
Chechen society is still mainly pre-state and
traditional. It is based on the unwritten cus-
tomary law […] Public executions sentenced
by the sharia court appear to be the begin-
ning of the state-building of Chechnya,
which is to be an inevitably bloody affair’.
Opposing views
There is also an opposite notion of sharia
as ’a barbarous remnant of the middle ages’
The distinct flavour of this view was
captured by Seyyid-Muhammad
Abubakarov, the former Dagestani
Mufti, in an interview with ‘Izvestia’ just
before his assassination in August 1998:
’Do you remember the recent execution
of the death sentence imposed by the
sharia court in Chechnya? And such
trouble and harrowing reminiscences
made of it? Even those who had agreed
with this sentence hesitated, their souls
having been disgusted. But let’s think of
a quite another thing. The problem is
what we should do with those who deal
in kidnapping and trade the captured,
turned into living goods, or with those
who kill their victims and sell their
cadavers. I consider sharia court as a
preventive measure against new
murders, not as a pure cruelty. Today a
criminal knows that his case will be
arranged, decided in his favour, that
punishment is not inevitable. According
to sharia, his responsibility is full – thus it
is a good preventive measure, isn’t it?’
that ‘judges brutality in the Chechen man-
ner’ associated with public flogging, cutting
off of hands, throwing stones, and therefore
quite unsuited for the modern law and soci-
ety. This view is shared by the top-level offi-
cials in the Russian Federal government such
as K.M. Tsagolov, a deputy to a former minis-
ter of nationalities of the Russian Federation,
and the majority of the pro-Moscow Cau-
casian authorities. They accuse adherents of
the sharia courts of working for Chechen ter-
rorists. Part of the Moscow mass media sid-
ing with the Putin’s government propagated
such a negative vision of ‘Shariatists’. As an-
other minister of the Russian Federation, Ra-
mazan Abdulatipov, pointed in August 1999:
‘Against a background of the war in Dages-
tan and the aggravated situation in the
North Caucasus, an impression has been
spread in Russia that every Muslim is an Is-
lamic extremist’.
Paradoxically, both of these antagonistic
visions of sharia have a somewhat common
core. The first striking thing is the almost
total absence of knowledge of Islamic law
among the majority of adherents and oppo-
nents of re-enacting Islamic courts. In their
view sharia is reduced to some elementary
norms of criminal and family law. No one can
distinguish the S h a f ici t e legal school, tradi-
tionally dominant on the territory of Dages-
tan, Chechnya and Ingushetia, from the
Hanafi one prevailing among the other Cau-
casian and Russian Muslims. Due to such ig-
norance, the Chechen authorities adopted
the Sudanese sharia code based on the Ma-
likite m a d h h a b. The majority of participants
in the debates are unable to judge numer-
ous deviations from the classic Islamic doc-
trine as they were attested in the work of re-
enacted sharia courts in the last decade.
It is noteworthy that no Muslim judges or
even academic legal theoreticians specializ-
ing in Islamic law take part in this public de-
bate. Its participants are mainly journalists,
politicians and academic scholars including
political scientists, historians and anthropol-
ogists. The only exception is Prof. L.R.
Syukiyaynen from the Institute of State and
Law in Moscow. Syukiyaynen is Russia’s lead-
ing expert on Islamic law, although his opin-
ion is uncommon and much more realistic.
While recognizing the great advantages of
sharia in resolving social problems and in re-
laxing local tensions in present-day North
Caucasus, he argues that there has not yet
been adequate application of Islamic law in
this region.
Myth-making about the sharia is charac-
teristic of both opposing sides of the debate.
The concepts of both are more or less di-
vorced from reality. ‘Highland Muslim tradi-
tionalism’ is seen as the key to the nature of
the North Caucasian law and society. This
notion does not take into account the radical
social and legal changes that have been in-
evitably caused by drastic state reforms in
this region for more than a century (from the
1860s); the mass resettlement of Muslim
highlanders to the plain; and even forcible
deportation of entire groups that took place
under the Soviet rule. Moreover, the authors
cited above completely ignored the fact that
the criminal laws of the sharia were not ap-
plied in the pre-modern Caucasus. Histori-
cally, highlanders settled criminal cases in
accordance with their customary laws or im-
posed state legislation.
Another myth typical of the discourse on
sharia courts is the vision of Islamic law as a
natural antagonist of the Russian state. Par-
ticipants of these debates argue that in the
past sharia played a significant role in the
political resistance of the North Caucasian
highlanders, first to the Russian conquest
and later to the Soviet reforms. From this,
they conclude that restored sharia courts
must undermine Russian rule in the present
day Caucasus. This mythology has a long his-
tory, embedded in the colonial policy of late
Imperial Russia, which considered Islamic
law unfavourable. After the Caucasian war of
the 19t h century, the possibility of Islamic
uprisings haunted the mind of top-level
state officials such as S.M. Dukhovsky, Gover-
nor-General of the Turkestan Province, or
K.P. Pobedonostsev, Procurator-General of
the Saint Synod. This fear lead the state to re-
strict the use of sharia norms for the Russian
Muslims and to keep Muslim clergy of the
North Caucasus under tight control. In turn,
Muslim political opposition arose at the end
of the 19t h century, constantly reclaiming
the full application of the sharia law.
This mythology had much influenced legal
and social development of the North Cau-
casian Muslims in the 20t h century. First, it
led to the introduction of sharia courts after
the Revolution of 1917 and the collapse of
the Russian empire. These courts were en-
acted by revolutionary decrees passed by
the First Congress of the Highland Peoples
of the Caucasus and that of the Terek peo-
ples held in 1917-1918. They worked under
different political rules including the early
Soviet one and were abolished only by 1925-
1927. For the second time, the idea of ‘Islam-
ic resurgence’ was realized in the North Cau-
casus following the break-up of the Soviet
Union. Sharia courts were introduced here
again. But the social and legal situation in
the region had completely changed.
One should take into account that re-Is-
lamization emerged in a context of, and in
reaction to, the Soviet legacy. It presents a
specific modern answer to challenges origi-
nating from the collapse of the Soviet rule in
the Caucasus. Now the myth of sharia is em-
bodied in the post-Soviet flesh and is
fraught with all its negative effects due to
the degradation of Islamic legal culture and
growing criminalization of power and soci-
ety in the region. ♦
M u h a m m a d -
Sayyid Gaziev,
q a d i a n d
chairman of
sharia court,
K h u s h t a d a
village, Dagestan.
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The B a lk ans
R AY M ON D D E T R E Z
In the Balkans, religion seems to have played a much
more important role in the process of nation building
than language. Speakers of Serbo-Croat fell apart in
three national communities on the basis of religion.
Thus emerged the Bosniak nation, which identifies it-
self with Islam and clearly distinguishes itself from
the Catholic Croats and the Orthodox Serbs. The es-
tablishment of the national states in the Balkans was
accompanied, from the beginning of the 19t h c e n t u-
ry, by attempts to restore the pre-Ottoman Christian
states. The population was ethnically homogenized
by expelling ethnic and religious minorities or by
forcibly assimilating them. In particular the Muslims
in the Balkans, and especially the Muslim Turks, fell




It is generally assumed that in the Balkans,
religion – including Islam – rather than lan-
guage, plays a decisive role in the process of
nation building. The former Yugoslavia is a
case in point. In the central part of the east-
ern Balkans, where the former Yugoslavia
was situated, a South Slavic language is spo-
ken which used to be called Serbo-Croat or
Croato-Serb until recent times. In the 19t h
century, the very similar dialects of Serbo-
Croat were standardized into one single lit-
erary language, intended to demonstrate
the ‘oneness’ of the Yugoslav or South Slav-
ic nation v i s - à - v i s its many enemies (Ger-
mans, Hungarians, Turks).
In the same period, however, within the
community of speakers of Serbo-Croat, na-
tional identities began developing on the
basis of religion; or rather, national commu-
nities emerged, coinciding greatly with reli-
gious communities. Catholics speaking
Serbo-Croat, living in the Habsburg Empire,
identified themselves as Croats, whereas
the Orthodox speakers of Serbo-Croat, liv-
ing scattered over the Habsburg and the Ot-
toman Empires and in their own principality
of Serbia, considered themselves Serbs. The
development of a Bosnian national con-
sciousness among the Muslim speakers of
Serbo-Croat was slightly retarded, due to
the Serbs’ and Croats’ attempts to incorpo-
rate them at least conceptually in their own
respective national communities as Serb or
Croat Muslims, and to the fact that belong-
ing to the Muslim community traditionally
was far more important to the Bosnians
than belonging to one or another national
community. The Yugoslav nationalists, en-
deavouring to create a single Yugoslav na-
tion, tended to minimize the religious differ-
ences among Bosnians, Croats and Serbs, as
they thwarted the process of South Slavic
u n i f i c a t i o n .
In the 20t h century, however, especially
after the establishment of the Kingdom of
Serbs, Croats and Slovenes in 1918 (re-
named Yugoslavia in 1929), as a result of the
Serbs monopolizing political and military
power in the new state, Croats started dis-
tancing themselves from the idea of a sin-
gle, South Slavic nation and state and devel-
oped a national identity of their own, em-
phasizing the particularities of the Croat
language and the Catholic faith as distinc-
tive features of the Croat nation v i s - à - v i s t h e
Serbs. After an abortive and rather compro-
mising attempt to establish an independent
Croat state under Nazi protection during
the Second World War, Croatia was re-inte-
grated into Yugoslavia, which had become a
communist federal state in 1944. The Croats
finally achieved their aim in 1991, when the
Republic of Croatia was internationally rec-
o g n i z e d .
Bosnian nationhood
In post-war Yugoslavia, the formation of a
Bosnian national consciousness was finally
completed. The official recognition of Bosn-
ian nationhood in 1969 – under the clumsy
denomination ‘Muslims in the ethnic sense
of the word’ – resulted mainly from the
need for a national community whose rep-
resentatives would balance Croat sepa-
ratism and Serb hegemonism at the level of
the federal government and of the govern-
ment of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegov-
ina. This does not mean, however, that the
Bosnian nation was an artificial creation.
The Bosnians constituted already then a
very distinct national community, defining
itself through Islam, just as Croats and Serbs
defined themselves through Catholicism
and Orthodoxy respectively. In fact, the very
insistence of Croats and Serbs on religious
affiliation as a basic component of national
identity had largely contributed to prevent-
ing the Bosniaks from considering them-
selves Muslim Serbs or Croats, as both Serbs
and Croats indefatigably attempted to
make the Bosnians believe. How could a
Muslim be a Serb, if being Orthodox is fun-
damental to being Serb? Besides, just as
Croats think of their nation as a part of West
European civilization and Serbs have the
sense of belonging to Slavic Orthodox East-
ern Europe, the Bosnians consider their na-
tion a full member of the large family of Is-
lamic peoples with their own age-old and
rich cultural traditions, which are an integral
part of the Bosnian national identity.
To be sure, in the Balkans, religion in gen-
eral has little to do with devoutness. Forty
years of communist rule dramatically re-
duced church and mosque attendance. The
religious revival of the last decade is mainly
the result of the people’s desire to express
their belonging to an ethnic or national
community. As religion is the basic compo-
nent of national identity, church and
mosque attendance appears to be a demon-
stration of national awareness. Of course,
the clergy (be it Catholic, Orthodox or Mus-
lim) has seized the opportunity to strength-
en its position in society and to acquire a
more or less official ‘national’ status. This
may – and often does – threaten the secular
character of the state granted by the Consti-
tution. It has, however, less to do with reli-
gious fanaticism than with nationalist fa-
naticism. This goes for Bosnians, Croats and
Serbs alike.
National and religious
i d e n t i t y
The identification of national and reli-
gious identity (in the sense of belonging to
a religious community) is the least articulat-
ed with the Bosnians. The same phenome-
non can be observed with the other Muslim
communities in the Balkans. The Pomaks
(Bulgarian Muslims) in the Rhodope moun-
tains in Southern Bulgaria, in spite of their
being linguistically related to the Bulgari-
ans, seem to associate more with the Turk-
ish minority in Bulgaria than with the major-
ity of Orthodox Bulgarians. Here, religion is
apparently a stronger uniting factor than
language. In Greece too, the Pomak minori-
ty is steadily absorbed by the Greek Turks,
notwithstanding the attempts of the Greek
authorities to impose upon them a Pomak
consciousness, separate from the Turkish
(and Bulgarian).
The identification of national and religious
identity is the strongest with the Orthodox
nations in the Balkans – Bulgarians, Greeks,
Macedonians, and Serbs. This is the result of
the Byzantine legacy of ‘national’ churches.
Nation, state, religious community and ec-
clesiastical organization are supposed to be
congruent. The Bulgarian Constitution
states that Orthodox Christianity is the tra-
ditional religion of the Bulgarian people; the
Greek Constitution is promulgated in the
name of the Holy Trinity. Consequently,
non-orthodox minorities – Muslim Pomaks
and Turks, but also Catholics and Protes-
tants – are considered, sometimes quite ex-
plicitly, as ‘defective’ Bulgarians, Greeks or,
for that matter, Macedonians and Serbs, and
as a threat to national unity and solidarity.
The identification of national and reli-
gious community has determined the atti-
tude of the Orthodox peoples in the Balkans
towards Islam in yet another way. In the 19t h
century, urged by nationalism, the Balkan
peoples began their struggle for national in-
dependence against the Ottoman domina-
tion, established at the end of the 14t h a n d
during the 15t h century. Independence was
perceived by the leaders of the respective
independence movements as the restora-
tion of the former mediaeval, pre-Ottoman
states. Since the mediaeval Balkan states re-
peatedly went through periods of imperial
growth and feudal disintegration, the bor-
ders were not very well defined. As a rule,
every national community aimed at the re-
establishment of its respective mediaeval
state at its maximum size – which resulted
in legion territorial overlappings and border
conflicts. In addition to the former size, the
Balkan peoples also wanted to restore the
ethnic composition of the population of
their former states. As religion was one of
the main distinctive features of national
identity, the former religious community
was to be restored as well. In contrast to his-
torical evidence, the population of the
Balkan mediaeval states was perceived by
the 19t h-century Balkan nationalists as eth-
nically and religiously homogeneous.
Thus, in order to re-establish the mediae-
val situation, ethnic and religious minorities
that came into being after the Ottoman con-
quest had to be eliminated. In some in-
stances, the identity of these minorities was
‘reconstructed’ in such a way that they
could be incorporated in and consequently
assimilated by the majority. The Greeks la-
belled their Slavic co-religionists (about
150,000 people) in Greek Macedonia as
‘Slavophone Greeks’ and have been treating
them as ethnic Greeks ever since. The Turks
in Greece too are officially called ‘Greek
Muslims’. Calling them Turks is punishable.
An attempt to ‘reconstruct’ the Bosnians as
Islamicized Serbs or Croats failed. For the
time being, Bulgarians have been more suc-
cessful in preventing the Pomaks from de-
veloping a separate Pomak national con-
sciousness – though they have been help-
ing them by explicitly identifying Bulgarian-
hood and orthodoxy.
The main victims of the Balkan Christians’
endeavours to restore their mediaeval
states are those communities that differ
both ethnically and religiously from the ma-
jority: the Turks and the Kosovars, being nei-
ther Slavs, Greeks, nor Orthodox Christians.
As Islam was introduced in the Balkans
mainly as a result of the Ottoman conquest,
there was no place for Albanian and Turkish
Muslims in the restored Christian Balkan
states. As the double barrier of ethnic and
religious ‘otherness’ made it impossible to
reconstruct their national identity in a way
to make them – albeit conceptually – disap-
pear into the majority, more radical ways to
eliminate them had to be resorted to. All in-
dependence wars in the Balkans (the Serb
Uprisings in 1804-30, the Greek War of Inde-
pendence in 1821-30, and the Russian-Ot-
toman War in 1877-8) were accompanied by
massacring and expelling not only the Ot-
toman officials and military, but also the
Muslim Turkish population. During the First
Balkan War in 1912, not only Turks but also
Albanians fell victim. The ethnic cleansing of
Bosnians in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo
is a resumption of this ‘method’ of nation
building in the late 20t h c e n t u r y .
Having lost most of its non-Turkish and
non-Muslim populations, the late Ottoman
Empire and the subsequent Turkish Repub-
lic resorted to similar practices in order to
ultimately create a homogeneous Turkish
state. The treatment of the Armenians,
Greeks and Kurds in Anatolia are the most
notorious of these measures. However, the
identification of nationhood and religious
affiliation is less apparent in the official
Turkish (Kemalist) interpretation of national
identity than it is in the Christian Balkan
c o u n t r i e s . ♦
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We ste rn  Euro p e
W E R N E R  S C H I F F A U E R
Against Metin Kaplan, self-proclaimed head of the
Caliphate State, proceedings were taken up by the
Oberlandesgericht Düsseldorf in February 2000. The
‘emir of the believers and caliph of Muslims’ had
been charged with incitement for the murder of his
opponent Halil Ibrahim Sofu in Berlin in 1997, and
with running a criminal organization. The process
may very well mark the end of most radical Islamic
group which has developed in the German diaspora
of Turkish migrants.
The End of
t h e Caliphate State?
The Metin
K a p l a n C a s eThe community was founded by Metin Ka-plan‘s father, Cemaleddin, in the early 80s as
a breakaway from the National View – the
European branch of the National Salvation
Party in Turkey. In 1983-84, the leadership of
the former National Salvation Party split on
the issue of whether the party should be re-
established after the coup d‘état of 1980. All
parties had been outlawed but now new na-
tional elections were scheduled. When Er-
bakan and the party establishment opted
for the foundation of a successor party (the
Refah (Welfare) Party), a revolutionary wing
headed by Kaplan separated. For them the
history of the coup d‘état had demonstrated
the limitations of a parliamentary way to an
Islamic rule. As soon as an Islamic party be-
came strong enough to form the govern-
ment and to introduce serious reforms, it
would be suppressed. Kaplan‘s teaching can
be summed up under three headings: (1)
Following Sayid Qutb, he proclaimed a revo-
lutionary situation: Turkey was in a state of
barbarity, analogous to the period of
c a h i l i y e t in pre-Muslim Mecca. In this situa-
tion, no compromises with the system were
possible. (2) The revolution could be
achieved by building up an extra-institu-
tional grassroots movement by means of
t e b liǧ (preaching with words and practice):
On the sole basis of the Koran, the disas-
trous frictions between Muslim communi-
ties worldwide could be overcome, a mass
movement would be established and the
unity of the ü m m e t could be restored. (3)
Revolutionary pan-Islamism: The reunifica-
tion of Islam has to start from below with a
coalition/cooperation of all revolutionary Is-
lamic groups (including the Islamic Republic
of Iran). The final aim would be the re-estab-
lishment of the caliphate. The new revolu-
tionary community set up by Kaplan called
itself ‘Union of the Islamic Communes and
Communities’ (I
.
s â m î Cemaatleri ve Cemiyet-
leri B i r liǧ i) .
The movement had a good start. Many
sympathizers of the National View in Europe
were weary of the compromises made by
the party establishment. Typical slogans
were those such as: ‘Does Islam exist for the
party or does the party exist for Islam?’ In
many of the mosques established by the Na-
tional View, the Revolutionary wing found a
majority and took over the mosque.
A religious military order
It soon became evident, however, that the
movement was not able to keep up the mo-
mentum it had in the beginning. It re-
mained restricted to the Turkish diaspora
communities in Europe. But even there it
did not appeal in a significant way to Mus-
lims who were not members of the National
View (like member of the S ü l e y m a n c ı o r
Nurcu communities). In 1985, the Kaplan
movement stagnated and in 1986 an ero-
sion process began. This process culminat-
ed when Ahmed Polat, one of the founding
members, left the movement together with
a considerable number of followers in 1987.
An erosion process is particularly problem-
atic for a charismatic movement in which
fascination born out of success is of existen-
tial importance. A charismatic movement ei-
ther grows or declines at an exponential
rate. The secession of Polat, therefore, could
have meant the end of the community. In
order to cope with this crucial situation, Ka-
plan re-organized the hitherto rather open
movement into a closed sect.
An issue of crucial importance was the re-
lation of the movement to the Islamic Re-
public of Iran. In the early 80s, the Sunni-
Shia split seemed to be a matter of the past
for many Muslims who were enthusiastic
about the possibilities of Islamic revolu-
tions. However, the Iranian revolution re-
mained a singular event (and became stuck
in the dirty war with Iraq). The hopes for
other revolutions waned. Parallel to disillu-
sionment, the old resentments against Shi-
ites re-surfaced again. After Polat had de-
fended his secession with a criticism of Ka-
plan‘s pro-Iranian stance, Kaplan saw him-
self forced to redefine his position. He now
began to insist on the basic dogmatic differ-
ences between Sunna and Shia. This dog-
matic clarification had practical conse-
quences. Kaplan stopped the practices of a
group of enthusiastic believers, who had
sworn an oath of allegiance to Khomeini
and had also insisted on putting up Khome-
ini posters in mosques. Dogmatic clarifica-
tion thus implied centralization, i.e. a
stronger control of the local mosques. In
order to be able to control the mosques
which were spread all over Europe, Kaplan
began to control personally the appoint-
ment of persons in charge (preachers and
heads of mosques). The autonomy the
mosques had enjoyed in the early phase of
the movement thus came to an end. The
drastic changes led to conflicts in the com-
munity and to the divorce from dissenting
members. Kaplan interpreted this process
as one of purification. He thus implied that
the loss of numerical strength was more
than compensated by an increase in spiritu-
al strength: While the fearsome and weak
parted, the strong and courageous re-
mained. A further aspect of this process was
an increased drawing of boundaries. The at-
tendance of mosque services and prayers
also by members of other communities
which had been the practice during the first
years ceased and only members of the Ka-
plan community proper now frequented
the mosque. A more or less exclusive in-
group thus evolved within which increas-
ingly non-conformist positions were devel-
oped, emphasizing the differences to other
Islamic communities.
Ideologically all this was reflected in the
transformation of the movement’s self-per-
ception: the Kaplan community no longer
conceived itself as a movement open to all
but rather as a closed religious military
order. The steps for becoming initiated
were centered around the institutions:
school (m e d r e s e), mystical convent (t e k k e)
and barracks (k ışl a k). The sectarian process
culminated in Kaplan declaring himself
locum tenens of the caliph in 1992. He also
proclaimed a government in exile. With this
step, the differences to the other Islamic
communities in Europe became irreconcil-
a b l e .
Kaplan as caliph
The radicalization of the movement went
along with a dramatic change in the social
composition of the community. The first fol-
lowers of Kaplan had been autodidacts of
the first generation, men who had little or
no formal education, who had taught them-
selves to read and write, and who had dis-
covered Islam on their own terms. They had
found in Kaplan a figure that expressed their
scepticism towards the wider society. They
associated Kaplan’s programme with the
hope for the restoration of the unity of Islam
– an issue of central importance to them.
Most of these men left Kaplan when he be-
came more sectarian. They realized quite
clearly that any claims to the caliphate were
unacceptable to the other Islamic commu-
nities and would therefore deepen the fric-
tions rather than help to overcome them.
However, younger migrants of the second
generation took their place – among them a
considerable number of academics and
high school students. These students intro-
duced new practices into the community.
They set up groups for learning Arabic,
studying Islamic law, learning about the life
of the Prophet, and so on. In short, they de-
veloped a rather academic approach to
Islam, using the intellectual tools they had
acquired in German institutions of higher
education. They stressed truth more than
unity and therefore had fewer problems
with the increasingly sectarian nature of the
community. Kaplan‘s success with regard to
the recruitment of new members stabilized
and reinvigorated the community. The
number of members, which had dropped
from approximately 12,000 in 1985 to 1300
in 1992, has remained stable ever since.
The years 1992-1994 saw further develop-
ments toward an elitist cadre party which
increasingly viewed itself as the spearhead
of the Islamic revolution. In 1994, Kaplan fi-
nally declared himself Caliph-proper. This
rather presumptuous step was justified with
the notion of a historical turning point. After
centuries of the decline of Islam, only a
small but powerful elite was left (all other
Muslims being trapped in compromises
with the world). Under the leadership of the
new Caliph, a r e c o n q u i s t a would commence.
Sceptics were reminded of the small num-
ber of believers Muhammed commanded in
the battle of Badr. This construction is char-
acteristic of the hermetic logic that had de-
veloped in the sect during the first half of
the 90s. Although internally coherent, it
could no longer communicated to members
of other Islamic communities.
In 1995, on his deathbed, Cemaleddin Ka-
plan appointed his son Metin as successor
to the Caliphate. Metin, who did not have
the charisma of his father, faced consider-
able problems in the community. In early
1996, the movement split and a counter
caliphate under Ibrahim Sofu was pro-
claimed in Berlin. Both caliphs issued dia-
tribes, brandishing each other as d e c c a l. In
summer 1996, Metin issued a fatwa con-
demning the counter-caliph to death. In
May 1997 Ibrahim was actually killed by a
death squad in his apartment in Berlin. Al-
though – of course – Metin was under suspi-
cion, nothing could be proven. There is the
suspicion that the murder was committed
by volunteers who had served as mercenar-
ies in Kosovo and in Afghanistan and had
learned to kill in these wars. In October
1998, Turkish authorities claimed (in what
looked very much like a set-up by the Turk-
ish Secret Service) that the police had pre-
vented an attack on the A n ı t k a b i r (the mau-
soleum of Atatürk) during the festivities cel-
ebrating the 75t h anniversary of the revolu-
t i o n .
In 1999, Metin Kaplan was arrested,
though the charges against him seem to
stand on rather shaky grounds. The state at-
torney admitted during the first day of the
trial that a direct link to the murder of
Ibrahim Sofu cannot be established. A con-
viction seems doubtful. But even if the trial
is inconclusive, it is increasingly placing po-
litical pressure on the movement and might
very well mean its end. ♦
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MI C H A E L  W .  S U L E I M A N
Arabs have been emigrating to North America for
over a century, and they now number approximately
three million. For most of this period of emigration,
the overwhelming majority of Arab immigrants to
America were Christian. However, large numbers of
Muslim Arabs (and other Muslims) have settled in the
New World, especially since World War II. Almost
from the beginning, the Arab community in North
America suffered from negative attitudes directed
against it by the host society. An important ingredi-
ent in negative stereotypes of Arabs is the general
American impression that Arabs and Muslims are es-
sentially the same people. Indeed, to Americans, the
term ‘Arab’ or ‘Muslim’ conjures up hostile reactions
to a large group of nations or countries (e.g. Arabs,
Turks, Iranians, Muslims, etc.) which are seen as in-
distinguishable. Such views have had a definite im-
pact on the Arab community in North America.
The Arab Community in
North America
Until World War I, Arabs in North America
may be considered sojourners exhibiting
many traits of a middleman minority, that is,
a community whose members primarily en-
gage in one particular specialized activity
such as migrant work or peddling. Indeed,
substantial numbers of Arabs in America en-
gaged in commerce, most often beginning
as peddlers commissioned by their own
countrymen. Their objective was to make
the greatest amount of money in the short-
est possible time in order to help their fami-
lies in the country of origin and/or to even-
tually retire in comfort in their village or
neighbourhood. In the meantime, in Ameri-
ca, they spent as little of their income as
possible, often living in crowded tenements
and, while on the road, in barns, or shacks to
avoid expensive hotel costs. They did not
live rounded lives, allowing themselves no
luxuries and finding contentment and so-
lace in family life. They developed few last-
ing relationships with ‘Americans.’ A l - N i z a l a,
the term the Arab-American community
used to refer to itself, is a name which clear-
ly described its status and purpose. It means
a ‘temporary settlement’, and it was used in
contrast to ‘the Americans’ to indicate the
alien or stranger status of Arabs in America.
World War I was a watershed for Arabs in
North America, cutting them off from their
people back home. An important identity
crisis occurred when these peripatetic so-
journers realized that they had to make a
major decision about whether to become
‘settlers’ or return to their former home-
lands. It had become increasingly difficult
for them to function as temporary aliens.
After World War I, it became clear to large
numbers of Arabs in North America that it
was not possible to go ‘home’ again and
that, in fact, the United States and Canada
were their homes. This change from so-
journer to permanent settler necessitated,
and was accompanied by, other changes,
both in the way Arabs in America thought
and in the way they behaved. Arabs in
America now saw more clearly that they had
to become full-fledged Americans. Assimila-
tion was now strongly and widely advocat-
ed, and citizenship training and naturaliza-
tion were greatly encouraged.
In the heyday of the melting pot approach
to assimilation, Arabs in America strove to
remove any differences separating them
from the general American population, ex-
cept perhaps for food and music. They also
neglected (or deliberately chose not) to
teach their children Arabic or to instill in
them much pride in their heritage. The re-
sult was that, by World War II, Arabs in North
America were, for all practical purposes, a
group indistinguishable from the host soci-
ety. It took a second wave of immigration
and other developments to rekindle interest
in their Arab heritage and to revive them as
an ethnic community.
Building a new future
Among the most important issues with
which Arabs in America have had to wrestle
is the definition of who they are, their sense
of identity as a people, especially as they en-
countered and continue to encounter bias
and discrimination in their new homeland.
While Arabs in the United States and
Canada constitute an ethnic group, they
were not an ethnic minority in their former
homelands. Their new identity has been
shaped by many factors but especially by an
active and continuing interaction between
conditions in the old and the new home-
lands – as well as the interplay between
their perceptions of themselves and how
others see them. Thus, while the early immi-
grants spoke Arabic and came from a pre-
dominantly Arabic culture and heritage,
they nevertheless did not think of them-
selves as ‘Arabs’. The main bond of solidari-
ty among them at that time was familial,
sectarian, and village- or region-oriented. In
fact, the plethora of names by which they
were known in the New World reflects both
their own lack of ‘national’ identity as well
as ignorance or confusion on the part of the
host society.
In a very real sense, the search for an ade-
quate or ‘comfortable’ identity for Arabs in
America has been guided (or perhaps com-
plicated) by the need to feel pride in their
heritage and simultaneously avoid preju-
dice and discrimination in their new home-
land. For most, the search is neither success-
ful nor final. They continue to feel and expe-
rience marginality in American society and
p o l i t i c s .
They try to overcome this in various ways.
Some resort to ethnic denial: they de-em-
phasize their Arab background by claiming
connection with what they believe is more
acceptable in America. Instead of proclaim-
ing their Arabism, for instance, they claim
that they are Lebanese or Egyptian. Some
may even deny their heritage altogether,
claiming to be Greek or Italian. Some new
arrivals, however, choose ethnic isolation.
They are unwilling to change themselves,
and do not believe they can change the host
s o c i e t y .
Among those who want full integration or
assimilation into American society, especial-
ly middle-class Arab Americans, many em-
phasize the strong cultural link between
Arabs and Americans. For most, accommo-
dation is the easiest and most comfortable
stance. These men and women consciously
or subconsciously act in ways that reduce
their differentness from the American dom-
inant group. They attempt to blend in. Oth-
ers, especially those who seek material suc-
cess, and particularly those who are in ‘pub-
lic professions’ (television, radio, movies,
etc.), often give in and convert to the pre-
vailing view. Not infrequently, these individ-
uals – the very individuals who are looked
down upon by the Arab-American commu-
nity – are then selected to speak for and rep-
resent Arabs in America.
The Arab-American
community in the 1990s
After more than a century of immigration,
it is clear that the basic reasons that Arabs
came to America are no different from those
that drove or attracted other groups to
come. They came for a variety of reasons:
the promise of a quick fortune and a sense
of adventure; the threat of war or economic
disaster; education, training, and technolo-
gy; or the thrill of living in a free democratic
system. Whatever their reasons, true inte-
gration and full assimilation have so far gen-
erally eluded them. In part, this is the result
of the many developments leading to the
debunking of the notion of a melting pot
and greater tolerance of a multicultural so-
ciety. The more important reason, however,
has been the hostility the host society has
shown toward Arab immigrants.
Nevertheless, on the whole, Arabs in
America have done very well. Since the
1960s, there has always been at least one
representative of Arab background in the
US Congress (for example, James Abourezk,
Mary Rose Oakar, Mark Joe (Nick) Rahal II).
Others have served as state governors (Vic-
tor Atiyeh) or on the White House staff (John
H. Sununu). Similarly, individuals of Arab de-
scent have been elected to the Canadian
parliament (for example, Mac Harb and
Mark Assad), as well as to provincial legisla-
t u r e s .
Furthermore, Arab Americans have not
only done well, but have even fared better
economically than the general population
average in many areas. The 1980 and 1990
US census data, for instance, show that Arab
Americans reached a higher educational
level than the American population as a
whole. In fact, according to the 1990 census,
15.2% of Arab Americans have graduate de-
grees or higher – more than twice the na-
tional average of 7.2%. Household income
among Arab Americans also tends to be
higher than the average. They have also
proven to do well in professional, manage-
ment, and sales professions.
Although many Arabs in America have
reached the highest level of their profes-
sion, in almost all professions, the American
media primarily highlight the negative
achievements of Arabs. Quite often, in fact,
the media will announce the ‘Arab’ (or ‘Is-
lamic’) origin or affiliation of anyone ac-
cused of a terrorist act – even before they
know whether the perpetrator is indeed
Arab or Muslim. In the case of positive role
models, however, such as Michael DeBakey
or Ralph Nader, the media rarely, if ever,
mention that these individuals are of Arab
background. In part, the reason is that, be-
cause of racism, many find it necessary to
hide their origins. Every now and then, lists
of prominent Arab Americans are published
in the press to inform the public about the
community’s accomplishments. But the
very fact that such lists are compiled indi-
cates that Arab Americans feel the sting of
negative stereotyping and try to correct
such bad publicity.
Despite the fact that Arabs have lived in
America for over a century and despite their
major successes, they are still struggling to
be accepted in American society. Full inte-
gration and assimilation will not be achieved
until that happens. ♦
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This article is a translated version of Lange’s 
‘Een handdruk mag worden geweigerd’,
N R CH a n d e l s b l a d, The Netherlands, 23 March 2000.
Yasha Lange is an editor of the NRC Handelsblad, 
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When may a headscarf be forbidden or not? Case law
determines where the boundaries of an individual
culture are drawn. The alderwoman of education in
Almere, a town in the vicinity of Amsterdam, the
Netherlands, extends her hand in a friendly way to-
wards the director of the Islamic school. He keeps his
arms stiff at his sides. The alderwoman’s extended
hand dangles uncomfortably in the air. A discussion
takes place. The council of the Al-Iman school says
that Muslims are not permitted to have physical con-
tact with the opposite sex. The alderwoman eventu-
ally decides to respect this. What else can she do? 
A Handshake 
May Be Refused
In a reaction in the Dutch daily T r o u w, M a y o r
of the conservative Christian municipality of
Staphorst, W. Plomp asked rhetorically,
‘How far should the tolerance [of the major-
ity] go if this gives minorities the room to
exercise a form of intolerance that serves
what we, in our culture, consider as rude-
ness and discrimination against the oppo-
site sex? Shouldn’t you expect some give
and take from both sides?’ Of course, but
the council of the Islamic school is still with-
in its rights – that is, if the findings of the
Commission of Equal Treatment are any in-
d i c a t i o n .
At the end of 1998, an Muslim couple goes
to the dentist. The wife refuses to shake
hands with the male dentist. The dentist is
so angry that he, in turn, refuses to examine
the husband’s teeth. He also submits a com-
plaint to the Commission of Equal Treat-
ment: discrimination on the basis of gender.
However, the Commission rules that there is
no discrimination. The Muslim woman is
within her ‘rights’. Religion wins over social
n o r m s .
Around ten years ago, the concept of ‘in-
tegration with the preservation of culture’
was introduced. A stroke of genius, a ‘win-
win’ situation, everyone happy. Sometimes,
however, integration and the preservation
of culture seem to clash. And now and then,
that sort of collision is fought out in court.
Then, case law also gives a reasonable
amount of insight into the question of
where the boundaries are drawn between
the two sometimes conflicting ideas.
An example: a Moroccan father does not
want his daughter to participate in the re-
quired mixed swimming lessons at school.
He points out a verse in the Koran to the
judge. The judge finds that the text in the
Koran has been interpreted quite freely and
that it is not explicitly stated that mixed
swimming is forbidden. The case goes to
the Supreme Court. The judgement is am-
biguous. The school is right because the fa-
ther had never submitted a formal request
for exemption. But the father is right in that
the Dutch judge should not have pretended
to be an authority on the Koran.
Another example: a woman has already
worked as a hairdresser for six years. One
day, she decides to wear a headscarf. The
owner of the hair salon believes that this
cannot be permitted; his clientele will drop
off and he wants to fire the woman. She
fights her dismissal in court, which decides
in her favour. According to the judge, the
owner has ‘not sufficiently demonstrated’
that a hairdresser wearing a headscarf
would be detrimental to his business. In the
discussion over integration and the preser-
vation of culture, the term ‘making space’
regularly surfaces.
Representatives of minority organizations
believe that the Netherlands should not
only profess integration in theory, but
should also make room for different cultures
in practice. Therefore, they want days off on
Islamic holidays, Eid al Adha (Festival of Sac-
rifice) to be a national holiday, a place for
prayer in the workplace and single-sex gym
classes in school. They believe that integra-
tion will go more smoothly if the Nether-
lands makes space for the cultivation of in-
dividual identity.
Minister Van Boxtel (Minority Policy) is in-
deed in agreement. His position: everything
is fine, as long as the borders of the Dutch
legal system are not crossed. ’I think praying
in a public school is fine. But the boundary is
the Dutch constitution. That should not be
t o u c h e d . ’
According to Susan Rutten, teacher of pri-
vate law at the University of Maastricht, that
also does not happen in practice. Years ago,
she wrote an overview on Moslims in de Ned-
erlandse Rechtspraak (Muslims in the Dutch
Justice System), for the Ministry of the Inte-
rior. Since then, she has kept up with all case
law. ‘In decisions regarding compulsory ed-
ucation or in criminal cases, the fundamen-
tals of Dutch law are not touched.’
However, it is not always so clear. Recog-
nizing a child from a polygamous marriage?
An employee who wants to pray during
working hours? Who gets custody of a
child? Mostly the mother in the Nether-
lands, always the father in Morocco. In these
sorts of cases, judges seldom give an across-
t h e - b o a r d verdict, says Rutten. ’A weighing
of interests occurs.’
As an example, she takes the case of an
Muslim woman who receives unemploy-
ment benefits. The woman refuses a job be-
cause only men work in the company. Her
benefit payments are threatened, legal pro-
ceedings follow and the woman is judged to
be within her rights. It would cause prob-
lems with her faith, her husband and her en-
vironment if she went to work for that com-
pany. Thus, ‘within reason’ it can not be re-
quired that she accept the job.
However, that is true for just this case. A
Moroccan woman requests benefit pay-
ments and says at the same time that she is
not suitable for the work market because
she already does housework. The benefits
are denied, the woman initiates legal pro-
ceedings, but does not win the case and re-
ceives no benefits.
Different factors influence the judges’
weighing of interests. ‘The call of religion is
a strong argument’, says Rutten. ‘To coun-
teract that, you need something very impor-
tant.’ An example is the verdict of the
Supreme Court on the wearing of head-
scarves by students at a public school in the
town of Alphen aan den Rijn. Since then, al-
most all cases concerning the headscarf
have been won by the wearers – except in
gym class. Rutten: ‘The Commission of Equal
Treatment then asked the girls to do a som-
ersault, to see if the headscarves presented
a danger. Good, huh? Finally, the Commis-
sion found that for safety reasons, it was not
discriminatory to forbid headscarves during
gym class. In another case, however, the
Commission found that long sleeves may in-
deed be worn in gym class.
Other influential factors are the fairly
broad equality principle and the degree to
which an individual is integrated in the
Netherlands. The better integrated, the less
the claim to a ‘cultural background’. A good
example of the weighing of interests is the
groundbreaking decision of the Supreme
Court in 1984 regarding a woman who was
fired on the spot because she refused to
work on an Islamic holiday. Verdict: if some-
one asks well in advance for an extra day off
for an important holiday, that cannot be
grounds for firing the person. But the
Supreme Court also had a proviso: if the in-
terests of the employer would be seriously
impaired, then no day off.
It appears from case law that judges take
into account the cultural background, faith
and sometimes the inequalities between
the sexes in other cultures. Is that also true
for incidences of crimes of honour, such as
the recent shooting at a school in Veghel?
Rutten: ‘The judge will never say: someone
is not punishable because “honour” crimes
are seen differently in Turkey. But the cir-
cumstances of each individual are consid-
ered. It is not unthinkable that in such cases,
cultural background could fall under the
category of overpowering psychological







a d o l e s c e n t s .
true Islam. In a word, the modern communi-
ty is virtual, and not embedded in a society
or a territory.2 This individual re-appropria-
tion of knowledge and authority is also an
indicator of the westernization of the rela-
tion to religion.
Of course, the ‘salafi’ or fundamentalist an-
swer to westernization and globalization is
not the only answer, even if it is the more vis-
ible. In fact most of the Muslims who would
define themselves as ‘believers’ tend to find
their own personal way of adapting to this
western environment, which by the way is
not a ‘Christian’ one, but a secular one. There
is no symmetry between religions, because
the western religions have left the public
scene to become private. The process we are
witnessing today is one of individualization
and privatization of religious practices, of
the relation of the self with religion.
Here we come to another issue. It is wide-
ly admitted, among western public opinion,
that westernization should go along with an
a g g i o r n a m e n t o in theology and religious
thinking, a ‘liberal Islam’ as opposed to fun-
damentalist Islam. Of course there are many
Islamic thinkers working on this issue. But
their impact on the Muslim population
seems rather weak. Any visit to an Islamic
bookshop shows that the most popular
books are not related to an ‘enlightened’
perception of Islam, but to basic or even
fundamentalist description of what religion
is and what the duties of the believer are.
But this is not in contradiction with the
‘salafi’ trends within the Muslim popula-
tions. In fact, the two real trends which are
working among the European Muslims are:
firstly, a vocal fundamentalist school of
thought, trying to build a reconstructed
community by preaching individuals, and
addressing the real concerns of individuals
who lost most of their community links; and
secondly, the silent majority of the believ-
ers, who found their way on the basis of
compromises, adaptations, and makeshift
Continued from front page: Muslims in Europe / by Olivier Roy
N o t e s
1 . The confusion between religious and ‘ethnic’
groups, or more exactly the perception of a
religious group as a quasi one has some
antecedents in Europe: one can be an atheist
‘Protestant’ or ‘Catholic’ in Northern Ireland.
2 . ‘La communauté virtuelle: l’Internet et la
déterritorialisation de l’islam’ (2000). R é s e a u x.
Paris: CENT/Hermes Science Publication.
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theology. The real processes at work among
the Muslim are that of individualization and
reconstruction of identities along different
patterns, all phenomena that undermine
the very idea of ‘one’ Muslim community in
Europe. There is no Western Islam, there are
Western Muslims. ♦
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E d u c a t i o n
N I M A T H A F E Z  B AR A Z A N G I  
American Muslims do face misconceptions, yet their
view of the woman as morally dependent, hence so-
cially and politically non-central to issues of Islamic
and multicultural education is indeed problematic.
How is it plausible for a morally dependent individ-
ual to instil the character of an autonomous spiritual
and intellectual Muslim who can integrate effectively
in a ‘pluralistic’ society? A change in the paradigm of
moral or religious education – beyond multicultural-




In 1998, a special edition of Religion and Ed-
u c a t i o n (R & E, 25, 1&2, Winter 1998, St. Louis,
MO: Webster University), a journal of the Na-
tional Council on Religion and Public Educa-
tion, focused on ‘Issues of Islamic Education
in the US’, suggesting a transformation in
the framework of investigating moral or reli-
gious curricula if we seek significant
changes resulting from the contemporary
‘educational reform’ movements. As issues
of character building and religious identity
are making a visible dent both in education-
al assessments and religio-ethnic cultural
studies, a main concern comprises cross-
cultural understandings of education that
take religion, values, character, or morals as
a sub-text, particularly when a woman’s
morality is viewed as a proxy to that of her
male household.
The theme of this special edition of R & E i s
t a q w a. T a q w a is an Arabic word often over-
simply translated as ‘piety’, but which bears
the meaning of ‘a conscious balance be-
tween the individual, the society, and the
limits set by Allah or God as the source of
value and knowledge.’ As the guest editor
of this edition, three overarching issues for-
mulated my thinking on it – from selecting
the theme to the significance that this edi-
tion of R & E may have for the debate over ed-
ucation in the US as a whole. The first issue
is how to achieve a balance between the be-
lief systems of individuals (often referred to
as religion or philosophy) and the US uni-
versal schooling system which has tradition-
ally intended, to a large degree, to meld di-
verse individual views into the ‘common
ground’ of a ‘pluralistic’ social framework.
The second issue is questioning the efficacy
of ‘teaching about religion’ and ‘teaching a
religion’. This issue comes out in particularly
sharp relief in teaching about Islam as a be-
lief system, and about Muslims, in a ‘neutral’
manner when many teachers have little or
no knowledge of Islam, and what they do
know too often offers an inaccurate picture.
The third issue, which was the core of this
edition, is how to introduce a discourse on
‘Islamic education’ from females’ perspec-
tives – only two of the thirteen contributors
are males – when females have traditionally
been perceived as lacking the full privilege
to interpret Islam.
The centrality of Muslim women’s and
girls’ education and acculturation (Barazan-
gi and Mohja Kahf’s articles) to Islamic edu-
cation – and even their very contribution to
this edition of R & E – may seem contradicto-
ry and perhaps difficult to understand by
those whose knowledge of Islam is limited
to the perception that males are the only ‘le-
gitimate interpreters’ of Islamic texts or the
perception that females are ‘oppressed by
their patriarchal religion’.
Challenges and responses
The challenge facing Muslim educators –
and those who would learn or educate oth-
ers about Islam – is twofold. On the one
hand, teaching about religion, particularly
about Islam, has been relegated to courses
in history, social sciences, area studies or
world religions (Maysam al Faruqi and
Gisela Webb’s articles address the higher
education dilemmas).
This relegation makes ‘religion’ seem as if it
were something of the past, neglecting the
lived experience of it, even though some,
particularly Muslim educators, have made
great strides not to let that happen (Susan
Douglass, Audrey Shabbas and Sharifa
Alkhateeb’s articles). On the other hand,
Muslim educators are trying to restore the
relationship between ‘values’ and ‘facts’, or
soul and mind, while nonetheless ignoring
their discrepant practices concerning
women’s autonomous morality. The US con-
stitutional framework that separates ‘teach-
ing about religion’ from ‘teaching religion’
may have resulted in a split between teach-
ing and educating, but more problematic is
the Muslims’ splitting between the female’s
ability to consciously choose Islam as her
worldview or belief system and her ability to
cognitively participate in the interpretation
of this belief system.
The first matter is being addressed by in-
troducing ‘Islamic education’ as an alterna-
tive measure (Salwa Abd-Allah and Zakiyyah
Muhammad’s articles). The demand on
teachers to be ‘neutral’ when teaching
about religion and its ‘sacred language’ – o r
values in general – can reduce teaching to
the transmission of ‘facts’ and reduce reli-
gion to a sterile ‘factual’ entity. This reduc-
tion seems to disregard the human need for
a value system that is learned in a particular
language and taught within a specific his-
torical and cultural environment (Mary El-
Khatib and Yahiya Emerick’s articles) using
specific instructional material (Abidullah
Ghazi and Tasneema Ghazi’s article). The
second matter, the conscious choice of the
belief system needs to be addressed further.
We educators – Muslim or non-Muslim –
have missed the practice of the basic princi-
ple for clear cognition and constructive be-
haviour, autonomous morality, especially
when we continue to rely solely on male in-
terpretations of Islam and of woman’s
morality from her male household.
Prospects of change
No matter what we call this process of im-
parting knowledge, the problem lies in that
we continuously talk about change, expect-
ing change by the ‘other’ without changing
ourselves first. Some refer to the Qur’an as
stating that God will never change the con-
dition of a people until they change what is
in themselves (Qur’an, 13: 11). How can we,
for instance, teach about Abrahamic reli-
gions equitably, or about other worldviews,
when some of us still perceive the ‘other’ as
inferior without attempting to understand
the basis of the particular behaviour we find
o b j e c t i o n a b l e ?
When the majority of us still consider our
own standard interpretations and practices
as the measuring stick for how others think
and what they ‘ought to do’ – instead of
considering facilitating them to learn to
think autonomously – then we have not yet
acknowledged our shortcomings as human
educators. Various teachings and philoso-
phies have set certain limits, yet these
teachings also remind us that the judge of
our work and intention is not our own crite-
rion, but the guiding principle of t a q w a, or
the equilibrium between autonomy and
heteronomy. How constructive this balance
is in our own character and interaction with
ourselves, others and nature, is what makes
us human. We need a constant reminder to
recognize our human limitations, and so our
job is to figure out how to strike this bal-
ance, not to dictate the criterion to each
o t h e r .
To recognize that Muslim learners in the
US need a different schema from that of
non-Muslim learners is as significant as real-
izing that these Muslim learners also need a
different schema from that of Muslims any-
where else. How we may bring an equilibri-
um between the ideals of Islamic pedagogy,
and the prevailing views and practices of
education in the United States, based on Pi-
aget, Dewey and others is one step forward.
To recognize the centrality of Muslim
women’s Islamic higher learning and active
agency in interpreting Qur’anic pedagogy is
the first step toward equitable Islamic edu-
c a t i o n .
I am concerned with integrating these
and other views into a balanced pedagogy
for Muslims – both males and females – and
for teaching (about) Islam in the United
States at the turn of the 21s t century. This
implies a pedagogy in which there is equi-
librium between the need for deciding the
moral, religious, as well as secular founda-
tions of multicultural education and the
need for determining how best we may pre-
pare the next generation to consciously
think about, and to effectively act within,
the parameters of these foundations.
One of the focal points of Piaget’s social
theory is the concept of equilibrium. ‘Equili-
brated exchanges among adults’, writes
Rheta De Vries, ‘are those in which discus-
sants share a common framework of refer-
ence (which may be political, literary, reli-
gious, etc.), conserve common definitions,
symbols, etc., and coordinate reciprocal
propositions. Piaget (1941/95) calls this
phenomenon “reciprocal valorization” by
“co-exchangers” within a particular scale of
values.’ (Educational Researcher, 1997, 26:
1 1 ) .
The equilibrated education
Valorizations – being ‘affective and cogni-
tive’, and eventually social – represent the
‘equilibrated exchange’ that the contribu-
tors (the ‘valorizers’) in this special edition
of R& E hope to achieve. As important is rec-
ognizing a representation of these valoriz-
ers’ frame of reference – being predomi-
nantly feminine and paradigmatically differ-
ent from those who follow precedent
(m u q a l l i d u n). Also significant is the realiza-
tion that learners who identify themselves
with Islam as a worldview (encompassing
both religion and culture) or with Muslims
as a cultural group have special needs.
Depending on the reader’s frame of refer-
ence, this special edition of R& E m a y
achieve either a ‘cooperative equilibrium’ or
result in a constraining system that I would
call ‘window-dressing tolerance’. I am not
‘reading history backward’ when I bring to
the readers’ awareness the fact that equilib-
rium, t a q w a, in the Qur’an is the measuring
stick by which a human character is judged
(Qur’an, 49:13). By extension, I argue that
t a q w a can also be the criterion by which a
course of study is declared ‘Islamic’ or ‘non-
Islamic’. It is only when education achieves
this (conscious) balance, this equilibrium,
that we can call it ‘Islamic’. To focus on
whether Muslim/Islamic schools are impart-
ing ‘Islamic education’ or ‘religious educa-
tion’, and what is being projected as ‘Islam-
ic’, is to understand the relationship be-
tween two domains in the pedagogy of
moral judgement and ‘religious education’,
particularly in ‘pluralistic’ societies like the
US. The relationship between the ontologi-
cal domain (the beliefs about the nature of
reality) and the intellectual domain (the
causal and associational standards by which
we investigate reality) is almost absent in
the American Muslim educators’ debates,
especially when women’s perspectives and
participation in jurisprudence and consulta-
tive community affairs are concerned. Fur-
thermore, these are rarely discussed in con-
temporary educational debates. Is there a
relationship between the absence of such
discussions and the misunderstandings that
surround Islam (and Muslims)? How does
this relate to the prevalent views of Muslim
women’s and girls’ morality, education and
acculturation? I challenge the reader to find
the connection. ♦
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B oo k Rev i ew
A L L A N  C H R I S T E L O W
On his way through an airport in 1988, Professor
Bilqasim S aca d a l l a h of the University of Algiers expe-
rienced a scholar’s worst nightmare. He lost a brief-
case containing a partially completed manuscript, re-
search notes, and documents difficult to replace.
This disaster might be read as a metaphor for his ob-
ject of study, Algerian cultural history. On a far larger
scale, French colonialism posed a potentially irre-
versible disaster for the Arabic and Islamic cultural
heritage of Algeria. With the initial French onslaught
in the 1830s, many documents and manuscripts were
destroyed; some for no better reason than that
French soldiers found them convenient for lighting
their pipes. French confiscation of Islamic endow-
ment properties in urban areas left educational insti-
tutions dependent on meager allocations from colo-
nial authorities. The prolonged upheaval of the revo-
lution from 1954 to 1962 also took its toll as the mili-
tant settlers of the Secret Army Organization (OAS)
used their incendiary skills on the National Library,
and as private collections of books and periodicals
were destroyed or dispersed, and archives were cart-




Bilqasim S aca d a l l a h
The task of re-collecting the materials of Al-
geria’s cultural heritage is, despite all that
has occurred, by no means impossible. To
Professor Sacadallah it was a compelling task.
He continued with his work and, some ten
years after the briefcase disaster, published a
nine-volume work, Tarikh a l - J a z a i ' i r a l -
t h a q a f i (The Cultural History of Algeria) with
Dar al-Gharb al-Islami, a Beirut publishing
house specializing in works on the Maghrib.
Scope of the Work
This work is encyclopedic in scope, cover-
ing aspects of Algerian culture ranging from
Quranic interpretation and Islamic law to
decorative arts and music. Several sections
reflect the Islamic tradition of scholars’ bi-
ographies. The first two volumes cover from
1500 to 1830, from the eve of the Ottoman
era to the start of the French conquest. The
next six volumes cover the colonial era, and
the final volume consists of an exhaustive
i n d e x .
The Tarikh al-thaqafi casts a wide net, cov-
ering not only major and minor Algerian Is-
lamic scholars and religious leaders but also
French educators, interpreters, and Oriental-
ists, as well as French educated and bi-cultur-
al Algerian Muslims. Its encyclopaedic style,
at once broadly comprehensive and narrow-
ly segmented by topic, offers an alternative
to the monograph, a Western scholarly for-
mat that has dominated the writing of Alger-
ian history in the post-colonial era. It allows
for the exploration of persons, events, and
themes that escape the attention of scholars
guided by narrow theoretical concerns.
The immediate purpose of the Tarikh al-
thaqafi is to create a practical reference work.
But it is hard to separate this practical task
from larger issues. A product of the 1980s
and 1990s, this work appears at a time when
it has become evident that Algerians cannot
simply retreat comfortably into their Arabic-
Islamic tradition, and that Algeria is inextrica-
bly involved in a wider global society. In
these decades, many Algerians, both of secu-
lar and Islamic orientation, have found them-
selves destined to live and raise their families
in Europe or North America. An element in
the evolving identity of these communities is
the conviction that dialogue between Islam-
ic and Western cultures is possible, and that
Algerians, because of their long and intense
exposure to the West, have an important role
in spearheading such dialogue. In this con-
text, an investigation of cultural interactions
in the colonial period is highly relevant.
Second, the relation between religion –
and, more broadly, culture – and the state
has emerged as a central problem for Alge-
ria. A reasoned discussion of the issue re-
quires an examination of the three decades
prior to the First World War (abundantly cov-
ered in these volumes), a period when Islam-
ic policy was at the heart of France’s p o l i t i q u e
c o l o n i a l e. The colonial authorities then nur-
tured an orthodox religious establishment in
Algeria but, as alliances between religious
elites and governments often are, it was frag-
i l e .
S aca d a l l a h ’ s work does not propose any
simple, clear-cut thesis about the evolving
relationship between Islam and the state.
Rather, he provides examples that might
serve as grist for discussion of the issue. He
often displays his greatest enthusiasm when
discussing individuals who defy easy catego-
rization, who invite us to see the complexity
of forces shaping the Algerian past.
Launching Arabic journalism
Take for example Jeanne Desrayaux,
daughter of an Algiers lycée professor, and
herself recipient of a diploma in Arabic. In
1905, she was sent by the then Governor
General Charles Jonnart, along with her fa-
ther, on a mission to Tunisia and Egypt.
There she studied girls’ education and Arabic
publications. Inspired by what she saw, she
returned to Algeria to establish a l - I h y a (R e-
v i v a l), the first Arabic-language magazine
published in Algeria. Leading Algerian fig-
ures in the state-sponsored Islamic educa-
tional establishment collaborated on the
publication. It published articles on the cul-
tural and political ferment sweeping the Is-
lamic world at the time. A key premise of a l -
I h y a was that assimilation had failed and the
future well-being of Algeria depended upon
moral and intellectual regeneration based
on Arabic-Islamic tradition. Though it lasted
less than two years, publishing some thirty-
four bi-weekly issues, al-Ihya helped inspire a
number of other Arabic newspapers in the
years before the First World War.
S aca d a l l a h contrasts Desrayaux to her con-
temporary, Isabelle Eberhart, a figure who
has attracted much attention from Western
academics, drawn to her image of swash-
buckling adventure and lifestyle experimen-
tation. Desrayaux receives scarcely a line in
the major French language studies of Alge-
ria. If her photograph is an accurate indica-
tion, she was prim and proper. She also ap-
pears to have been at least partly of African
ancestry, perhaps with family origins in the
French West Indies. It may be that part of
Jonnart’s intent in fostering her enterprise
was to create a socially conservative alterna-
tive to a l - A k h b a r, the paper run by French
radical Victor Barrucand, chief promoter of
the Eberhart mystique.
Jonnart’s efforts to create a sort of Franco-
Algerian synthesis in early 20t h-century Alge-
ria soon broke down, and for many reasons.
It was an imperial cultural synthesis, built
from the top down, opposed from the outset
by French settler politicians, supported by
diverse individuals who, because of their ed-
ucation or disposition, identified with the ef-
fort to promote what we would now call a
multi-cultural society. The effort was also
crippled by the French law on separation of
state from religion, passed in 1905.
Islamic activist 
with a colonial medal
As the imperial synthesis crumbled, new
expressions of Islam in Algeria took on a
more popular and political character. Symp-
tomatic of this transformation was cA b b a s
Bin Hamana, who was instrumental in estab-
lishing the first community-supported mod-
ern Islamic school in Algeria, in Tebessa, a
town near the Tunisian frontier, some 200
kilometres south of the Mediterranean.
Tebessa was remote in location, yet situated
so that it was exposed to new winds blowing
in from Tunis and Tripoli.
Bin Hamana was in many ways a model
colonial subject, decorated by the French for
his zeal as an agricultural entrepreneur. But
when the Italians invaded Libya in 1911, Bin
Hamana, like many assimilated Algerians, be-
came an ardent supporter of the rebels. He
corresponded with Tripolitanian rebel leader
Sulayman al-Baruni.
Not long after this Bin Hamana got caught
up in the fray of municipal politics in
Tebessa. He incurred the wrath of the local
French mayor, who had him thrown in jail.
But he also struck up an alliance with Charles
Michel, an engineer posted in Tebessa to
work on the nearby phosphate mines, and a
partisan of the Société des Droits de
l’Homme. As a result, Bin Hamana’s case was
taken all the way to the Chamber of Deputies
in Paris where he was vindicated in 1913. The
following year he was murdered, ostensibly
as a result of a local political vendetta.
Bin Hamana’s career, while obscure, might
be seen as a microcosm of themes that con-
tinued to weigh heavily on Algerian political
life: links with international Islamic and anti-
imperialist causes; human rights activism;
Islam as a factor in popular mobilization; and
factional violence, perhaps manipulated by
higher authorities, but with a dynamic of its
own, and the potential for undermining pro-
jects to build a stable political hierarchy.
A reformer in the z a w i y a
Another complex figure that captured
S aca d a l l a h ’ s attention is cA b d a l -cA z i z Bin al-
Hashimi Bin Ibrahim. Though he was head of
a Qadiriyya Sufi lodge, or z a w i y a , in the oasis
community of El Oued, his father had sent
him to study at the Zaytuna Islamic universi-
ty in Tunis where he absorbed s a l a f i c r i t i q u e s
of Sufism. In 1937 he joined the Association
of Algerian cU l a m a, who supported modern
Islamic education with a strong s a l a f i o r i e n-
tation. He opened a school under the aegis
of this association in the family lodge in El
Oued. But soon thereafter he fell victim to a
combination of local rivalries and interna-
tional tensions. He was accused of support-
ing German and Italian plots and incarcerat-
ed in the notorious Kudiyit Aty prison in Con-
s t a n t i n e .
From El Oued to Minneapolis
The story is of particular relevance to Pro-
fessor S aca d a l l a h, for he was growing up in El
Oued when the above events occurred. With
the support of the Association of cU l a m a, he
pursued his education first in Tunis, then in
Cairo. His educational career took a novel
turn in 1962 when he went to the University
of Minnesota on a Fulbright grant to prepare
a PhD in history. Some three decades later,
he was to conduct much of the work for the
present volume in the quiet stacks of the
University of Minnesota library, with the aid
of its interlibrary loan staff, who helped him
pull together some of the dispersed frag-
ments of Algerian cultural history that the
winds of fortune had transported to North
A m e r i c a . ♦
Traditional bard
p e r f o r m i n g .
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Bo o k P re senta ti o n
P A T R I C I A  S L O A N E
Islam, Modernity and Entrepreneurship among the
Malays is the result of nearly four years of research con-
ducted between January of 1993 and January of 1998,
on entrepreneurship, networking, and corporate cul-
ture among the middle- and upper-middle-class Malay
population of Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. The book is an
analysis of an initial period of fieldwork (from 1993 to
1995). It is the first in-depth anthropological study of
Malay Muslim enterprise and entrepreneurial culture
since the inception of the New Economic Policy (NEP) in
Malaysia in 1970, a systematic programme intended to
develop the economic skills of Malays in an ethnically
diverse nation after the ethnic riots in 1969. 
Islam, Modernity
a n d
E n t r e p r e n e u r s h i p
among the Malays
Certain ethnographic studies have discussed
the economic situation of Malaysians –
Malays, Chinese, and Indians – who have
been disadvantaged by the dramatic
changes brought about by the NEP. This
study, however, discusses the lives and en-
terprises of the Malay men and women who
have been advantaged the most by Malay-
only government policy. Many economists
and political scientists have argued over the
consequences of NEP for the Malaysian na-
tion as a whole and the economic and social
consequences of Malaysia’s ethnicized poli-
tics, but there have been few ethnographic
studies of the social group most directly in-
volved in and affected by NEP – the new
Malay middle and upper-middle class. Al-
though there is recent literature focusing on
the spectacular culture of consumption and
choices of the new rich of Asia (one publish-
er even has a series dedicated to that sub-
ject), the analysis in Islam, Modernity and En-
trepreneurship among the Malays p r o v i d e s
insight into the culture of business – the eco-
nomic decisions, the investments, and the
capital and social networks – that have re-
sulted in Malay wealth. There is also very re-
cent literature on the spectacular economic
downturn among the Asian ‘Little Dragon’
economies in late 1997; I venture to suggest
that the book offers retrospective insight
into why that crisis occurred in one Little
Dragon, and perhaps even offers prognos-
ticative insight into the nature of Malaysia’s
recent, but exaggerated, economic recovery,
which also silenced the voices of political
dissent in 1999.
Research among Malay
e n t r e p r e n e u r s
Entrepreneurship is, in Malaysia, what NEP
intended it to be: a middle-class, even elite,
phenomenon. It earns grand-scale public at-
tention in the Malay community; the govern-
ment honours individuals who are deemed
successful entrepreneurs, bestowing titles
and honorifics upon them, while magazines
and the media report endlessly on the
lifestyles and management secrets of Malay
entrepreneurs. Hundreds of Malay entrepre-
neurial people, who were participating in
the modern economy in Kuala Lumpur or at-
tempting to cast a wider net to economic
and social niches in the rest of Malaysia,
Southeast Asia, and the world, offered in-
sight through our conversations. I inter-
viewed people in their houses and their of-
fices, factories, and country clubs. Male and
female entrepreneurs – both participated
with equal fervour in the modern economy –
were contacted. Also interviewed were par-
ents and children, students, and teenagers
(every one of them wanting to be an entre-
preneur one day); recent university gradu-
ates (all wanting to be entrepreneurs); pro-
fessors and professionals in big corporate
businesses who were planning to go out ‘on
their own’ or were already doing so on the
side. Furthermore, groups were met with or
spoken to, such as women’s and men’s en-
trepreneurial societies, college alumni co-
horts, and executives’ networking organiza-
tions established to capture greater entre-
preneurial opportunities. I attended work-
shops (accompanied by informants) on
Malay entrepreneurship, Malay entrepre-
neurs’ clubs, entrepreneurship talks, entre-
preneurial development societies, entrepre-
neurial award ceremonies, and huge confer-
ences and trade shows sponsored by gov-
ernment ministries and agencies to develop
local, regional, and global Malay entrepre-
neurial networks.
Malay entrepreneurship and the changes
it implies affected other, less visible aspects
of life, especially in relationships between
men and women, children and parents,
brothers and sisters, individuals and cohorts,
even human beings and Allah. As such, I
spent a great deal of time in Malay homes,
discussing marriage, family, modern
women’s roles, and the consequences of
rapid social change. It was found generally
everywhere that Malay men and women ac-
tively seek to understand the role of Islam in
contexts of social and economic change, and
follow or react to d a k w a h , the intensification
of Islamic practice in Malaysia since the
1 9 8 0 s .
Later on in the first period of fieldwork, in-
creasing focus was placed on several partic-
ular ventures which seemed characteristic of
the various kinds of entrepreneurship in
which my informants were engaged. These
were established businesses, a year or so old,
well beyond the drawing-board stage in the
sense that they had already been capital-
ized, registered with the government, and so
on. The enterprises focused upon had been
formed with the injection of government or
private capital, and consisted of several large
manufacturing concerns, as well as enter-
prises which represented the non-industrial
sector into which much Malay private capital
is flowing: real estate, insurance, tourism, ad-
vertising, publishing, communication, and
c o n s u l t a n c i e s .
Good works – Malay
entrepreneurship and Islamic
v a l u e s
The first part of the book, presented under
the rubric of ‘Good Works’, argues that
among the Malay middle class, entrepre-
neurship has become the main vector of eth-
nic, religious, and moral worth, and a test of
virtue and modernity among the beneficia-
ries of the NEP. The complex themes of Islam-
ic duty and financial obligation, which en-
frame Malay life in relationships with parents,
spouses, cohorts, and the communal group,
are explored. Also explored are the crucial,
self-consciously ‘modern’ redefinitions of Is-
lamic economic beliefs and meanings which
have shaped the Malay understanding of en-
trepreneurship and human agency. Focusing
upon several individual stories of eschatolog-
ical and economic self-development, I exam-
ined the ways in which a Muslim world-view
establishes balanced definitions of self-inter-
est and group interest and clarifies the cul-
ture of social and moral entailments in which
the informants operate. Also examined was
the belief informants had that they were pre-
serving – through entrepreneurship – egali-
tarian and communal traditions and values
from the Malay past, when in fact, entrepre-
neurship has resulted in greater social dis-
tinctions and the formation of a new elite. I
argue that entrepreneurship implies, to the
informants concerned, an Islamic develop-
ment process which could reveal key, group-
oriented moral and traditional behaviours –
the material demonstration of ‘good works’ –
until Malay entrepreneurs see themselves
acting not just for themselves, but for all
Malays, Muslims, and the very fate of the na-
tion and Malaysian society.
Networks – Malay
entrepreneurship in action
The second part of the book, presented
under the rubric of ‘Networks’, is an attempt
to elucidate how the informants enact their
understanding of Malay economic modernity
and entrepreneurship; that is, how they in-
fuse their altruistic image of ‘good works’ into
economic and social action. A description is
given of the way in which networks and rela-
tionships form in Kuala Lumpur society and
the ways in which social life can be manipu-
lated in pursuit of economic gain. Case stud-
ies of entrepreneurial networking and the en-
trepreneurial objectives of three of the enter-
prises concerned are given. The first case
study illustrates how alliances form among
Malay entrepreneurs, often as a consequence
of the way in which the government repre-
sents modern economic opportunity and en-
terprise to Malays. The expectations infor-
mants had of each other and of their ventures
in pursuing such opportunities, and the often
disappointing returns that their swiftly
formed alliances brought are dealt with.
The second case study examines the con-
sequences of achieving a high profile for one
female entrepreneur in Kuala Lumpur. The
positive effects of networking used for build-
ing alliances are described along with the
negative effects of networking – when gos-
sip and rumours of sorcery are used by net-
work participants to diminish the identity of
an entrepreneur who is thought to be dan-
gerously self-interested, and even un-Islamic.
It is suggested that these consequences are
often experienced by autonomous women in
Malay entrepreneurial society, who induce a
certain cultural ambivalence about the true
source of their powers.
An entrepreneurial venture that harnessed
its very existence to the role of Malay net-
works to the point at which networking be-
came the primary purpose – indeed, the
product – of the enterprise itself, is exam-
ined. These networks are then related to
other forms of Malay action which explicitly
use social relations for economic ends, and it
is shown how this strategy has become in-
creasingly concatenated to the Malay theory
of ‘good works’.
Finally, the crucial role of entrepreneurship in
establishing and legitimizing Malay identity
and representing Malay ideals of morality,
egalitarianism, harmony, and tradition in the
contexts of rapid social and economic
change is discussed. It is demonstrated that
through its seemingly endless incorporative-
ness, through the enmeshing of material and
affective ties in networks, Malay entrepre-
neurship, to its actors, symbolizes diminished
eliteness and Malay classlessness, and im-
plies openness, shared power, and free ac-
cess to opportunity. What was learned from
the informants can be described as a Malay
theory of entrepreneurship, one which lo-
cates Malay entrepreneurs in their local cul-
ture, validates the pro-Malay policies of NEP,
and connects Malay development to a global
culture of capitalism. Then a theory of Malay
entrepreneurship is elucidated. A description
is given of the way in which entrepreneur-
ship tends to confirm, determine the gender
of, and politicize Malay eliteness, while simul-
taneously closing out many of the entrepre-
neurs aspiring to wealth and power who are
met in the pages of the book. Moreover, it is
argued that the theory of Malay entrepre-
neurship conceals the crucial role of the state
in creating and supporting high-level, politi-
cally-connected Malay entrepreneurs – pre-
cisely the group that I then went on to study
in later periods of research in Malaysia. ♦
Patricia Sloane, Institute of Social and Cultural
Anthropology and JASO, Oxford University, earned 
a PhD in Social Anthropology from Oxford University
in 1996. She was appointed as a research fellow at
the Institute of Malaysian and International Studies
at the National University of Malaysia, where she
researched middle-class culture, and later conducted
an in-depth study of corporate culture in a major
Malay-owned conglomerate. An editor for JASO, 
The Journal of the Anthropological Society of
O x f o r d , she is currently preparing an article on
sexual harassment in the Malay workplace.
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from North and South and to reach out to
broader audiences. Although literacy levels
in the Maghreb are on the rise, public expo-
sure to the world of ideas remains limited.
With its critical reviews, interviews and es-
says, P r o l o g u e s aims to facilitate access to
this world. The journal expresses disagree-
ment over the way Islamic dogmas and laws
are invoked and used in the political arena
and advocates democratic alternatives, ar-
guing that these are probably closer to Is-
lamic ethics or, at the least, not incompati-
ble with them.
A bilingual (French-Arabic) scholarly and
cultural journal, P r o l o g u e s has been pub-
lished quarterly in Casablanca since 1993.
To date, eleven issues have been published.
It is distributed in particular in the Maghreb,
but also reaches readers in Europe, the Mid-
dle East and North America. Abdou Filali-
Ansary is the editor. ♦
P e r i o d i c a l
R O B E R T  W A TE R H O U S E
Millions of words are published every year by and
about the peoples of the Mediterranean. Its place at
the crux of Europe, the Middle East and North Africa
and its historical importance overlaid with present-
day relevance means that Mediterraneans are never
far from the news. Many cultures, speaking many
tongues, have shared interests and concerns, even if
the act of sharing often seems more like smash and
grab. Yet among all the words and images there are a
precious few voices saying just what it is to be a
Mediterranean today.
The Azur Decade:
A Brief History of Mediterraneans
Or so it seemed to Kenneth Brown when,
in the spring of 1990, he began testing his
thoughts and ideas on a group of friends
in Manchester, where he was a senior lec-
turer in sociology. Brown’s working back-
ground in Morocco, Tunisia and the Mid-
dle East, and his knowledge of Arabic and
Hebrew as well as Spanish and French
should have warned those of us he cor-
ralled that the ride would be lively.
P r o l o g u e s is a Maghrebin book revue. Above
all it is the voice of a group of intellectuals
who seek to renew, from within, contempo-
rary Arabic thought through debate and
analysis. For this reason, P r o l o g u e s seeks to
bring together themes that are of central
concern in the Mediterranean region. It
aims to stimulate communication among
social scientists, scholars, and intellectuals
Prologues: Revue
Maghrébine du Livre
Studies in Contemporary Islam is a new, ref-
ereed journal focusing on Islam and Muslims
in the contemporary world, published by the
Center for Islamic Studies at Youngstown
State University. It is published two times a
year and is devoted to the understanding,
review, analysis, and critique of contempo-
rary Islamic religious and intellectual devel-
opments, on the one hand, and of socio-po-
litical changes in Muslim societies, on the
other. The journal aims to be interdiscipli-
nary and international in its range and cover-
age. Intended to serve as a forum for schol-
arly dialogue and exchange, Studies in Con-
temporary Islam does not to promote a par-
ticular point of view or ideology. The editors
are Mumtaz Ahmad (junaid@erols.com) and
Mustansir Mir (mmir@cc.ysu.edu).
The first issue (Spring 1999) includes the
following articles:
– Farhang Rajaee, ‘Paradigm Shifts in Mus-
lim International Relations Discourse’;
– Anas B. Malik, ‘Understanding the Political
Behavior of Islamists: The Implications of
Socialization, Modernization, and Ratio-
nalist Approaches’;
– Timur Yuskaev, ‘Redeeming the Nation:
Redemption Theology in African-Ameri-
can Islam’;
– Frederick M. Denny and the Late Olga
Scarpetta, ‘Jailhouse religion: The Chal-
lenge of Corrections to the American Mus-
lim Community’; and
– Mumtaz Ahmad, ‘Democracy on Trial in
M a l a y s i a ’ . ♦
For information, contact:
Center for Islamic Studies
421 DeBartolo Hall
Youngstown State University
Youngstown, Ohio 44555-3448, USA




The first two issues of M e d i t e r r a n e a n s b o r e
the imprint of Didsbury Press, a small inde-
pendent Manchester publishing house
whose owner, Patrick Quinn, personally
funded the venture. They carried an extraor-
dinary selection of contributors – novelists,
poets, journalists, artists and photographers
– covering an extraordinary variety of top-
ics. From the outset, M e d i t e r r a n e a n s p u b-
lished uncompromisingly in English or
French, without translation. Designed on
desk-top by Trevor Hatchett, edited from
the garrets and pubs of South Manchester,
M e d i t e r r a n e a n s proved an immediate t o u r
de force: ’a new bold literary review’ wrote
the G u a r d i a n. Le Monde Diplomatique c a l l e d
it an ‘éblouissant sommaire […] de très
beaux écrits de poètes, journalistes, ro-
manciers de la région.’
Goytisolo, Durrell, Moravia
Issue 1 of Summer 1991 had Juan Goytiso-
lo on Cairo’s City of the Dead, Lawrence Dur-
rell on bull-worship in Provence, Alberto
Moravia in conversation, David Hirst on Sad-
dam before Kuwait, Clarisse Nicoidski on a
French soldier’s diary from the Algerian
front in 1960. Mahmoud Darwish described
how he risked on a daily basis a sniper’s bul-
let to make early-morning coffee during the
height of the Beirut civil war; Yigal Sarna de-
tailed an infamous sectarian murder in Is-
rael. Lucia Graves told how her father Robert
came to Mallorca, while Claudia Roden ex-
plored Italy’s regional cuisine.
So it went on. By the third issue, Brown
had taken himself and the review to Paris,
where the official funding climate was more
promising. He found a new co-editor, Han-
nah Davis, and set about widening a circle
of supporters who eventually evolved into
an advisory panel.
Moments of destiny
The first of the themed issues, Algeria,
Summer 1993, came at a moment of destiny
as civil war loomed. This was closely fol-
lowed by Beirut/Sarajevo and Israel/Pales-
tine. M e d i t e r r a n e a n s showed no aversion to
the hot spots, though it retained a section of
Varia at the back, and had the ability to at-
tract spicy pot-pourri contributions like An-
dreu Martin’s story of sex – and worse –
among beach hoodlums (Issue 4).
Financial support from the Centre Nation-
al de Lettres helped establish Me d i t e r-
r a n e a n s in Paris, but the review remained –
and remains – at the commercial margins,
depending upon the goodwill of contribu-
tors and subscribers. Involvement with
Med-Media, the EC programme for journal-
ist training led to a Spring 1994 seminar in
Marseille and subsequent publication of an
hors serie title, ‘Etre journaliste en Méditer-
ranée’ (also in Spanish and Arabic, but not
English). A second such seminar took place
in Alexandria in cooperation with Al Ahram,
il manifesto and M i l l i y e t. Continuation of the
project awaits de-freezing of the EC
Mediterranean programme budget.
For Issue 7, Autumn 1995, Brown and
Davis devoted almost a whole review to the
falling apart of Yugoslavia, ‘Le pont détruit’.
The title referred to Mostar, the Bosnian city
dismembered by Croats. M e d i t e r r a n e a n s ’
by-now proven mix of reportage, short sto-
ries, poetry and telling images described,
with passion but without side, a Balkan
tragedy which continues to unfold.
Alexandria, Istanbul, Morocco
More recent issues have been, perhaps,
less consciously from the frontline yet are
hardly irrelevant. ‘Alexandria in Egypt’ (Au-
tumn 1996) found the ancient waterfront
city at the point of shaking off economic
doldrums and Durrellian ties. ‘Istanbul,
Many Worlds’ (Autumn 1997) explored the
Turkish dilemma of embracing the West
while fighting a war in its own eastern back-
yard. ‘Voices from Morocco’ (Winter 1999-
2000) captures Mahgreb aspirations at the
millennium, with a change of king and per-
haps of regime.
Five-year programme
M e d i t e r r a n e a n s has survived almost a
decade in the tough theatre of international
publishing. It commences the millennium in
good spirits with the next issue, on Mar-
seille, planned for Autumn 2000, homes
both in the Maison des Sciences de
l’Homme in Paris and the Friche Belle de Mai
in Marseille, and high hopes of a five-year
publishing programme based on two issues
per year. The proposed subjects for 2001 are
Haifa and Salonika.
The struggle, as ever, is not for good ma-
terial but for the financial wherewithal to
publish. In a world where book selling is be-
coming more global by the day, small oper-
ators have a huge marketing challenge.
M e d i t e r r a n e a n s is soon to fight back via its
own website (mediterraneansreview.com)
which will offer readers the opportunity to
sample back issues, as well as being able to
order and subscribe on line. ♦
For further information:
E-mail: medit@msh-paris.fr
Robert Waterhouse is president of l’Association
Méditerranéens and a co-editor of M e d i t e r r a n e a n s.
E-mail: robertwaterhouse@atsat.com
P E R I O D I C A L P E R I O D I C A L
For information, contact:
Prologues: revue maghrébine du livre
34 Rue Mohamed Smiha
BP 125 144 Ain Diyab 20052
Casablanca, Morocco
E-mail: prologues@atlasnet.net.ma
Fax: + 212 2 449 551
URL: http://www.ned.org/page_3/Prologues
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M o r o c c o
AN TO N  J .  E S C H E R  &
S A N D R A  P E T E R M AN N
At the beginning of the 21s t century, the Medina of
Marrakesh is facing significant changes. The old
town had been isolated and preserved by the French
protectorate policy during the first half of the 1900s.
After the withdrawal of the colonial power, the for-
mer incarnation of Muslim cultural life declined to a
residential area for the poorest rural population. 
Neo-colonialism 
or Gentrification
in the Medina 
of Marrakesh
During the sixties, individual members of a
growing gay community settled Marrakesh.
In the 1980s, UNESCO acknowledged the
exotic attractiveness and the cultural signif-
icance of the ‘oriental Medina’ of Marrakesh
by including the town in the world’s cultural
heritage programme, and the characteris-
tics of the Medina also attract the interna-
tional mass tourism today. Helped by the
structural condition of globalization, nu-
merous western foreigners had moved into
the old town by the end of the 20t h c e n t u r y .
All forms of media, first and foremost the In-
ternet, offer real estate for rent and for sale
in many quarters of the old part of Mar-
rakesh. In the Medina, the growing group of
western foreigners live excessively on a
grand scale together with the increasingly
impoverished Moroccans. Does all this
speak for symptoms of neo-colonialism? Or,
due to the fact that well-off foreigners con-
tribute to the renovation and preservation
of the fabric of the buildings, does it rather
indicate gentrification?
2 0t h-century town planning
The policy of Governor Lyautey and his
chief architect Prost during the time of the
protectorate helped to spatially isolate the
old towns of Morocco, including the Medina
of Marrakesh, from modern town expan-
sions as well as to preserve the fabric of the
buildings. This did not only include the
preservation and protection of the historic
old towns, but also the building of modern
‘European’ towns, so-called villes nouvelles,
at a distance from the old towns.
After the end of the French protectorate
in 1956, the Moroccan upper and middle
class left the old town, and a poor rural pop-
ulation spread into the Medina. By the 60s,
international tourism had already discov-
ered the old towns along with all other old
cities of cultural interest in the world. UN-
ESCO took the cultural significance of the
Medina into account by including it into the
world’s cultural heritage programme in
1985. However, the town-planning restora-
tion measures were restricted at first to indi-
vidual buildings and to the paving of the
most important streets of the old town.
Western foreigners 
in the Medina of Marrakesh
During the 60s and 70s, the process of de-
colonization took place comparatively
peacefully in Morocco. Foreign real estate
property was not expropriated. This led to
individual western foreigners settling in the
Medina of Marrakesh already in the early
60s, when one could still find the French
population of the protectorate in the v i l l e s
n o u v e l l e s. That would not have been possi-
ble during the time of the French protec-
torate because of urban apartheid. Many of
these foreigners were artists and architects
‘looking for the Orient’ and/or looking to
‘find themselves’. An international gay com-
munity was established, which functioned
as the initiator for the massive influx of
western foreigners at the end of the 20t h
c e n t u r y .
A fascination with the oriental aura, the
colours, the fragrances, the year-round
warm climate, the reasonable cost of living,
and expectations of Dionysiac joys con-
tributed to the expansion of the communi-
ty. By the mid-80s, the number of western
foreigners in the Medina had risen to sever-
al dozen, but it remained a manageable
quantity. By the mid-90s, Europeans had be-
come increasingly interested in buying
houses in the old town. At this time, the first
inns (maison d’hôtes) and several exclusive
restaurants were built. During the final years
of the 20t h century, the real estate business
boomed in the old town. The demand for
real estate has especially exploded in the
last two years, and supply has been extend-
e d .
In September 1999, western foreigners
lived in approximately 150 r iy -a .d s Most pre-
ferred were accommodations which stood
out for their not yet completely dilapidated
fabric, close proximity to the Jemaa el-Fna,
and easy accessibility by car.
In contrast to previous years, last year’s
buyers no longer mainly came from the
upper class or the artist scene, but rather
from the broad middle class of Europe.
There is a wide variety of newcomers, from
immigrants and transmigrants, to bour-
geoisie and illustrious holiday guests, to Eu-
ropean Muslims.
Many buy r iy -a .d s in Marrakesh because of
the comparatively low cost – with respect to
European prices. However, not only the pur-
chase price is decisive: the standard of living
in general has improved. In Marrakesh, a
house with an inner courtyard and em-
ployed servants is affordable for many.
Other equally important arguments are in-
dividuality and independence, which one
can express and enjoy behind the closed
walls one’s own house. The r iy -a .d is consid-
ered a symbol of freedom by both tempo-
rary and permanent immigrants. Europeans
are still attracted by a world which seems
strange and mystical to them, and which
may evoke sentiments of being a colonialist
amidst the omnipresent poverty of the Mo-
r o c c a n s .
Hollywood films, TV reports, magazines,
newspapers, and the Internet add to the
subjective conveying of information about
the Medina of Marrakesh and to the promo-
tion of living in a r iy -a .d. Currently, architects
and real estate agents are offering hundreds
of r iy -a .d s on the market. French Moroccan
estate agents pursue aggressive marketing
strategies, which range from face to face
contact on the Jemaa el-Fna to interactive
communication on the Internet. Western
foreigners also buy in other old towns of
Morocco, such as Essaouira and Asilah.
Gentrification 
vs. neo-colonialism
The prominent American architect Bill
Willis, who has been living in a former
palace in the north of the Medina since the
60s, formulates the arguments brought into
discussion on the presence of western for-
eigners in the old town of Marrakesh by the
new inhabitants: ‘It’s very good for the Med-
ina because these foreigners are bringing in
a lot of money and are fixing up all these old
houses that are falling into ruins […] or are
tearing them down and are building some-
thing marvelous in the place […], so that’s
very good. […] It cleans up the city. It brings
a lot of money to Morocco. It employs hun-
dreds of Moroccan workmen, and so that
part is very, very good’. These observations
cannot be contradicted if one applies them
exclusively to the fabric of the buildings and
to the financial input. Similar to the eco-
nomically and socially declined districts of
industrial countries, those districts of Mo-
rocco which seem to be left to fall into
socio-economic ruin are structurally saved
and revalued by the wealthy population. In
addition, another way of life is being estab-
lished in the district: gentrification in the
‘oriental town’ – indeed in the ‘oriental
town’ because the houses, apart from some
exceptions, are designed in the ‘oriental’
style that shaped the image 19t h- c e n t u r y
Europe had of the Orient. Thus, a hybrid
area was created with an imaginary oriental
ambience and a sumptuous way of life,
which consciously contrasted the poverty of
the neighbourhoods. This contrast, which is
manifest especially in the availability of ser-
vants in houses, hotels, and restaurants,
adds to the fact that western foreigners feel
they live in a ‘sort of gracious colonial at-
mosphere’, as Mr Willis says.
Depending on what perspective is taken,
the process of change in the Medina of Mar-
rakesh either proves to be gentrification,
which is evaluated positively because it
helps preserve the precious fabric of the
buildings rich in tradition, or it represents
neo-colonialism, which uses the product of
Islamic culture to meet the expectations of
the European settlers. One should recall in
this context the origin of the imagination
‘Orient’, as Mary Anne Stevens2 outlines: ‘Be-
tween 1798 and 1914, North Africa and the
Near East, as a closest non-Christian region
to Europe, exercised a fascination upon the
West, which responded in a variety of ways:
the scholarly study of ancient civilisations
and of contemporary cultures, imaginary
evocations in poems and novels, literary de-
scriptions and tourists’ enthusiasms, as well
as representations by artists.’ More than a
hundred years after the Europeans created
the image of the ‘Orient’, they now once and
for all (peacefully) start to redesign their ‘Ori-
ent’, i.e. the old towns of Morocco, struc-
turally and ideologically according to their
imagination. They do that from the inside,
where the Islamic urban way of life, the cu m-
rân hadarî, is rooted. ♦
N o t e s
1 . The ordinary house with an inner courtyard in the
Moroccan town is called d a r. The central element
is the inner courtyard surrounded by a colonnade,
at which rooms facing each other are located. In
the corners are usually an entrance, a kitchen, and
a stairwell with a bathroom. In Morocco r iy -a.d
stands for a special form of a house with a garden.
The basic type has residential buildings on the
shorter sides that face each other. The other sides
display high boundary walls. In today’s Marrakesh
every residential house is called r iy -a.d in colloquial
context with foreigners.
2 . Stevens, Mary Anne (1984). ‘Western Art and its
Encounter with the Islamic World 1798-1914’. In
The Orientalists: Delacroix to Matisse. European
Painters in North Africa and the Near East, Mary
Anne Stevens. London: Royal Academy of Arts, pp.
1 5 - 2 3 .
Prof. Dr Anton J. Escher is head of the Center for
Research on the Arab World (CERAW), Institute of
Geography, Johannes Gutenberg-University of
Mainz, Germany.
E-mail: a.escher@geo.uni-mainz.de
Sandra Petermann is a researcher at the Center for
Research on the Arab World (CERAW), Germany.
E-mail: petes000@mail.uni-mainz.de 




pool of an old
town house
renovated by a
E u r o p e a n .
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N o t e s
1 . This article is based on a talk given at the Felix
Meritis Foundation, Amsterdam, 24 January 2000.
2 . Conner, Patrick (1979). Oriental Architecture in the
W e s t. London: Thames and Hudson, p. 141.
3 . Sweetman, John (1988). The Oriental Obsession:
Islamic Inspiration in British and American Art and
Architecture 1500-1920. Cambridge: University
Press, p. 193.
4 . Haider Gulzar (1996). ‘Muslim Space and the
Practice of Architecture: a Personal Odyssey’. In
Making Muslim Space in North America and Europe,
edited by Barbara Daly Metcalf. Berkeley:
University of California Press, pp. 36, 42.
5 . I am grateful to Imam Dr Abduljalil Sajid JP for
information in this paragraph.
6 . I am grateful for guidance on Bradford to Dr Philip
Lewis and Mr Neil Waghorne.
Peter Clark is a freelance consultant and translator
from Arabic to English, Brighton, UK.
E-mail: mecas@clark1.clara.net 
U K
P E T E R  C L AR K
Islamic architectural influences in Britain from India
and Andalusia go back to the 18t h century. Inspiration
from the Middle East appears in private houses, syna-
gogues and mosques from the 19t h century. Since the
immigration and growth of a British Muslim communi-
ty in the last fifty years, purpose-built mosques have
been constructed and have absorbed an older ‘orien-
talist tradition’. Other mosques have been converted
cinemas, private houses, churches and factories, often
with some decoration intended to Islamize the build-






There is nothing alien about Islamic archi-
tectural influences in Britain. Nor is British
Islam a peculiarly 20t h-century phenome-
non. Close connections between the Islamic
world and Britain go back for over four cen-
turies, through trade, diplomacy, travel, art,
the Empire and scholarship. In the early 17t h
century there is evidence of a small commu-
nity of Muslims in London – including crafts-
men and a lawyer, though there is no record
of a mosque.
Imperial fantasies
The 18t h century was a great age for build-
ing in Britain. Styles often reflected an atti-
tude of philosophical curiosity about the
world. From Islamic countries there were in-
fluences from buildings from Grenada to
India. Mosques were designed, not as places
of worship but as ‘garden embellishments’.
One such example was at Kew where
William Chambers built an exotic collection
of oriental buildings for Frederick Prince of
Wales. His mosque (now disappeared) had
‘Gothic ogee arches’ above the doorways
with quotations from the Holy Qur’an in
gold lettering.
Britain’s closest contacts with the Islamic
world two centuries ago were through the
expanding Empire in India. In the first twen-
ty years of the 19t h century there was a
vogue for an Indian style. British architects
relied on artists’ drawings that would have
been produced in expensive folio editions.
One pioneering artist was William Hodges
who produced Select Views of India b e t w e e n
1785 and 1788. Hodges was impressed by
what he called ‘Moorish grandeur’ and ar-
gued, as had Sir Christopher Wren a century
earlier, that there was an historic connec-
tion between Islamic architecture and the
Gothic arch.
The supreme example of replication of In-
dian Islamic architecture was the Royal
Pavilion at Brighton, whose architect, John
Nash, studied volumes on Indian Islamic
buildings. Though a classicist throughout
his life – he designed the Regents Park es-
tates – Nash was versatile and delighted, as
one architectural historian has observed, ‘in
small domes or “pepper-pots” of every
shape, some of them deliberately oriental.’2
Brighton Pavilion had an impact on many
new buildings throughout the 19t h c e n t u r y ,
but other influences were reaching Britain
from Andalusia and from the Middle East.
Orientalist painting has been fully docu-
mented. Thanks to the development of
steam-driven ships, travel to the Middle East
from the 1830s became easier. Travellers re-
turned with souvenirs, and also ideas of de-
sign and notions of space and leisure.
Two outstandingly self-conscious at-
tempts at reproducing Arab architecture in
the 19t h century have survived.
One is at Leighton House in London, built
in 1865 for the artist Lord Leighton who col-
lected ceramics and other Islamic artefacts
during visits to the Middle East. The house
was built to house his souvenirs. The model
was La Zisa in Palermo, but the 17t h- c e n t u r y
wooden lattice-work came from Damascus.
Another example is the Arab Room at
Cardiff Castle, built by William Burges for
the Marquess of Bute. Burges had been to
Turkey. He had taken time off from design-
ing the Crimean Memorial Chapel in Istan-
bul to study the city’s mosques. The floor
pattern of the room, to quote John Sweet-
man, ‘sets out the Islamic eight-fold figure,
which is developed with pyrotechnic virtu-
osity in the domical ceiling.’3
Faith takes over
Meanwhile fantasy was yielding place to
faith. The first religious buildings to owe in-
spiration to Islamic models were actually
new synagogues. Newly prosperous Jewish
communities eschewed the Gothic or the
Classical styles. One was associated with
medieval Christianity, the other with 18t h-
century rationalism. The adopting of a
‘Moorish’ style was a reminder of Jewish
glories in Arab Andalusia. The finest exam-
ples have been in mainland Europe, but
there is one good example in Liverpool. An-
other in the heart of Muslim Bradford has a
horse-shoe arched doorway and horizontal
banding of alternate colours of stone.
Some new churches also displayed Islamic
influences, albeit indirect. The best example
is Christ Church Streatham in South London,
whose architect, James Wild, used horse-
shoe shaped arches and a grand west door-
way modelled on the doorway of the Sultan
Hasan Mosque in Cairo.
From the late 19t h century there was a
growing Muslim presence in Britain. At first,
prayers were held in private houses or in
rented halls. Sometimes there were rallies at
Leicester Square (ironically by the Alhambra
Theatre, now the Odeon cinema), Hyde Park
Corner or Peckham Rye. The first purpose-
built mosque was at Woking, south of Lon-
don. This was constructed from funds left by
the Ruler of Bhopal, and was built in 1889 by
a British non-Muslim architect.
Today it is reckoned that there are about
1.5 million Muslims in Britain. In addition to
the small number of converts, about
600,000 are of Pakistani origin, 150,000 from
India and 200,000 from Bangladesh. A ma-
jority of British Muslims have now been
born in Britain.
The South Asians have tended to occupy
particular areas of inner cities. In many
places South Asian Muslims have often
been the latest wave of outsiders. The ap-
pearance of an area may be like a
palimpsest with physical evidence of earlier
settlements. Manningham in Bradford, for
example, has been successively the home of
German Jewish immigrants, then Irish and
now South Asians. Near the synagogue al-
ready mentioned, is an Irish pub. Syna-
gogue and bar are incongruous prominent
buildings in an area inhabited by people
overwhelmingly of Pakistani origin.
There are today about 1200 mosques and
praying areas in Britain, of which approxi-
mately a hundred have been purpose-built.
The major mosques of Britain – at Regents
Park London, in Whitechapel, the cathedral-
mosques of Birmingham, Leeds and Edin-
burgh – have been built with funding from
outside Britain. The others have been con-
versions of houses, warehouses and cine-
mas. Richly carpeted rooms where shoes are
discarded, calligraphic texts and some dec-
oration have helped to ‘Islamize’ the build-
ing. In the 1960s, the architect Gulzar Haider
arrived in Britain from Pakistan and attend-
ed prayers at a Wimbledon house. ‘There
was no m i h r a b niche, just a depression in a
side wall, a cold fireplace with a checker-
board of green and brown ceramic tiles. A
small chandelier with missing pieces of crys-
tal was suspended asymmetrically in a cor-
ner. A rickety office chair with gaudy plush
rug draped over its back acted as the m i n b a r
pulpit.’ Twenty five years later he returned
to the house-mosque which was ‘now
wrapped with a glazed finish: arched win-
dows sat squeezed into what seemed like an
endless line of sharp crescents: and there
was a number of token minaret domes,
whose profile came less from any architec-
tural tradition than from illustrations of the
Arabian Nights. ’4
The Sussex area has a small, but ethnically
heterogeneous community of Muslims, with
39 mother tongues. Of the three Brighton
mosques, one occupies a private house that
was previously a Jewish school, another is a
converted shop, the third is above five
shops. To the east, is the Hastings mosque –
a converted church – and to the west is the
Worthing mosque – a converted warehouse.
The new town of Crawley, inland, near
Gatwick airport, has a purpose-built
m o s q u e .5 This pattern is fairly representa-
tive of British mosques.
Orientalism revived?
By contrast, the Manningham area of
Bradford is almost wholly Muslim. Of the 30
mosques in the city, four have been pur-
pose-built, two are in former cinemas, three
are former churches and nine are converted
industrial premises. The rest have been
adapted from private houses. What is likely
to be the largest mosque, in Darfield Street,
has been under construction since 1986.6
Part of it has been opened for prayer, but
problems of funding have led to slow
progress. Nonetheless the architect, Neil
Waghorne, has a clear vision of how the
building will develop. He is a student of
Turkish architecture. Part of his inspiration is
the Suleymaniye mosque in Istanbul. A su-
perb m u q a r n a s doorway has been carved by
a local stonemason, David Bedford, from
Yorkshire stone.
Islamic architecture has historically adapt-
ed to local traditions of building. In Britain
many purpose-built mosques have been in
a tradition of ‘orientalist’ architecture, going
back to the 18t h century. The best models
from the Islamic world have been studied,
used or copied. The sponsors of the build-
ings today are Muslims but the architects,
designers and craftsmen are likely to be
non-Muslims. What makes a building an Is-
lamic building? Its purpose? Its owners? Its
source of inspiration?
Is a distinctly British Muslim style emerg-
ing? Is it the blending of work from the Is-
lamic world with local materials? Or is it the
striking adaptation of a building originally
designed for other purposes? ♦
Gujarati Mosque
at Manningham,
B r a d f o r d ,
formerly a factory.
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F i l m
C L A U D I A  P R E C K E L
As could be read in the Indian newspaper MP Chroni-
c l e in November 1999, the word ‘Bollywood’, sobri-
quet for the glamorous Indian film industry in Bom-
bay, will be among several new entries of Indian ori-
gin (like b i n d i or m e h n d i) to be included into the mil-
lennium editions of famous British dictionaries. Bom-
bay has been the centre of India’s film industry since
1895, when the films of the Lumiere brothers were
shown in the Watson’s Hotel. Although there are stu-
dios in other Indian cities where films in various lan-
guages and dialects are produced (e.g. Telugu films
in Hyderabad or Tamil films in Madras), Bollywood
clearly remains the most important centre for the
production of Hindi films. Many Bollywood actors
are Muslim – as are important composers and lyri-
cists – and it is therefore interesting to investigate
the biographies of these stars.
tion of their biographies. The following
questions were to be answered in this re-
search: Is it important for Muslim actors to
be clearly identified as Muslim? Do they
convey a particular Muslim identity? Do
they come from a specific social back-
ground? As there are no published studies
on this matter, one begins with surfing the
Internet, which is nowadays an ideal medi-
um for the Bollywood star cult. It was very
easy to trace 183 biographies of present
Bollywood stars, 50 of whom are Muslims.
The most popular among them are Shah
Rukh Khan, Salman Khan and Saif Ali Khan.
Figures indicate that 27% of Bollywood
stars are Muslims, while only 12% of the In-
dian population is Muslim. It is also interest-
ing to see that only five of these superstars
(e.g. Tabu, her sister Farah, and Zeenat
Aman) are Muslim women, whereas some
decades ago Muslim female actors were
much more prevalent on screen. A probable
reason for this may be that with the growth
of influence of several strict religious
groups, Muslim families may not want their
daughters to appear on screen – an issue
that requires further examination.
The social origin
of Muslim actors
Having stated that the percentage of Mus-
lims in Bollywood’s film and show business
is above average, one may ask about the
stars’ social origin. Here one can clearly ob-
serve that being a Bollywood star is (mostly)
an upper-class phenomenon. Actors often
state that their father was a doctor, lawyer,
or restaurant owner. Some come from a
family of actors, directors, scriptwriters or
producers. Often, the mothers were practis-
ing professionals as well. Shah Rukh Khan’s
mother, for example, was a well-educated
Muslim woman who had studied in Oxford
and later worked in social service. The most
famous example of an upper-class Bolly-
wood actor is Saif Ali Khan: his father is the
famous cricketeer Mansoor Ali Khan Patau-
di. His mother is the actress Sharmila Tagore
(Mississippi Marsala), a niece of the writer
Rabindranath Tagore. Before her marriage,
Sharmila Tagore converted to Islam and
took on the Muslim name Aisha Sultan. On
Hindi films (which last at least two hours)
are traditionally melodramatic love stories,
marsala western, or adaptations of US hits.
The revival of Hindi love stories has attract-
ed, since the 1980s, millions of viewers into
at least 12,000 Indian cinemas. Spectators
are terrified when a hero’s life or virgin’s
chastity is endangered, are relieved when
the hero discovers the intrigue and applaud
when the heroine finally falls into the hero’s
a r m s .
Some say that these romanticized love
stories are a typical expression of Indian cul-
ture because music and dance are its tradi-
tional media. Other defenders of Bollywood
films add that films often propagate reli-
gious tolerance and harmony, which may
be an important social function for them in
India’s multi-religious society. Critics, on the
other hand, say that Bollywood films only
support the status quo of India’s social sys-
tem. Whatever may be said for and against
it, India’s film industry produces more films
than any other country in the world.
A visitor to India cannot ignore Bolly-
wood’s charm and the omnipresence of its
superstars, as witnessed by huge, painted
film posters and video clips on MTV Asia or
Channel V. Film magazines like G o r
C i n é B l i t z provide the hottest gossip about
the stars, contributing to a very impressive
‘star cult’.
Watching the popular music shows on
television, one can easily recognize that the
essential film music is very often provided
by Muslim composers and lyricists, the most
famous of whom is A.R. Rahman. One also
notices that many Bollywood stars are Mus-
lims, which is what inspired the examina-
his father’s side of the family, Saif Ali Khan is
related to two former ruling families of
India, namely to the n a w a b families of
Pataudi (Haryana) and of Bhopal (Madhya
Pradesh). When asked about his n a w a b i o r i-
gin, Saif Ali Khan stated that n a w a b i s h o u l d
stand for dignity, grace and good living, but
had in recent years become a synonym for
debauchery. However, he added that at the
end of his film career, he plans to return to
Bhopal to work for several social projects.
This, in his eyes, would be a good means for
using his popularity as well as his social
b a c k g r o u n d .
The question of education is connected to
that of social origins. Is Islamic religious ed-
ucation a part of superstars’ education? It is
very interesting to see that many Bollywood
actors (not only the Muslims) have a univer-
sity degree, though none of them studied
acting as such. Shah Rukh Khan, for exam-
ple, studied mass communication at the
renowned Jamiyya Milliyya Islamiyya in
Delhi, Saif Ali Khan is Oxford-educated and
Feroz Khan obtained a degree in business
management from a university in the USA.
None of them give out facts or details con-
cerning religious education, the study of the
Qur’an or the Arabic language. Bollywood
stars seem to regard religious education as a
private or family matter.
Inter-religious marriages
In this context it is interesting to observe
the choices of spouse made by Bollywood
actors. Whereas Muslim actresses in most
cases chose (and still choose) a Muslim as
husband, many male Bollywood stars have
married Hindu women (e.g. Shah Rukh Khan,
Saif Ali Khan, and Aamir Khan). In recent
times, it has not been seen to be necessary
for these women to convert to Islam before
marriage, although even the superstars
admit that they had to face difficulties with
regard to acceptance of their marriages.
Shah Rukh Khan, for example, has said that
that his wife’s family was at first strictly op-
posed to their marriage, because they con-
sidered him to be ‘the wrong man with the
wrong religion, the wrong attitude and the
wrong profession.’ Some Muslims also
demonstrated in front of his house to
protest against his inter-religious marriage.
But this did not prevent Shah Rukh Khan and
his wife Gauri from marrying in a court cere-
mony (which is obligatory for inter-religious
marriages) as well as in a Hindu ceremony.
Aamir Khan said in an interview that he
would not regard a Hindu-Muslim marriage
as a problem in a secular state such as India.
In his view, the fundamentalists among the
Hindus as well as among the Muslims should
get used to this fact. He further explained:
‘Somehow I have a feeling that despite the
attempts of fundamentalist parties to polar-
ize communities – and to a certain extent
they have succeeded in this polarization –
when it comes to love, that polarization
somehow doesn’t work. That’s what my ex-
perience is.’ He added that, as in his case, it
should be possible to celebrate Muslim as
well as Hindu festivities together with the
whole family without a problem.
It is also interesting to observe that chil-
dren of these Hindu-Muslim couples some-
times have a Hindu name, sometimes a Mus-
lim one. For example, Aamir Khan’s son’s
name is Junaid, whereas his daughter has
the Sanskrit name Ira. In their educational
upbringing, Muslim, Hindu and even Christ-
ian ethics are taught, and their grandmoth-
ers play an important role in this religious
education. Thus, Muslim actors seem to re-
gard themselves as models for tolerance
among all Indian religions. This can be stat-
ed not only for their family life, but also for
their jobs as actors. There are many friend-
ships established with Hindu colleagues.
Further, most Muslim actors see no difficulty
in playing characters from another religious
community, as shown by Shah Rukh Khan,
who played a Sikh in a television series (with
a turban), thus exposing himself to heavy
criticism from some Muslim organizations.
In conclusion, one can state that Muslim
Bollywood stars stress their Islamic identity
without, nonetheless overemphasizing it. Ex-
treme attitudes in religious matters are total-
ly rejected by them. They rather regard them-
selves as citizens of a secular India which, in
their eyes, is a place of religious coexistence.
However, only the future will show if they will
be able to maintain their image as modes of
religious tolerance in an Indian reality of
growing religious tensions. ♦
Claudia Preckel MA, is a PhD student and member of
the research group on ‘Islamic Educational Networks
in Transnational and Local Contexts (18t h- 2 0t h
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N o t e s
1 . All the titles of the films quoted are in transcribed
and simplified Arabic for technical reasons and
have been taken from the Dictionnaire des
cinéastes du Maghreb (Armes, Roy (1996). 
Paris: Editions ATM). Where there is no original
title in Arabic, the French title is quoted.
2 . Maherzi, Lofti (1980). Le cinéma algérien.
I n s t i t u t i o n s - i m a g i n a i r e - i d é o l o g i e. 
Algiers: Sned, p. 291.
3 . Léon, Maryse (1981). ‘L’image de la femme dans la
littérature et le cinéma algérien’. In L’Algérie vue
par son cinéma, edited by J.P. Brossard. 
Locarno: Editions Festival du Film, 1981, p. 122.
4 . Bouzid, Nouri (1995). ‘New Realism in Arab
Cinema’. A l i f 15, p. 249.
5 . Symbolically this means breaking away from and
eliminating every trace of the past.
6 . Inversion in French of the consonants of the word
a r a b e indicating the second generation of
immigrants of North African origin.
Leyla Bouzid Discacciati studied Islamic Studies 
at Humboldt University and Comparative Literature 
at the Free University, Berlin Germany.
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F i l m
L E Y L A  B O U ZI D  D I S C AC C I A T I
Women, taken as cinematographic figures, evoke mul-
tiple images of a cultural and social discourse and draw
attention to gender and family relations in a broader
sense in a specific society, in this case, Tunisia and Al-
geria. The process of research and analysis of the films
goes beyond a simple collection of female figures.
Rather, it focuses on the representation of female iden-
tity in the films and how this identity (as a mirror of so-
ciety) has changed and continues to change. 
The Image of Women in
Algerian and
Tunisian Cinema
An analysis of the female figure in Tunisian
and Algerian films1 must take into consider-
ation one of the dominant characteristics of
the cinema of these countries, namely their
short history, as they came into being only
with national independence (in 1956 and
1962 respectively). As they are of recent cre-
ation, these cinemas are the articulation of a
quest for a specific national identity rather
than a creative need for expression. The cin-
ema is seen as a way of expressing a socio-
cultural discourse and imposing images
drawing attention to specific political inten-
tions. The representation of women in films
has thus been influenced by the interpreta-
tion of women’s role in society.
Mother, wife and daughter:
representation in early films
There was no lack of films about women in
the 1960s and 1970s. However, limited and
generalized images were conveyed. Female
figures were always present in the films,
even if their representation was without sig-
nificance. They appeared ‘alongside’ the
main male characters or were utilized as part
of the environment where the action took
place. The representation of the woman in
her roles as mother, wife and daughter, was
linked to a socio-political discourse. The ten-
dency of these films was, in fact, based on
the need of these young nations, Algeria and
Tunisia, to create a national identity. The
family acted, for example, as a microcosm of
the whole social system. In the familial
sphere, the representation of women, in
roles defined only by their relationships with
male figures, consolidated religious, social
and political values.
In a number of Tunisian films of the 1960s,
the figure of the woman is often represented
as a dominating and self-confident mother
who enjoys considerable decision-making
power within the family. However, in the pro-
lific Algerian productions which idolized the
war of independence, stressing and mythi-
cizing the strong and heroic character of the
male fighter, only stereotyped figures of suf-
fering mothers or wives were portrayed. As
Maherzi emphasizes, in these films women
took on the classic functions of protectors
and nurturers.2 An example is the remarkably
successful film Rih al-Awras by Lakhdar-Ham-
ina (The Wind from the Aurès, Algeria, 1966),
where the protagonist is a mother in despair,
without a real political conscience and in
search of her son who has disappeared,
without whom she is lost. Likewise, in Rache-
di’s Al-afyun wal-‘asa (Opium and the Stick,
Algeria, 1969) the female figures are por-
trayed only in the home environment and
appear cut off from the political situation of
the period.
Another role for female figures is that of
the wife, probably the most suitable role to
consolidate the formation of a young na-
tion. Shams al-diba by Behi (Hyenas’ Sun,
Tunisia, 1977) and Dhil al-Ardh by Louhichi
(Shadow of the Earth, Tunisia, 1982) show
wives who are attentive to the needs of
their children, husbands and families, thus
consolidating the identity of the Arab family
n u c l e u s .
In films which ‘preach’ a social debate (for
this reason defined by critics as ‘social
films’), another image of the woman
emerges: a woman oriented towards West-
ern-style ‘modernity’, who fights for her
rights. In many Algerian films, this image is
based on a specific socio-cultural process.
Following the agrarian reform in 1972,
women were considered an active part of
the economic process for development,
based on the Socialist model. As a conse-
quence, this political p l a i d o y e r is reflected
within the couple or preferably within the
family. In A l - F a h h a m by Bouamari (The Char-
coal Burner, Algeria, 1972) the wife of the
charcoal burner who has gone to work in a
factory following the sector’s economic cri-
sis, becomes aware of her situation and re-
jects her traditional role as a housewife, not
because she has become aware of herself as
a woman but for reasons linked to an eco-
nomic change. M. Léon comments: ‘Le cou-
ple n’est utilisé que comme le moyen ser-
vant le mieux à l’exposé didactique, et le
plus apte à toucher la sensibilité du specta-
t e u r . ’3 Women’s active participation in the
national economy is shown in two other ex-
emplary films: A z i z a by Ben Ammar (A z i z a,
Tunisia, 1980) and Laila wa akhawatuha b y
Mazif (Leila and the Others, Algeria, 1978). In
both films, the protagonists suggest that
women’s emancipation will occur (and
thereby contribute to national develop-
ment) if they enter the world of work out-
side the home environment. Both protago-
nists become self-aware, leading them to
rebel: against the claustrophobia of the
family environment (in A z i z a) and against
the ill-treatment of women in the workplace
and in the public sphere (in Laila wa
a k h a w a t u h a) .
The other figure chosen by filmmakers for
a social discourse is that of the daughter,
representing the new generation. The main
characteristic of the daughter is her contro-
versial relationship with her father, her de-
sire for freedom and an adequate educa-
tion. In two films, Rih al-Janub by Riad (W i n d
from the South, Algeria, 1975) and H o u r i a b y
Mazif (H o u r i a, Algeria, 1986), the young pro-
tagonists face up to paternal authority, rep-
resenting the previous generation and rebel
against it so that they can gain access to ed-
ucation and consequently, to emancipation.
For example in the first film, the protagonist
explains to a shepherd in clearly didactic
tones that education is fundamental for her
emancipation and for national develop-
ment. The girl’s behaviour is given a positive
value, also because economic development
needed emancipated and educated women.
The search for a personal
i d e n t i t y
In the 1980s and 1990s, with the advent
and consolidation of a u t e u r films, a consid-
erable change can be noticed in the film-
maker’s artistic approach and, consequently
in the contents and aesthetics of film pro-
duction. The search for a new identity and a
personal – individual and no longer collec-
tive – dimension which has characterized
a u t e u r films from the Maghreb since its be-
ginnings, also affected representations of
women in film. What is new in these films is
mainly the search for the past and present
in the collective imagination and the sur-
mounting of the stereotypes presented in
previous films: the discourse goes from the
social to the introspective and from political
issues to personal questions.
The women represented are looking for
new models and life styles and a dimension
of their own, with the concentrated effort to
be considered thinking individuals in soci-
ety. The female figures are no longer ‘ideal-
istic or theoretical constructs’.4 It is there-
fore the diversity and multiplicity of these
figures that represents the leitmotif of films
made in the past twenty years. Moreover,
male and female filmmakers deepen the dis-
course on women, investigating the mecha-
nisms of the relations between the sexes in
a broader sense, for example touching upon
such delicate taboo subjects as homosexu-
ality or male chauvinism.
By emigrating and fleeing abroad, women
look for the opportunity to express their real
identity which has been oppressed by claus-
trophobic family environments. This is high-
lighted in Ben Mabrouk’s a l - S a m a (T h e
T r a c e, Tunisia, 1982) where, at the end, the
protagonist, suffocated by a restrictive envi-
ronment, burns her textbooks from the
exams she has failed5and leaves for Europe.
In C h e b by Bouchareb (C h e b, Algeria, 1990)
and Keswa, al-haitu al-da’i by Bornaz (K e s w a ,
the Lost Thread, Tunisia, 1998), the problem-
atic confrontation between the culture of
origin and that of the country of immigra-
tion is treated differently. The discomfort af-
fects above all female b e u r s6 who, having
appropriated European customs and habits,
find themselves at grips with a now lost
identity on their return to the country of ori-
g i n .
With different approaches, two other films
deal with the identity of woman in society,
but by observing the difficult quest by North
African men for their own sexual identity
and through the analysis of the controversial
relationship between the sexes. Rih al-sadd
by Bouzid (Man of Ashes, Tunisia, 1986) and
Asfour stah–Halfaouine by Boughedir (H a l-
f a o u i n e, Tunisia, 1990) deal with these taboo
subjects by placing the accent on the vio-
lence generated by negating sexual identity
and, in the latter film, on the ‘territoriality’ of
sexuality as conceived by Islam.
The psychological and physical violence
that blocks and forms an obstacle to
women’s progress in the society of the
Maghreb is often generated by strictly polit-
ical reasons or by claustrophobic patriarchal
family structures: this is the theme of films
such as T o u c h i a by Benhadj (T o u c h i a, Alge-
ria, 1992) and A l - q a l ’ a by Chouikh (The Cita-
d e l, Algeria, 1988). The screams of the pro-
tagonist in the first film and of the little girl
in the second, both in the last sequences,
show the need to express pain and put an
end to silence in order to bring about
c h a n g e .
The discourse of
e m a n c i p a t i o n
A constant reality in Tunisian society is
highlighed by two films: Soumt al-Qusour b y
Tlatli (Silences of the Palace, Tunisia, 1994)
and Bent Familia by Bouzid (Bent Familia,
Tunisia 1998). Both films focus on the dis-
course of emancipation and the improved
social and juridical condition of women in
society. In the first film, hope for change is
placed in the future generations, who will
conclude the slow and difficult march of
progress, begun by their mothers upon the
country’s independence. Bent Familia, on
the other hand, underlines that forty years
on, little has really changed in how Tunisian
women are considered. Despite their im-
proved juridical position, women experi-
ence the paradox of ‘false modernity’ where
they are not yet considered free and think-
ing individuals but still as belonging to a
family, which thinks, decides and acts on
their behalf.
In the final analysis, women’s search for
their own identity and dimension continues
in daily life in Tunisia and Algeria. Such a
search is mirrored in representations of
women in film in these societies and will
continue to do so as the societies them-
selves undergo change. ♦
Soumt al-Qusour,
Silences of the
P a l a c e.
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Maulana Sayyid Abul Hasan Ali Nadwi (Ali Miyan)
The recent death of Maulana Sayyid Abul Hasan Ali
Nadwi, known by the simple title Ali Miyan, has
been mourned not only in his home of India but
among the many Muslims and non-Muslims
throughout the world who knew him and his con-
tributions as a scholar and public figure. He was
widely respected as a scholar of Q u r ' a n i c c o m m e n-
tary and other traditional knowledge; he was a
prolific writer of biography, history, and contem-
porary commentary; and he was a renowned
leader in numerous institutions focusing on the
political, educational, and social life of Muslims
today. He is credited with writing perhaps a hun-
dred books in Urdu and in Arabic, many of which
have been translated into English and other lan-
g u a g e s .
Born in Rae Bareli, India, in 1914, Ali Miyan was
associated, from his student days, with the Nadwat
al cU l a m a in Lucknow, an institution founded early
in the century to bridge the gap between the
Western and the classically educated elites. A fur-
ther goal of the Nadwa was to foster interaction
with the Arab world and to cultivate a high stan-
dard of Arabic learning. Ali Miyan’s own life richly
fulfilled those objectives. His grandfather was
among the founders of the institution; his father,
the eminent scholar cA b d al-Hayy Hasani (d. 1926),
was its rector, as was his elder brother, whom Ali
Miyan succeeded as rector in 1961. One significant
dimension of Ali Miyan’s scholarly work was to
help shape a historical heritage of Muslim political,
intellectual, and spiritual leadership by writing his-
tories and biographies of the great figures of the
Indian Muslim tradition from Shaikh Ahmad Sirhin-
di in the l7t h century to the leaders of the contem-
porary Tablighi J a m aca t m o v e m e n t .
His connection with the Tabligh movement
began in 1939, and he supported the movement
through his writings and also by his own participa-
tion in d a w a as well as his influence on those asso-
ciated with Nadwa to participate as well. It is as
someone whose energy was focused on spiritual
and educational matters that he became an influ-
ential spokesman for Muslims in India.
Those who gathered in Lucknow, Rae Bareli, and
elsewhere to condole his death included Muslim
leaders from India and abroad and Hindu, Bud-
dhist, and Christian luminaries who lauded him for
his compassion, tolerance, and vision as well as for
his extraordinary scholarship. ♦
B A R B A R A D .  M E T C A L F
On the 7th of February, W.C. Smith died in his na-
tive Toronto, Canada, aged 83. To many readers of
the ISIM Newletter, Smith’s name will be associat-
ed with the founding of the modern discipline of
Islamic Studies. At the age of 33, he established
the distinctive Institute of Islamic Studies at
McGill University, where he taught until 1963. By
this time his first four books - and for some, his
best known - had already appeared: Modern Islam
in India: a social analysis (1943) and Islam in Mod-
ern History (1957), The Meaning and End of Religion
(1962), and The Faith of Other Men (1962). Each of
these books reflected the author’s special rela-
tionship to the study of Islam as well as his deep
concern for the personal, individual quality of
faith inspired by the world’s religions as key to
their being vital, living traditions.
The Smith years still marked the Institute’s ethos
when I became a graduate student there shortly
after his departure from Montreal for Harvard.
Scholars and students, both Muslim and non-Mus-
lim, shared in a joint venture of scholarly enquiry
formerly dominated by Western orientalists. Here,
understanding a religious tradition entailed a de-
gree of empathy with its participants but without
surrendering critical and historical analysis. This
was in fresh contrast with the vestiges of a colo-
nial, orientalist mind-set which lingered on at the
School of Oriental and African Studies, London,
where I had just completed an undergraduate de-
gree. Smith, although ordained to the Presbyter-
ian ministry and who had taught at the Forman
Christian College in Lahore, brought to the study
of Islam a broader, sharper vision of a modern, plu-
ralist world that previous generations of mission-
aries to the sub-continent had lacked. His sensitiv-
ity to other cultures and languages also informed
his approach to Christian theological debate, pos-
sibly best expressed in his book Towards a World
T h e o l o g y (1981) which had built upon his earlier
Questions of Religious Truth (1967) and Religious Di-
v e r s i t y (1976). Writing a new preface for his Faith of
Other Men (re-issued 1998 as Patterns of Faith
around the World), Smith expressed his irenical ap-
proach to comparative religion in these character-
istic terms, ‘Classically the Church, or similarly the
Muslim world, was right that faith is fundamental-
ly one, wherever it be found. They were wrong that
its only form is a particular pattern with which they
were familiar.’ ♦
D A VI D  W A I N E S
Wilfred Cantwell Smith (1916-2000)
Ferdinand Smit (1959-2000)
During the first week of March, the shocking news
that Ferdinand Smit and two friends were brutally
murdered in North Mali was made known. The three
were on a motoring trip from Amsterdam to Ba-
mako. A proficient Arabist and knowledgeable Mid-
dle East expert, Ferdinand worked as a diplomat for
the Dutch Foreign Office and had extensive field ex-
perience in the Middle East. In the early 1980s, dur-
ing his studies (Arabic at the Universities of Amster-
dam and Leiden and Middle Eastern Archaeology at
the University of Amsterdam), he served several
times in South Lebanon as an interpreter and intel-
ligence officer for the Dutch Battalion in the UNIFIL.
Moreover he participated in a number of archaeo-
logical campaigns in Syria. After finishing his stud-
ies, Ferdinand entered the Dutch Foreign Service in
1986. He was posted in Cairo and Damascus and
worked for some time at the Middle East and Africa
Desk in the Hague. His last posting abroad was on
secondment with the United Nations in Gaza.
Ferdinand was fluent in Arabic. A keen observer of
Middle Eastern political affairs, he also had a great
interest in academic pursuits. In his position, he was
several times instrumental in setting up and finding
funds for academic research projects. In spite of his
busy and demanding job, he was able to complete
his PhD research and write his thesis. Just before he
left for Mali, he had handed in his dissertation, The
Battle for South Lebanon: The Radicalization of Leba-
non’s Shi’ites (1982-1985). It is for a large part based
on documents that he was able to acquire during
his work as a UNIFIL intelligence officer. The
Catholic University of Nijmegen, where he was to
defend his thesis, has now decided to award the
doctorate posthumously.
For many of us, it is difficult to realize that Ferdi-
nand is not amongst us anymore. We will remember
him as warm friend, a solid scholar and an expert
with varied and multifaceted interests in Middle
Eastern and Islamic affairs. ♦
R U U D  P E T E R S
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K now l ed ge a nd T echn ol o gy 
J O N  W .  A N D E R S O N  
The Muslim world is experiencing a media explosion –
from street-corner kiosks to satellite television and the
Internet. Islamic messages and discussions of them are
everywhere. They are proliferating, thanks to increas-
ingly accessible, user-friendly technologies, from the
already-familiar tapes and the lowly telephone to the
hi-tech Internet, from pulp fiction to new law review
journals, from popular culture magazines to multime-
dia Islamic educational material. Redrawing the dimen-
sions of Islamic discourse, identity, and consciousness
extends beyond audience fragmentation to an ex-
panding public sphere of new genre and channels of
expression for new voices and interpreters.
New Media in the
Muslim World: T h e
Emerging Public Sphere
Observers and analysts of the Muslim world
have become familiar with how cassette
tapes and satellite television have changed
the propagation of Islam. The face-to-face of
sermons and fatwas are increasingly mediat-
ed, and Islamic discourse is increasingly em-
bedded in the media tools of modern life.
This integration process is as diverse as its
channels, as messages migrate between
media and the range of interpreters, if not of
interpretation, expands accordingly. Expan-
sion is not just of the field. Through the new
media, increasing numbers of participants
take part in a public sphere in which all have
an authority to talk about Islam. In the
process, ideas and understandings about Is-
lamic thought and practice may be frag-
mented and recombined with ideas and ex-
periences of contemporary, often immedi-
ate, contingencies of how to lead Muslim
lives in increasingly global societies.
The new media enabling these changes ex-
tend functionally and experientially beyond
the already familiar tapes of preachers and
their satellite outlets. They are vernacular
and down-market, often overlooked in text-
based scholarship focused on intellectuals
and the more social and behavioral analyses
applied to the masses. The new media range
from pulp novels and popular culture maga-
zines to new kinds of law reviews in which
n o n -cu l a m a ' join the cu l a m a ' in thinking
about the s h a rica and its contemporary ap-
plications. They also discuss how to be and
become Muslim, and how to share Islam with
others in non-Muslim countries and in the
face of existing Islamic conventions. The
same themes are taken up on Internet chat
and World Wide Web sites. The channels of
such discourse also include desktop publish-
ing, faxes, the increasingly ubiquitous tele-
phone, and the Internet. These genre and
channels dramatically lower the barriers and
risks of entry to the public sphere, and elude
efforts to contain communication within ac-
ceptable – most narrowly within ritual –
t e r m s .
In this blurring of boundaries, a vast middle
ground is opening between elite, super-liter-
ate, authoritative discourse and mass, non-
literate, ‘folk’ Islam thanks to increasingly ac-
cessible technologies for mediated commu-
nication. The old communications ecology of
the mass media, with their few senders and
many receivers, is giving way to a new public
space with nearly as many senders as re-
ceivers. Cast in the vernacular, they are root-
ed in the conditions of modern life – which
they often address – are multi-channel, and
tied to consumer-level technologies that are
associated with and sometimes essential for
contemporary professional and middle class
life. Above all, they are participatory. Recep-
tion, and the sorts of informal deconstruction
among intimates, is replaced by participation
that displaces authority with engagement,
broadening both the forms and content of
engagement. Precedents range from the in-
troduction of printing to desktop publishing,
from leaflets to home-produced tapes of
everything from sermons to folk music. The
range of skills linking the singer and the stu-
dio, for instance, is increasingly available
through user-friendly and distributed ‘intelli-
gence’ built into consumer technology – and
into consumers through two generations of
spreading mass education.
The horizontal circulation 
of communication
The ground is shifting and enabling more
than opportunities to answer back. While dis-
sent initially attracts attention (of analysts, if
not of authorities), the new media facilitate a
much wider range as well as volume of views
in entering the public sphere. These include
alternative views, to be sure, but also mobi-
lization that is horizontal and structured
around shared interests and concerns in con-
trast to the top-down model in mass commu-
nications. The telephone becomes a tool for
extending personal networks into communi-
ty mobilization, and new law journals offer
arenas for engaging a wider range of actors
than traditional authorities in the ci j t i h a d t h a t
actually links the s h a r ica to contemporary
life. Similarly, pulp romances with Islamic
themes exemplify the increasing promi-
nence of the vernacular in new media while
the Internet, the medium par excellence o f
the ‘virtual community’, creates them on a
global scale.
In the past, information deficits encour-
aged reliance on skilled interpreters to fill in
the gaps and impose structure. Such struc-
tures of political, religious, intellectual au-
thority are giving way to skills to compose
and sift messages, to link and also to move
messages between media, to translate and
apply both messages and channels. Moderni-
ty poses such surpluses of representation in
multiple, sometimes alternative lifestyles,
concepts, and ideas about how to live prop-
erly; modernity itself becomes a topic of rep-
resentation and discussion in the popular
press, where it is endlessly deconstructed,
and also instructed. The slippage between
subject and object can be seen in the blurred
genres of Islamic novels that introduce
themes of Islamic manuals written by cu l a m a '
into vernacular fiction and pop culture mag-
azines, both significantly aimed at female au-
diences. Other messages also migrate from
one medium to another, increasing the hori-
zontal circulation of communication and
shifting its registers toward a sense of partic-
ipation quite beyond the experience of mere
r e c e p t i o n .
These are indicators of an emerging public
sphere of mediated communication be-
tween elite and ‘folk’ representations, of in-
termediate forms between face-to-face inter-
action and mass media speaking to mass au-
diences, and of increasing participation
through a continuum of forms, discourses,
and channels. Its significance is that this
range is both broader and more embedded
than the limiting cases captured in the ‘civil
society’ discussion focused on associations,
citizenship, and civility or in characterizations
of ‘activist,’ even ‘fundamentalist’, Islam that
increasingly appear overloaded as categories
for analysis. Those limited cases are embed-
ded in a wider range which is expanding and
emerging along multiple other dimensions
that come into view in the volume, New
Media in the Muslim World: The Emerging Pub-
lic Sphere.1
Multiple dimensions of new
media in the Muslim world
Continuities in Egyptian popular culture
commentary, Walter Armbrust shows, form a
tradition of reflection and self-reflection de-
constructing alternative framings of moder-
nity that belie easy interpretations of ‘hybrid-
ity.’ In a ground-breaking discussion of Islam-
ic romance novels, Maimuma Huq re-sorts
the contest of Islamists and secularists in
Bangladesh. John Bowen focuses on contem-
porary proliferation of Islamic law reviews in
Indonesia that engage a wide range of con-
tributors, who in turn explore western social
science as well as Islamic learning, to give a
close account of contemporary consensus-
building in one of the Muslim world’s larger
publics. The multiple registers of connec-
tions with wider publics is the subject of Gre-
gory Starrett’s account of the consumption
and reuse of Islamic teaching materials in an
American Black Muslim congregation. In it, is-
sues of personal morality are tied to knowl-
edge, including both technology and knowl-
edge of the community of Islam. Hakan
Yavuz provides an account of today’s media-
saturated Turkey, where new media figure
prominently in community-building that cir-
cumvents rather than merely challenges au-
thority and previously fixed positions and in-
terpretations. Eickelman describes the cen-
sors’ new dilemma with a world where mes-
sages easily migrate into alternative chan-
nels, alternative media, sometimes subtly
borrowing their authority as well as their
means. Jenny White tells a more grassroots
story of how television in Turkey puts events
before the public as they happen, and com-
pares that to how people use the telephone
for mobilizing and combining personal net-
works for public action. On a more global
level, the Internet has become a favoured
tool of the dispersed and of emerging elites
across the Muslim world, from ordinary Mus-
lims with extraordinary command of the
medium to vernacular preachers. They in
turn lead the way for more orthodox institu-
tions, including new, international Islamic
universities, Muslim academies that arose in
response to colonialism, and now the vener-
able Al-Azhar University and Sufi orders that
were already transnational.
Commenting on this practical pluralism,
Richard Norton describes responses of ‘the
slowly receding state’. Behind the specific
face of dissent, ‘the discourse that will give
shape to change’, he argues, emerges from a
broader society in which new media are
moving to the centre.2 Media have been a
measure of modernization at least since
Daniel Lerner’s The Passing of Traditional Soci-
e t y.3 Mass media were channels of nation-
building states and stages for ritualized com-
munication to mass citizens as witnesses. The
new media, in their comparative diversity,
flexibility, and lower barriers to entry, are
channels for diverse, flexible, and more ac-
cessible participation than mere witness. This
emerging public sphere is not only one of
talking back to power, but also one of a wider
range of actors who talk to each other, some-
times about power, and often about the
power of the new media in their communica-
tion. What also emerges from New Media in
the Muslim World are the multiple dimen-
sions of their embeddedness.
We are widely recognized to be in a period
of exploration, which moves into increasing-
ly accessible media with more diverse play-
ers, means, and channels. Cassettes, pulp fic-
tion, cheap magazines, but also law reviews
and the Internet, are media of migrating
messages and ‘blurred genres’, which con-
found authority, including that formerly re-
served (sometimes self-reserved) for intellec-
tuals. This is also a period of exposition, of
messages moving into mediated communi-
cation from more restricted face-to-face
realms. Here, a new communications ecology
is emerging that expands the public sphere
and participants in it. It is clear that we need
to pay more attention to precisely where and
how contemporary Islamic (and other) fer-
ment is occurring, including the range of
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I have been writing a dissertation on the
contemporary religious worship of the
Tatars in Finland since February 1999,
specifically concerning such matters as the
importance of Islam to the Tatars in ordi-
nary everyday life, their understanding of
essential Islamic concepts, norms, values,
moral conception and their contacts
abroad. From August to October 1999, I
conducted research in Finland: establishing
contact with the Tatars, making inquiries,
interviewing the imam Ahmet Naim Atasev-
er, and participating as an observer in Fri-
day prayer at the community centre in
H e l s i n k i .
’An old Muslim minority in Finland’; ‘an offi-
cially acknowledged religious community
since 1925*…’; ‘Secularization or still active
religious worship…’. Such statements
about the Tatars of Finland caught my at-
tention some years ago. The Tatars are an
old ethnic Turkic Islamic national minority
consisting of about 850 people, hardly
known either in Finland or the rest of Eu-
rope. 
Framework of the dissertation
I intend to focus on the following questions:
What is the role played by the five pillars, i.e.
the creed, prayer, the alms tax, the fast in the
month of Ramadan and the pilgrimage to
Mecca? What does the celebration of reli-
gious festivals mean to a Tatar? Is religiosity
visible in everyday life and behaviour? Who
transfers religious knowledge (imams, the
oldest members of families, influential fami-
lies or other actors) and to whom?
The contemporary religious worship of the
Tatars in Finland is seemingly of no interest in
scientific discussions and publications. It is
commonly assumed that the Tatars are a ho-
mogeneous group in view of their religion, i.e.
Sunnites and secularized Muslims. Within this
N o t e
* The second country in Europe to officially
acknowledge the rights of a Muslim community
was Belgium in 1974.
Liisamaija Jurvala, M.Pol.Sc., is a doctoral candidate
at the Institute for Asian and African Studies at
Humboldt University, Berlin, Germany
E-mail: lumme@zedat.fu-berlin.de
project my aim is also to analyse more care-
fully the far too general and loose characteri-
zation of the Islam practised by the Tatars in
Finland as Euro-Islam and to use a more pre-
cise definition for the term Euro-Islam in this
connection. ♦
Hong Kong Muslim Identities
Muslims in Hong Kong are characterized by
a high degree of ethnic and religious diver-
sity. They came from China, India, Pakistan,
Malaysia, Indonesia and from further places
or origins, and belong to various religious
traditions, such as the Sunni, Shi’a, or Bohra
groups. This project examines how the in-
volvement, or non-involvement, of different
Muslim groups into common organizations
explains how Hong Kong Muslims built up
their identities. In addition, the policies of
different Hong Kong Muslim organizations
from the 19t h century to today, and the
changes in these policies, are investigated
as indicators of how Muslims related to one
another, to their Hong Kong surroundings,
as well as to their societies of origins or of
previous residences.
The principal organizations surveyed are:
(1) the Trustees of the Islamic Community
Fund, which is the oldest organization in
charge of the administration of the mosques
and cemeteries; (2) the Islamic Union, which is
the second oldest organization of which also
Chinese are members; and (3) the Chinese
Muslim Cultural and Fraternal Organisation,
which has become especially important since
Chinese Muslims had become the largest
Muslim group in Hong Kong, and since Hong
Kong has returned to Chinese sovereignty.
Methodology and funding
This study started in 1998 and uses
archive research, interviews and participant
observation. It is part of Dr Plüss’ umbrella
project researching transnational communi-
ties in Hong Kong. The Muslim project has
received funding from the CRCG (the Com-
mittee for Research and Conference Grants
of the University of Hong Kong), the
Freemason’s Fund for East Asian Studies
and the Hang Seng Golden Jubilee Educa-
tion Fund. ♦
Caroline Plüss obtained a PhD in the Sociology of
Religion from Oxford University in 1995. Since 1996,
she has been working as a post-doctoral fellow at the
Centre of Asian Studies, the University of Hong Kong.
Her research includes the Jewish community in Hong
Kong, the Hong Kong Indians, and the Church of Jesus
Christ of Latter-day Saints (Mormons) in Hong Kong.
E-mail: cbpluss@hkucc.hku.hk
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C A R OL I N E  P L Ü S S
Islam in the Far North of Europe:
The Tatars of Finland
A D V E R T I S E M E N T
The ISIM Newsletter would like to urge
researchers to introduce their projects in this
section. Introducing new research in the field
of Islamic studies can serve to stimulate
interest as well as to strengthen networks
amongst researchers. 
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F i e l d w o r k
B R U C E  K O E P K E
Relatively few academic studies have commented on
Badakhshan Province in northern Afghanistan. Dur-
ing the period of the political ‘Great Game’ between
Tsarist Russian-Central Asia and British India in the
1 9t h century, British and Russian adventure-style of-
ficers occasionally returned with reports. Last centu-
ry, a number of German, Russian, Austrian, Swiss, as
well as a few Danish, French, American and Afghan
researchers discussed Badakhshan in terms of vari-
ous academic fields ranging from history, anthropol-
ogy, ethnomusicology, geography, and linguistics,
to geology, botany, and mountaineering. All of these
accounts refer to conditions prior to the Communist
coup in April 1978. Recent fieldwork experiences in
Badakhshan (1998 and 1999) have allowed an exam-
ination of the impact of Afghanistan’s civil war upon
cultural traditions, particularly those involving per-
formance, notably music and dance.




Province is inhabited predominantly by eth-
nic Tajiks who are speakers of Dari, a Persian
language, but also by other, bilingual, eth-
nic groups such as Uzbeks, Kirghiz, and
Pashtuns. Since the Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan in 1979 and the subsequent
ongoing civil war, very few researchers have
travelled to Badakhshan. Only a small num-
ber of foreigners working as international
aid workers and occasionally photo journal-
ists and adventure seekers have recently vis-
ited Badakhshan. The latter visitors tend to
publish their experiences in the commercial
category of ‘the most dangerous places in
the world.’
With a noticeable rise in orthodox Islam
throughout Afghanistan following the de-
feat of the Soviet-backed Communist gov-
ernment in 1992, and particularly since the
rise of the Taliban in 1994, performance tra-
ditions have been relegated to the fringes
of society. The Taliban are a fundamentalist
Islamic militia comprised of Pakistani and
Afghan religious students originating from
Pakistani m a d r a s as along the Afghanistan-
Pakistan border as well as from disillusioned
former m u j a h i d e e n from predominantly
Pashtun-inhabited regions in southern
Afghanistan. Following the Taliban’s inter-
pretation of s h a ri ca law, all ‘non-religious’
forms of cultural expression that include
human actions – and this definition includes
entertainment music and dance – are re-
garded as un-Islamic and sinful. As a result,
expressive arts have been banned in areas
controlled by the Taliban and their strict
policies are reinforced by the Department of
Vice and Virtue. In contrast, in the non-Tal-
iban northern regions an official decree
against expressive traditions has not been
issued. These areas, comprising almost 20%
of Afghanistan’s territory, are ruled by the
former post-Communist government of
President Burhanuddin Rabbani and loosely
aligned commanders. At present, the
provinces of Badakhshan, Takhar and most
of the provinces of Kapisa, Parwan and
Baghlan are under the control of the anti-
Taliban alliance, as are several smaller dis-
tricts in Kunar, Balkh, Samangan, Kunduz
and Jowzjan.
Travel into Badakhshan
Considering Afghanistan’s precarious po-
litical situation, the physical task of reaching
Badakhshan was not only time-consuming,
but, at times, quite challenging. The hospi-
tality of the Badakhshi and Afghan people,
however, more than compensated for these
efforts. Other than the aeroplanes of the
United Nations and International Red Cross,
which irregularly enter Faizabad from Pe-
shawar and Islamabad in northern Pakistan
so as to transport international and Afghan
aid workers as well as medical patients,
there is currently no other air service avail-
able to Badakhshan. Issued with a visa valid
for travel to Rabbani-governed territories, I
arrived in 1998 at Faizabad’s airport which
consists of a Soviet-built runway composed
of corrugated steel sheets. Although the air
traffic control facilities were destroyed dur-
ing the jihad against the Communist
regime, this airport remains Badakhshan’s
only serviceable port for small aircraft.
Due to the unforeseen earthquake in the
Shahr-e Bozurg region several months later,
I was forced to abandon my fieldwork pre-
maturely. After unsuccessfully attempting
to re-enter Badakhshan by plane the follow-
ing year, I eventually managed to return
overland from Tajikistan. Whilst this route is
primarily utilized to enable essential hu-
manitarian aid to reach Afghanistan across
the Amu Darya, it is not an official border-
crossing and consequently requires many
essential documents and permits which are
obtainable only in Dushanbe.
First impressions
Within Badakhshan, hotels and guest-
houses catering to international tourists or
researchers no longer exist. The only re-
maining hotel in Faizabad, which once ac-
commodated tourists in the 1960s and
1970s, has now become a residence for visit-
ing commanders. Elsewhere, local teahous-
es, c h a y k h a n as, and hostels, s e r a is, are still
an option, but are frequented by many
traders for overnight stay and are therefore
inappropriate for longer lodging. Fortunate-
ly, I was generously allowed to rent accom-
modation in some of the compounds of in-
ternational aid organizations.
The centre of any activity in Badakhshan,
and for that matter anywhere in
Afghanistan, is the bazaar, no matter how
small and limited the range of available
goods. Faizabad’s bazaar is in the old part of
town in Shahr-e Kohne, along the main
street, Khiaban, and close to the Kokcha
River. Many local hand-made items, such as
traditional Badakhshi shoes, coats, caps,
pottery, lapis lazuli jewellery, saddle goods,
and urns are sold next to imported Pakistani
and Iranian basic household wares.
In order to travel within Badakhshan and
to pass frequent checkpoints, appropriate
travel documents are essential and have to
be issued by district governors or key com-
manders. Only limited motorized public
transport is, however, available within the
province. The few operative jeeps belong
mainly to commanders and together with
the only other irregular form of motorized
public transport – travel on heavily laden
trucks – reflect Badakhshan’s poor econom-
ic state and fragile infrastructure. No roads
are surfaced and are thus prone to frequent
washouts and landslides. Closures can last
for anything from five hours to two weeks.
When the province’s main trade arteries are
impassable, especially the western road
connecting Faizabad with neighbouring
Takhar Province’s capital Taloqan, the usual-
ly poorly stocked bazaars empty out quickly.
I recall one occasion when wheat, an essen-
tial food item, was unavailable in Faizabad’s
bazaar and local bakers were forced to close
their businesses for three days. These un-
predictable conditions mean that walking
with a loaded donkey or riding a horse re-
mains the most reliable form of transport.
Agriculture, both as subsistence farming
as well as for local export, provides the main
form of economy. As a consequence of a
lack of employment prospects and regular
paid salaries, which are generally only avail-
able with aid organizations, bartering con-
tinues to be a common practice throughout
the province. Traditionally, wheat, rice and
millet were the main crops grown, but in-
creasingly opium poppies, although labour
intensive, have become the most common
type of cash economy. As a result of
Badakhshan’s isolation, as well as the cost of
limited and expensive imported fuel re-
sources, deforestation has become ram-
pant. This environmentally disastrous prac-
tice has led to Faizabad’s once famed pista-
chio forests virtually having disappeared
over the last two decades. Moreover, the
Kokcha River’s muddy brown water caused
by eroding mountains and landslides is a di-
rect attribute of uncontrolled deforestation.
Cultural life
Despite the economic hardship,
Badakhshan has probably still one of the
best education systems on offer in
Afghanistan for both girls and boys. This is
currently relatively well supported through
the assistance of international aid organiza-
tions. Before the Taliban take-over of Mazar-
e Sharif in northwestern Afghanistan in
1997, male and female secondary school
students could, upon graduation, pursue
tertiary education. But with all universities
in Afghanistan now being controlled by the
Taliban, and because of fears of reprisals
against residents from opposition-held ter-
ritories, students from Rabbani-governed
territories are unable to enrol for higher ed-
ucation in Afghanistan. Moreover, women
are barred from education in Taliban areas.
In spite of the serious economic and politi-
cal instability, Badakhshi continue to revel
in the few cultural events that are sanc-
tioned by local authorities, such as, for ex-
ample, the traditional and religious festivals
of Nowruz, Jeshen, and Eid. Celebrations
surrounding the Nowruz festival on 21
March 1998 were accompanied by a tradi-
tional b u z k a s h i horse tournament and a fair.
On another occasion, several weeks later,
the Jeshen festival was also commemorated
with a b u z k a s h i tournament in Ishkashim in
northeastern Badakhshan. Although Jeshen
was once an independence day celebration
in August, it is now held on April 28, the an-
niversary of the defeat of the former Soviet-
backed government.
With the Taliban’s continued attacks on
opposition-held territories, a general trend
towards conservative Islam is noticeable in
Badakhshan among the local population
and commanders alike. In direct response to
this religious orthodoxy, expressive tradi-
tions, such as music performances, occur
rarely and have been driven underground.
Prior to the civil war, Badakhshan’s leading
musicians were able to travel freely
throughout the main cities in Afghanistan.
Some were even selected for appearances
on Kabul television. Currently, entertain-
ment, either private or public, occurs only if
the local commander or community leader
condones such non-religious performances.
However, upon hearing of my research,
local musicians in more remote regions of
Badakshan would not infrequently arrive
unannounced at my residence and proudly
display their instruments, being delighted
to perform if the situation allowed. With the
strict interpretation of s h a ri ca, the profes-
sion of musician seems to have virtually dis-
appeared. Every performer I interviewed is
now primarily occupied as a subsistence
farmer, working on either private or leased
l a n d .
Unfortunately, with the current situation
of a politically non-unified nation, it seems
unlikely that long-term academic research
can be carried out in Afghanistan in the near
future, especially in regions that are in rela-
tive proximity to current frontlines. Similar-
ly, the survival of non-religious, perfor-
mance traditions is questionable. Yet, if a
popular government were to be soon for-
malized, and were to include a representa-
tion of Afghanistan’s various ethnic groups
and political factions, conditions could
change quickly. The Badakhshi are certainly
more than ready to embrace a peaceful pe-
riod, to rebuild their economy and to con-
solidate fragile cultural traditions. ♦
B u z k a s h i
tournament in
F a i z a b a d ,
Nowruz, 1998.
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Pr og ra mme P r esenta t io n
R AI N E R  B R Ö ME R
The development of scientific activity in the Ottoman
Empire and other contemporary Muslim countries
has so far attracted little if any attention from either
disciplines of ‘Oriental’ or Science Studies, despite
the long established fact that in the ‘classical’ age, Is-
lamic civilization actively contributed to the elabora-
tion of scientific traditions, which originated in differ-
ent surrounding cultures (Hellenistic, Sassanid, Indi-
an, etc.). At the Sixth Annual Congress of the German
Middle East Studies Association (DAVO) in December
1999 in Hamburg, the study group on ‘Arabic-Ot-
toman Sciences in the Modern Period’ organized a
panel in which five research projects covering the
1 7t h through 19t h centuries were presented.
DAVO Study Group on
A r a b i c - O t t o m a n
Sciences in the
Modern Period
Contrary to what Edward Said’s notorious ac-
cusations of ‘Orientalism’ suggest, pupils of
Sylvestre de Sacy, the archetype of Saidian
orientalism, started as early as the mid-19th
century to pinpoint the specific accomplish-
ments of classical Islamic sciences in their
proper historical context.1
However, even today, the assumption of a
gradual decline of Islamic sciences between
the 13th and 18th centuries is hardly contested
– though the notion of ‘decline’ is hard to de-
fine.2 The view is held that these sciences
were only rediscovered after the clashes with
European colonialism and imperialism in the
course of the 19th century, when ‘Western sci-
ence’ eventually supplanted the ‘classical’ sci-
ences almost completely.3 The fact is, howev-
er, that many disciplines flourished until the
mid-20th century.
Decline of sciences?
A number of possible reasons have been
suggested to account for this alleged decline.
Ghazali’s ‘destruction of the philosophers’, the
Ottoman defeat in the naval battle at Lepanto
(1571 AD) and subsequent persecution of ‘hu-
manist’ scholars,4 and the missing connection
between scholars and artisans – a crucial fac-
tor in the rise of modern Western science5 –
are some examples.
Each of these factors, however, can arguably
be called into question. A condemnation of
the tenets of natural philosophy occurred in
Paris 1270/77; the Inquisition threatened Eu-
ropean scholars in the same period Schulze
examines in the Ottoman Empire; and, on the
other hand, the connection between learning
and the trades is documented (e.g. in a rele-
vant number of instances in al-Jabarti’s fa-
mous chronicle of Egypt covering the years
from 1694 to 1821); to name but a few.6
Remarkably, scholars in the colonized coun-
tries, very early on, confronted the challenge
of Western technological superiority, reacting
with bewilderment, as in the case of al-Jabarti,
yet without questioning the superior moral
and cultural values of Islam. Thus, the self-pro-
claimed moral and cultural superiority of Islam
inaugurated a whole new thread of apolo-
getic literature during the Arab Renaissance
(nahda), projecting the ideal fulfilment of Is-
lamic duties back to the times of the pious an-
cestors of early Islam (as-salaf as-salih, hence:
salafiyya).7 Though the structure of discourse
is changing in the course of decolonization,
there is considerable continuity between the
thoughts of al-Afghani, cAbduh, Rida, al-
Banna, and Qutb and the present day teach-
ings of the Muslim Brethren.8
Paradoxically, many ‘oriental’ thinkers today
seem to subscribe to this traditional account
which claims that there is a remarkable intel-
lectual gap encompassing half the history of
Islam.9
C o n t i n u i t i e s
More recent research in the history of sci-
ence presents a different picture. Sonja Brent-
jes (Frankfurt am Main) who was unable to at-
tend the panel had a paper read ‘On the rela-
tion between the Ottoman Empire and the
West European Republic of Letters (17th - 18th
centuries)’ in which she traced a continuous
flow of scientific knowledge across the
Mediterranean Sea which contradicts the
‘iron curtain’ concept promulgated by, for ex-
ample, Edward Lewis.
At the same time, classical texts continued
to be read and annotated throughout the
18th century which is documented by the
reading and possession marks on Islamic
manuscripts preserved in libraries around the
world, as François Charette (Frankfurt am
Main) pointed out in his contribution on the
library of the Ottoman scholar Mustafa Sidqi
(d. 1769). Likewise, modern commentaries on
classical texts may well include an apprecia-
tion of the latest data from scientific observa-
tions. It therefore appears that, on the one
hand, detailed studies are still urgently re-
quired in order to document the available
sources of scientific activity to which little at-
tention has been paid thus far10 – a conse-
quence of the self-fulfilling prophecy that lit-
tle of interest was to be found in more recent
documents. On the other hand, it seems nec-
essary to take a broader look at the manifold
institutional settings where different forms of
scientific ventures might have been pursued.
Institutions of science and
networks of learning
Though it is assumed that a specific set of
institutions in the West supported the Scien-
tific Revolution (such as universities, corre-
spondence networks, learned societies, pri-
vate presses, and scientific journals),11 there is
some evidence that in the Islamic cultures
one might rather have to examine different
spaces of research and communication (from
mosques and Sufi brotherhoods12 to observa-
tories, hospitals, the hajj, private salons, mili-
tary institutions, etc.). Stefan Reichmuth
(Bochum) presented his work on the Indian-
born scholar Murtada az-Zabidi (1732-1791),
who created an intellectual network around
his dwellings in Medina and Cairo, which ex-
tended throughout the Muslim world, from
West Africa and Ethiopia to Anatolia and Cen-
tral Asia.13 Networks of teaching in the Mus-
lim world from the 18th to 20th century are the
subject of a Junior Scholars’ Research Group
based at the Ruhr University in Bochum, co-
ordinated by Michael Kemper.
While in the second half of the 19th century,
when Arab scholars discussed contemporary
Western scientific theories, the discursive
structures of the initial treatise and commen-
tary literature (rasa’il, shuruh) still remained
visibly rooted in traditional forms of scientific
practice,14 this did not prevent Arab scientists
from participating in Western-based interna-
tional scientific ventures like the global map-
ping of geomagnetism. Rainer Brömer
(Jena/Göttingen) showed in his paper how
the later director of the Egyptian observatory,
Mahmoud Bey al-Falaki (1815-85), in the
1850s travelled through a number of Euro-
pean countries, publishing his geophysical
data in different periodicals.15
Science and the public
The second half of the 19th century saw the
massive spread of interest in scientific mat-
ters to a growing literate public, in the ‘West-
ern’ world, but to a similar degree in the Arab
speaking countries. Dagmar Glaß (Leipzig)
characterized in her study the relationship
between Arab journalists and their readership
in the late 19th century as a ‘pedagogical dia -
logue’ in which the former actively sought to
create a public understanding of science. In
this process, only subsequently would the im-
portance of religious aspects of science gain
greater importance, which leads to a more
fundamental question dominating much of
the contemporary debate: Can science be Is-
lamic?
From a completely different point of view,
over the last three decades a number of pro-
jects has been initiated by Muslims through-
out the Islamic world and in the diaspora
which aims at creating an ‘Islamic science’ or
the ‘Islamization of scientific knowledge’
(ISTAC in Kuala Lumpur, IIIT in Herndon/Vir-
ginia, etc.).16 On closer inspection, many con-
tributions to this contemporary debate rather
a-critically subscribe to the assumptions of
Western ‘scientific fundamentalism’ (Ziaud-
din Sardar) which is to be Islamized in form
rather than in content.17 In this respect, the
‘Islamized disciplines’ show less similarity to
classical Arabic sciences than, perhaps, the
writings of the 19th century Darwinism de-
bate in which a considerable number of Arab
Christian authors were involved. ♦
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D e b a t e
D AV I D  S H A N K L A N D
Any researcher interested in modern Turkey can
hardly escape the controversy that has surrounded
religion in the last decade. The rise and fall of Er-
bakan and the Welfare Party, the National Security
Council’s secular ‘recommendations’ in February
1997, the partial closure of the I
.
m a m - H a t i p ( r e l i-
giously-oriented) schools, and the formation of
‘Western Working Groups’ to investigate alleged in-
filtration into the civil service by religious activists,
are just a few instances of how prominent these is-
sues have been. How, as observers, are we to attempt
to understand the significance of these and similar




There is no simple answer, but it seems pos-
sible to suggest, at least as a starting point
for discussion, two simultaneous but con-
tradictory trends. First, there appears to be a
rapidly growing heterogeneity, particularly
in the large urban centres such as Istanbul,
Izmir and Ankara. The precise reasons for
this are unclear, but certainly linked to
Turkey’s growing integration with the out-
side world, and encouraged by the highly
successful (if uneven) economic transforma-
tion of recent decades.
At the same time, it seems that Turkey is
tending to bifurcate sharply between pro-
and anti-secular movements. On the anti-
secular side, there are the popular Islamist
political movements, the Islamic brother-
hoods, the followers of Said-i Nursi, a con-
stellation of Islamic business, media, chari-
ties and associations, and the extremely vio-
lent Hizbullah. On the secular side, there are
the followers of the original Republican
People’s Party, moderate believers (such as
those who might find themselves holding
the central ground in the True Path Party),
parts of the senior bureaucracy (particularly
the judiciary), much of an increasingly con-
sumerist oriented youth, the military (led by
the army), and not least, almost the entirety
of the unorthodox minority, the Alevis.1
It can be argued that this split is profound.
Even taking into account the fact that peo-
ple may change their perspective, that
movements may sometimes blur into one
another, and that there is a vast difference
between rhetoric and action, the side that
an individual takes in this ideological divide
may lead them into quite different social
contexts in their daily lives: the one likely to
include a combination of religious rituals,
mosque-going, t a r i k a t membership, Koran
courses, right-wing or religious political par-
ties, Islamic discussion groups, Islamic foun-
dations (both economic and pious), the Is-
lamic media and a personal rejection of rev-
elry, ostentation, and overt displays of emo-
tion; the other leading to a less structured
life, but likely to include broad acceptance
of the republican state, its secular ceremony
and ritual, alcoholic drink, dance, and if also
politically committed – usually though cer-
tainly not exclusively – involvement in left-
wing groups. Indeed, it is this tendency to
‘bunch’ along the two sides of the secular/-
anti-secular split that explains much of this
divide’s volatility, and its potential to harm
Turkey in the coming decades.
Studying secularism
We often remind each other, both at con-
ferences and in our writings, that we should
be as sensitive as possible to diversity with-
in Islamic societies. In spite of this healthy
discussion, it seems that the emergence of
overtly secular movements in Turkey has
not attracted the same attention as the
more actively Islamist trends, whether that
latter study be to stress the Islamist move-
ments’ rise or, conversely, their supposed
decline. There is, for example, a persistent
tendency to give more weight to the pro-
nouncements of the Islamifying move-
ments, such as the Nurcus and their related
groups, and discount the more moderate
voice of the Directorate of Religious Affairs,
perhaps assuming that since it is govern-
ment-led, the people with whom it is associ-
ated must in some way be less ‘Islamic’. Yet,
many of the thousands of people who work
for the Directorate, along with those who
worship in its mosques and participate in its
wider activities, certainly regard themselves
as genuine Muslims and accept the secular
s t a t e .2 Likewise, we have a far greater
knowledge of the inner workings of the S ü-
l e y m a n c ı s than we do of the increasingly
visible jeunesse dorée who spend great parts
of their lives in clubs, restaurants, pop con-
certs and summer-houses. Yet these people
are still capable of taking vows at a shrine
outside Bosphorus University in an attempt
to pass their university degrees, or of planti-
ng a rose bush at the time of H ı d ı r ı l l e z i n
early May with a little wrapped image of
their desired goal suspended from one of its
branches. Many of these people would re-
ject with anger any imputation that they are
not ‘Islamic’, though they are not in the
slightest interested in Islamist politics or in
opposing the secular state.
’ C u l t u r a l i s m ’
It can be suggested that this imbalance is
partly a question of the language that we
use, and the categories that we employ to
label Islamic societies. To give an immediate
example, within the immense amount of
journalistic (and therefore prominent if not
in itself powerful) coverage that is attendant
upon Turkey and the European Union, there
is a core of writers, such as Hugh Pope of the
International Herald Tribune or the sepul-
chral anonymous scribes for The Economist,
who maintain that the secular state is in
some way by definition illegitimate, that the
correct course for Turkey would be to re-in-
troduce some form of more overtly Islamic
central state.3 This, bluntly, is part of an ex-
panding curse in sociological writings that
might be deemed ‘culturalism’: an implica-
tion that just because people are from one
particular group they have to behave in the
presumed standard fashion for that com-
m u n i t y .
The Alevis
The Alevis, the heterodox minority that
make up perhaps slightly less than 20% of
the population, are a further case in point. In
the dozen years that I have been studying
and conducting fieldwork among them,
there is not the slightest doubt that they
have been undergoing a transformation: a
process of codification of their previously
oral tradition, one that has been rapid and
interesting to witness, resulting in a large
number of publications, an increasingly
strong public profile, and above all, a large
part of its population becoming profoundly
s e c u l a r .
This does not mean that Alevi people are
all the same, far from it. Whilst it is necessary
to make the caveat that the situation is ex-
tremely fluid, there are those who embrace
secularism enthusiastically, so much so that
they wish no longer to regard their culture
as a religion at all, rather as a moral ethic to
help guide their everyday existence within
the Republic. These may regard ‘Aleviness’
as being henceforth unnecessary as a sepa-
rate or distinct category. There are those
who, whilst accepting the Republic, wish to
maintain closer contact with their traditions
within a sharply secular nation: these peo-
ple are likely to be active members of the
political left. It is perhaps the smallest dis-
tinct group that seeks more explicit recogni-
tion. For instance, Cem V a k f ı , led by an Alevi
religious figure, wishes to make the govern-
ment teach ‘Aleviness’ explicitly, basing its
argument on the political principle ‘no taxa-
tion without representation’. These people
are likely to regret the social change that
has been forced on to their communities,
and wish for something that they might
refer to as ‘traditional’ Alevi values, though
as their leaders have rarely spent much time
in Alevi villages, they are unlikely to be so at
a l l .4
Varying belief
As researchers, what sort of language
should we use to discuss this diverse social
change? To imply that social change among
the Alevi is predominantly a religious refor-
mulation is mistaken. This is not meant to
imply that the Alevis have become ‘unbe-
lievers’ – something which would distress
and irritate many of their members. Never-
theless, the shift undergone by the majority
appears rather akin to that which Christiani-
ty has undergone in Europe: most Alevis
predominantly experience their music and
dance as a cultural rather than a religious
experience; roughly akin, for example, to at-
tending a Mozart requiem or a Bach cantata
in a cathedral, an event not primarily moti-
vated by religion, regardless of the music’s
original social function.
In spite of this emergence of what appears
to be a secular moral humanism, there is an
increasing sense among those who study
the Alevis that their ‘predicament’ should
be linked with that of the Kurds in the east;
casting them as a deprived minority that are
being deprived of their religious rights with-
in the Republic.5 This is precisely the ‘cultur-
alism’ against which I am attempting to
warn in the study of Turkey. Precisely who is
being ‘deprived’ of their rights? It is worth
re-iterating that, first, within the anti-secu-
lar/secular divide, described above as being
so important and so significant, yet over-
looked, the Alevis have almost in their en-
tirety come out in favour of the founding
Kemalist reforms. They have conspicuously
resisted open calls from the Welfare and
now the Virtue Party to re-identify them-
selves primarily a religious minority. Sec-
ondly, when the immense and growing het-
erogeneity of the Alevi population is taken
on board, it is only the minority who are
seeking reaffirmation of their traditions
through explicit acknowledgement from
the state. Of course, they wish to be free to
act as they wish: this goes for any popula-
tion, but the majority have no desire what-
soever to be recast a millet either by their
traditional religious figures or by well-wish-
ing advisers in international academic and
institutional politics. It would be a tragedy
if, the Republic having escaped much of the
bloody conflict between sectarian move-
ments that was prevalent in the Ottoman
Empire, we as researchers were to con-
tribute to it now through misplaced whole-
sale attribution of characteristics where, in
fact, no such unanimity exists. ♦
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The IISMM, a research centre of the École des Hautes
Études en Sciences Sociales (EHESS), is devoted to
the study of societies and cultures in the Muslim
world. It is organized around a group of scholars rep-
resenting all the social sciences of the regions where
Islam is present: anthropology, history, anthropolo-
gy and history of law, political science, linguistics,
and sociology. Its goal is to simultaneously amplify
and mobilize existing resources by providing sup-
port for research projects conceived by specialists of
Islam and societies of the Muslim world. 
Institut d’Études de l’Islam et 
des Sociétés du Monde Musulman
The IISMM is not intended as a replacement
for the already existing research groups in
universities or in the Centre National de la
Recherche (CNRS). It intends, rather, to pro-
vide assistance to specialists in completing
projects under way and in preparing events
(e.g., round tables, seminars, colloquia, etc.)
that will highlight and disseminate this re-
search. Mobilizing the resources in this field
is done by lifting the routine-based barriers
that have, on occasion, so rigidly compart-
mentalized research on the Muslim world.
The IISMM intends to organize seminars
and encourage research focused on broad-
er topics than those that have usually been
studied, where specialists of a particular pe-
riod or region can enrich their thinking
through exposure to other approaches, de-
veloped in different areas of Muslim studies
or through the analysis of other civiliza-
t i o n s .
This call for an association of energies is
imposed by the evolution of the research
subject itself. Without breaking with the
long tradition of oriental studies of which
France may be justly proud, the IISMM
seeks to free research from the tendency to
confine Islam to a discourse so particularist
as to make the object into a kind of irre-
ducible reality, incommensurable, regard-
less of how it is approached, with any other
r e a l i t y .
The profound changes of the past centu-
ry combined with the improved knowledge
of the societies and cultures of the Muslim
world have returned that world to its histo-
ry, a history that is being both made and
unmade. Former oppositions are fading
away or being rearranged. Nevertheless,
‘Islam’ remains a fully valid topic of study. It
constitutes the only common feature defin-
ing the domain that the IISMM intends to
cover, extending from Senegal to North-
west China, from the Balkans to Indonesia.
The weight of religious tradition and the
search for renewal cannot obliterate the
multiplicity of references – political, scien-
tific, aesthetic or cultural – in the Islam of
today or yesterday, that fall outside of a
strict Koranic genealogy. Islam is not the
sum of its commandments. Whether it has
been so remains a question of paramount
importance to the IISMM.
The role chosen by the IISMM is to coordi-
nate research and specialized instruction,
and to open a venue of training and infor-
mation to a wide, non-specialized public. It
proposes a programme of research and
teaching activities.
Research training
Weekly or bimonthly seminars
These seminars are given within the con-
text of specialized courses concerning Mus-
lim societies at the EHESS. The courses lead
to the DEA (postgraduate diploma), a doc-
torate or the EHESS Diploma. The pro-
grammes and admission requirements will
be announced by the EHESS.
Summer schools
Every year, in a Muslim country and in
collaboration with the higher educational
establishments in that country, the IISMM
will organize study cycles bringing togeth-
er about 30 students preparing for doctor-
ates in France and in the host country
around a broad academic theme, allowing
for exchanges and field visits. Applications
should be addressed to the Institute, ac-
companied by a statement of purpose.
The first study-cycle will be held in Mo-
rocco, in collaboration with the Faculty of
Arts and Human Sciences of Saïs-Fès, from
13-22 September 2000, around the theme
‘Memory/Memories: Forms, Functions, and
C u s t o m s ’ .
Postgraduate workshops
The Institute supports and initiates meet-
ings intended to encourage contacts and
discussion between postgraduate students
working in the same cultural area and on
the same period. These sessions, in which
teaching staff also participates, will be led
by the students.
Research and teaching skills
Parallel to the research programmes of
external teams supported by the IISMM, the
Institute is also developing its own acade-
mic programme of cross-disciplinary semi-
nars linking different disciplines and cultur-
al areas.
Research subjects
The following are the research topics des-
ignated for the academic year 2000 and
2 0 0 1 :
Islam in the Feminine; Faces of Islam; In-
ternationalization of the Religious; Oriental-
ism and Social Sciences; and Contemporary
Artistic Creation in the Islamic Countries.
Occasional one-day seminars
These special events allow a wide public
to benefit from the presence of scholars in-
vited by the EHESS to discuss research in
progress. The first of these seminars con-
cerned ‘The Figure of the Literati in Islam’
(May 2000).
’One Book/One Event’
The series of meetings entitled ‘One
Book/One Event’ are open to an invited
public. The first of these focused on Nasr
Abu Zaid, Egyptian professor in exile in the
Netherlands and the author of A Critique of
the Religious Discourse, which has been
translated into French. The next meetings
will feature French specialists on modern
I r a n .
Continuing education
Annual courses, summer schools, and in-
tensive courses are organized on specific
themes and disciplines for groups and insti-
tutions that request them. ♦
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W O L F  D .  A H M E D  A R I E S  
The article entitled ‘Is Islam soluble in Germany?’
published in the last ISIM Newsletter (page 30) con-
centrated primarily on Muslims originating in Tur-
key, as if they are a unique phenomenon and not a
lively part of the community as a whole. While it is
true that Turkish Muslims account for almost 80% of
the German Muslim population, there are also small-
er groups whose members originate from other Is-
lamic societies globally. The smallest segment of the
German Muslim population is formed by Germans
who are often characterized by terms such as ‘con-
verts’ and thus overlooked. A few of these German
Muslims have been engaged in issues concerning the
Muslim community in Germany since the 1960s and
have been engaged in social work as well as in dis-
cussion of fundamental questions relating to Mus-
lims within German society. It is therefore appropri-
ate to briefly describe the history of involvement of
indigenous German Muslims.
Muslims in Germany
In the early 1960s, a handful of German Mus-
lims gathered around what later became
the Islamic Archives of Germany. Through
the efforts of this group, the first rules of a
local Islamic association were written and
registered under German law. At the same
time, Germans met in Hamburg, Munich,
Cologne and Aachen and began to organize
facilities for daily worship.
During the 1970s, these individuals utilized
their membership in different societal organi-
zations – political parties, unions, and the like
– to discuss the developing situation vis-á-vis
Muslim communities in Germany. Discussions
were initiated with the education ministry
over the question of religious education in ac-
cordance with federal and land constitutions.
Such discussions led to a series of seminars,
encounters and unofficial meetings in which
the partners attempted to find intersections
between Muslim communities and the Chris-
to-secular German system, which had been
molded by the thousand-year relationship of
the churches and different political forces. In
other words, where were the crossroads of a
church-molded legal system and a churchless
Abrahamic community living in such a soci-
ety? These public and semi-private encoun-
ters took place in a changing society that mar-
ginalized religious life and its public symbols
and thus, such questions were at the heart of
important debates within German society as
a whole.
At the same time, official Turkish repre-
sentatives often intervened in order to hin-
der access to greater freedom for their fel-
low countrymen and women. An example
was the rent of a local hall for a meeting. A
Turkish diplomat protested at the municipal
hall against permission being granted for
use of the hall. German Muslims followed
and insisted on the proper application of
German law. The meeting was held. In this
way, Muslims originating in Turkey learned
to enjoy the benefits of secular freedom.
The 1980s saw the birth of two umbrella or-
ganizations for Muslims in Germany. One,
established in 1986, was called the Islamic
Council for the Federal Republic of Ger-
many. The other, established a year later,
became the Central Council of Muslims in
Germany. Through the years, a number of
local Islamic associations have joined these
coalitions, and today, the Islamic Council in-
cludes 38 member associations, while the
Central Council has 28. Members of these
coalitions include associations with diverse
national, cultural, social and theological
b a c k g r o u n d s .
Meanwhile, the Turkish side reacted by
creating the so-called DITIB at Cologne. This
is an association under German law, but the
head and most of the personnel are Turkish
civil servants who are, ostensibly, ‘on leave’
and normally stay up to six years in Ger-
many without learning any German. Last
year, some younger men who grew up in
Germany became involved in DITIB as secre-
t a r i e s .
German Muslims have attempted to coop-
erate with DITIB but the contrast between
Turko-French l a i c i t é and German secularism
is so deep that one might say that each prin-
ciple almost destroys the other. For exam-
ple, German society expects that the
churches and religious organizations com-
ment publicly on political, ethical, social and
educational developments. On the other
hand, DITIB can rarely publish anything
without approval from Ankara. Certainly,
after its foundation, the board of the Islamic
Council had to adapt to this German norm;
while German Muslims had little difficulty in
offering their opinion, those of other back-
grounds had to adjust to this.
Today, the differences are not significant.
The two councils mentioned above (The
Central Council of Muslims and the Islamic
Council) are committed to organizing the
future of Muslim communities in Germany
within the framework of German societal
and legal contexts. An important step in this
direction has been the foundation of a com-
mittee on religious education (founded last
a u t u m n ) . ♦
For further information:
I I S M M
96 Boulevard Raspail
75006 Paris, France
Tel.: +33 (0)1 53 63 02 40
Fax: +31 (0)1 53 63 02 49
E-mail: iismm@ehess.fr
Lucette Valensi is director of the IISMM.
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N o t e s
1 . The ‘Seminar on Development Management: An
Islamic Approach’ was co-organized with the
Association of Kelantan Civil Servants while the
‘Book Discussion: Napoleon and Islam’ (by Christian
Cherfils, Utusan Publications and Distributors,
1999) was co-organized with Utusan Publications
and Distributors.
2 . The first international conference on ‘Islamic
Political Economy in Capitalist Globalization:
A n Agenda for Change’ was co-organized with
t h e Institut Kajian Dasar (IKD, Kuala Lumpur)
w h i l e the second, on ‘Islamic Political Economy:
Methodology and Practice from an Asian
Perspective in Response to Globalization’,
was co-organized with the Secretariat for Islamic
Philosophy and Science (Penang), Yayasan Nurul
Yaqeen (Kuala Lumpur) and the Japan Asia
Foundation (Tokyo).
3 . The book, edited by M.A. Choudhury, Abdad M.Z.
and Muhammad Syukri Salleh, is entitled I s l a m i c
Political Economy in Capitalist Globalisation: An
Agenda for Change, and was published by Utusan
Publications and Distributors, 1996.
4 . The books, all published by Utusan Publications
and Distributors, are Political Economy of
Development in Malaysia (edited by B.N. Ghosh and
Muhammad Syukri Salleh, 1999); Foreign Workers
in Malaysia: Issues and Challenges (by A.H.M.
Zehadul Karim, Moha Asri Abdullah and Md Isa
Bakar, 1999); and Pembangunan Industri Kecil dan
Sederhana di Malaysia (by Moha Asri Abdullah,
1 9 9 9 ) .
5 . The two theses were entitled: ‘Pondok Pesantren
Cooperatives in Sumatera Utara’ (PhD) and
‘Administration of Waqf Land in Medan, Indonesia’
(MA). The on-going research consists of the
following themes: ‘Agriculture Financing: A
Comparative Study between Conventional and
Islamic Systems’; ‘The Link between Bay’ Al-Salam
as an Islamic Mode of Financing and Instruments
of the Agricultural Investment Sector in the Light
of Islamic Economics’; ‘Development Perspective
of Gerakan Muhammadiyah in Indonesia’ (for MA
degrees); ‘Islamic Finance for Small and Medium
Entrepreneurs in the East Coast of Peninsular
Malaysia’; ‘In Search of a Truly Interest-Free
Financial System’; and ‘Zakat Accounting: The
Cases of Some Selected Islamic Institutions in
Malaysia’ (for PhD degrees).
Associate Professor Dr Muhammad Syukri Salleh is
Head of the Islamic Development Management
Project (IDMP), School of Social Sciences, 
University of Science Malaysia, Penang, Malaysia.
E-mail: ssyukri@usm.my
I D M P
M U H A M M AD  S Y U K R I  S A L L E H
The Islamic Development Management Project
(IDMP) was established in 1995 at the School of So-
cial Sciences, University of Science Malaysia. As a re-
search and education project, which gathers its
members from various disciplines and schools within
the University, IDMP aims at enhancing the field of
Islamic development beyond the confines of devel-
opment per se. It takes a multi-disciplinary approach
to development, integrating social, economic and
political tools of analysis to understand develop-




the Islamic WayThe IDMP goes beyond the study of Islamic
economics, Islamic development and Islamic
economic development to scrutinize and
construct a conceptual and practical frame-
work of the management of economics, de-
velopment, and economic development in
an Islamic perspective. As development is
seen as an all-embracing aspect of life, from
spiritual to material and physical, and from
the level of the individual to that of society,
state and beyond, IDMP intends to cover the
whole range of horizons of human life, for-
mulating and pioneering a new integrated
discipline that IDMP terms ‘Islamic Develop-
ment Management’.
A c t i v i t i e s
In realizing the above objectives, IDMP
undertakes the task of strengthening its
members with knowledge of Islam and re-
lated disciplines, as well as disseminating
this knowledge through weekly Qur’anic
studies, monthly in–house seminars, acade-
mic meetings, international conferences
(every two years), research, publications
and teaching. While Qur’anic studies, in-
house seminars and academic meetings
comprise regular gatherings for IDMP mem-
bers and interested individuals to share and
deepen their knowledge on subjects related
to Islam and Islamic Development Manage-
ment, the international conferences bring
IDMP members and international learned
persons together to present and exchange
their ideas and research findings on a cho-
sen theme.
The IDMP has, for nearly two years now,
conducted its weekly Qur’anic studies class-
es, organized numerous in-house seminars,
two academic meetings and three interna-
tional conferences. The first academic meet-
ing, a seminar on An Islamic Approach to De-
velopment Management was held in Kota
Bharu, Kelantan in 1998; while the second, a
book discussion on Napoleon and Islam was
held at University Science Malaysia in 1999.1
The first two international conferences, held
in 1994 and 1996, dealt with Islamic political
e c o n o m y .2 The third, held in 1998 and co-or-
ganized with the Islamic Research and Train-
ing Institute (IRTI) of the Islamic Develop-
ment Bank, dealt with the Management of
Economic Development in Islamic Perspective.
Currently, IDMP is preparing for its fourth in-
ternational conference to be held in the very
near future. The emphasis of this conference
will be placed on the conceptualization and
realization of Islamic Development Manage-
ment within the socio-economic and politi-
cal realities of today.
During the second international confer-
ence held in 1996, the first IDMP book, con-
sisting of papers presented at the first inter-
national conference3 was launched. The third
international conference held in 1998, saw
the appearance of three other books written
and edited by IDMP members.4 IDMP is now
editing the papers of this conference to be
published in one volume, as well as simulta-
neously editing a book based on the seminar
on development management held in Kelan-
tan. At the official opening of the 1998 con-
ference, a memorandum of understanding
was signed with Utusan Publications & Dis-
tributors on the publication of an IDMP bi-
annual Journal of Islamic Development.
The above activities run concurrently with
research and consultancy works. To date,
IDMP has completed two research projects,
firstly on the ‘Islamization of Development in
Kelantan’ and secondly on the ‘Implementa-
tion of Islamic Development: A Comparative
Analysis of Kelantan and Terengganu’. At the
moment IDMP is carrying out two other re-
search projects on the ‘Commercialization of
Agriculture’ and ‘Management of Islamic Re-
vivalism in Malaysia’. It has also begun con-
sultancy work for the Higher Education De-
partment of the Malaysian Ministry of Educa-
tion, investigating the ‘Entrance of Religious
Studies Students into the Public Higher Edu-
cation Institutions in Malaysia’.
As IDMP has yet to have its own teaching
programme, it utilizes the present structure
of the university to teach undergraduate
courses and supervise post-graduate stu-
dents. Undergraduate courses on ‘Islamic
Economics’ and ‘Islamic Economics Analysis’
are taught within the Economic Section of
the School of Social Sciences and School of
Distance Learning, respectively. Two other
courses – ‘Principles and Implementation of
Islamic Development’ and ‘Islamic Develop-
ment Institutions’ – are taught within the
Development Planning and Management
Section of the School of Social Sciences. At
the post-graduate level, a master’s degree in
Social Sciences and a PhD degree have been
completed by two students from the School
of Social Sciences. At present, three students
are preparing their master’s degrees and
three for their PhD degrees.5
Plans for the future
At this time, the IDMP merely exists as a
project under the School of Social Sciences.
Although it receives basic office facilities and
enjoys moral support from the School, the
IDMP is actually a self-sponsored project, fi-
nancially independent of both the School
and the university. A formal status within the
organizational structure of the university
such as a centre or institute (and perhaps a
school in the future) would help create a
more encouraging and active future for the
IDMP. It would bring IDMP members who
come from various schools and fields to-
gether into one formal institution, research-
ing, developing and disseminating the Is-
lamic Development Management discipline
through their respective fields, such as Is-
lamic Economics, Islamic Development, Is-
lamic Management, Islamic Politics, Islamic
Political Economy and so on. All these could
culminate in a practical, applied living Islam.
As such, achieving a formal status for the
IDMP within the organizational structure of
the university is a main objective for the
coming years.
The IDMP also aims at formulating acade-
mic packages to be offered to both under-
graduate and post-graduate students. Spe-
cific academic programmes, such as a major
and minor in Islamic Development Manage-
ment for undergraduates, as well as a mas-
ter’s programme and PhD programme, are in
the planning pipeline. As an initial step, a
proposal has been made for the master’s
and minor programmes in Islamic Develop-
ment Management, to be launched during
the Eighth Malaysia Plan, 2001-2005. Offer-
ing such programmes would not only enrich
the discipline of Islamic Development Man-
agement, but would also hopefully be able
to expedite the implementation of Islamic
development in various Muslim countries,
through the training of their Islamic devel-
opment managers at IDMP.
The way forward
The IDMP would not be able to accomplish
its objectives without the cooperation, sup-
port and acknowledgement of the University
Science Malaysia, as well as without that of
established institutions worldwide. Being a
project that depends, for its day-to-day oper-
ations, on research and consultancy grants,
continual assistance in goods, services and
monetary forms from established organiza-
tions and philanthropists would greatly help
IDMP to advance at a greater pace.
To date, the IDMP has enjoyed cooperation
with various institutions in organizing its in-
house seminars, academic meetings, inter-
national conferences and publications. It
hopes to continue such cooperation, taking
it further to include the training of its mem-
bers, and by being involved in coordinated
efforts and activities both at the national and
international levels. ♦P r o f e s s o r
Khurshid Ahmad
d e l i v e r i n g
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T e l: +31 20 638 69 09
F a x: +31 20 622 66 49
E - m a i l: mail@nieuwekerk.nl
16 December 1999 – 24 April 2000
• Earthly splendour, celestial art. Trea-
sures from Islam. Persian carpets, In-
dian miniatures and jewellery are
shown against a background of
ponds, fountains, flowers and a
aviary, recalling Paradise as it is de-
scribed in the Qur’an. The exhibition
is organized in co-operation with the




T e l / F a x: +31 118 593 305
E - m a i l: info@zijde.net
30 May - 15 July 2000
Oman: Textiles from the desert
G e m e e n t e m u s e u m
D e n H a a g
Stadhouderslaan 41
2517 HV The Hague
T e l: +31 70 338 1111
Continuing exhibition
• Islamic crafts. The renewed exhibi-
tion from its own collection, in par-





T e l: +31 10 270 71 72
F a x: +31 10 270 71 82
E - m a i l: mediatheek@wereldmuse-
u m . r o t t e r d a m . n l
• Due to renovations the Museum will
be closed until 26 November 2000. It
will reopen with a permanent exhibi-
tion of Islamic art from its own collec-




T e l / F a x : +31 53 3413788
C o n t i n u i n g
• Intercultural art
A U S T R I A




T e l: +43 1 534 30 0
F a x: +43 1 535 53 20
E-mail: v*@ethno-museum.ac.at
13 April - 17 September 2000
• Agatha Christie and the East: Crimi-
nology and Archaeology traces those
two strands in the life of the ‘Queen of
Crime’, displaying diaries, hitherto
unpublished photographs of Christie
and her husband, archaeologist Max
Mallowan; more than 200 artifacts
from his excavations in Iraq and
Syria; and a compartment from the
Orient Express.
B E L G I U M
E x h i b i t i o n s
Paleis voor Schone
K u n s t e n
Koningsstraat 10 /
Ravensteinstraat 23
B r u x e l l e s
T e l: +32 2 507 84 66
25 February - 21 May 2000
• Borderline: inimitable pieces of
Berber textile art, created by Moroc-
can and Tunisian countrywomen.
F R A N C E
E x h i b i t i o n s
Musée du Louvre,
75058 Paris
T e l: +33 1 40 20 50 50
F a x: +33 1 40 20 54 42
E - m a i l: info@louvre.fr Paris
17 March - 29 May 2000
• Ottoman Calligraphy’s Collections of
the Sakip Sabanci Museum. The exhi-
bition presents around 70 works be-
longing to the collection of the Sapik
Sabanci University in Istanbul. They
are all works by the most famous cal-
ligraphers of the period between the
1 5t hand early 20t hc e n t u r i e s .
Musée Jacquemart-André
158, bd. Haussmann, 75008 Paris
T e l: +33 1 465 11 414
F a x: +33 1 465 11 412
1 April - 2 July 2000
• Brilliance’s of Ottoman ceramic
w o r k s .
G E R M A N Y
E x h i b i t i o n s
Vorderasiatisches Museum
Entrée Pergamonmuseum
M u s e u m i n s e l
Am Kupfergraben
B e r l i n - M i t t e
T e l: +49 30 2090 5401
15 May 2001 - 30 September 2001
• Agatha Christie and the Orient
Museum of Islamic Art
M u s e u m i n s e l
B e r l i n - M i t t e
T e l: +49 30 2090 5401
C o n t i n u i n g
• The continuing exhibition is dedicat-
ed to the art of Islamic peoples from
the 8t h to the 19t hcentury. The works
of art originate from an area stretch-




T e l: +49 7 1122 25 173
F a x: +497 1122 25 194
U R L: http://www.ifa.de
C o n t i n u i n g
• Exhibitions and contemporary art
from the Middle East.
I R A N
E x h i b i t i o n s
Islamic Period Museum
T e h r a n
C o n t i n u i n g
• Continuing exhibition of Koranic
manuscripts, ceramics, metalwork
and textiles.
K U W A I T
E x h i b i t i o n s
Dar al-Athar al-Islamiyyah
Mahboula, Kuwait
T e l: +965 565 3006
C o n t i n u i n g
• Al-Sabah Collection of Islamic art.
The Tareq Rajab Museum
Hawelli 32036
K u w a i t
T e l: +965 531 7358
F a x: +965 533 9063
C o n t i n u i n g
• Arts of the Islamic world: Qur’ans, cal-
ligraphy, pottery, metalwork, glass,
ivory and jade carvings, costumes,
textiles, embroideries and jewellery.
The exhibitions include also relevant
objects from Tibet, Nepal and Bhutan.
M A L A Y S I A





T e l: +60 3 2274 2020
C o n t i n u i n g
• Collections of local and international
Islamic art objects. The museum
holds local and international orient-
ed exhibitions at intervals.
R U S S I A
E x h i b i t i o n s
The State Hermitage
M u s e u m
St Petersburg
T e l: +812 110 9079 / 96 25
F a x: +812 312 1550
U R L: www.hermitage.ru
C o n t i n u i n g
• Art of the Near East is represented in
the museum by an excellent collec-
tion covering the 7t h to 19t h c e n t u r i e s
which includes several exquisite mas-
t e r p i e c e s .
S I N G A P O R E





• Calligraphy from the Tareq Rajab Mu-
seum Kuwait. The Qur’an was central
to the development of the art of
beautiful writing. In this exhibition is
explored the various scripts that de-
veloped over the centuries and also
calligraphy as a decorative motif on
various media like ceramics and met-
a l w o r k .
S W I T Z E R L A N D
E x h i b i t i o n s
Völkerkundemuseum 
der Universität Zürich
Pelikanstrasse 40, 8001 Zürich
Tel: + 41 1 634 90 11
Fax: + 41 1 634 90 50
16 January - 3 September 2000
• Embroidered prayers: prayer rugs from
the Hazara of Afghanistan, an ethnic
minority of Shiite Muslims who live in
the hostile environment of the Sunni
Taleban. The prayer rugs are an identi-
fication mark of the Hazara culture,
which remained unknown outside
their own environment until some
years ago. A representative choice
from a private collection of about 900
pieces.
T U R K E Y
E x h i b i t i o n s
The Museum of Turkish 
and Islamic Art
I s t a n b u l
C o n t i n u i n g
• Exhibition of Ottoman and Islamic
Art, Folk Art and Folk Life.
U N I T E D  K I N G D O M
E x h i b i t i o n s
British Museum 
and Museum of Mankind
Great Russell Street
London WCIB 3DG
T e l: +44 171 412 71 11
F a x: +44 171 3238614/8480
C o n t i n u i n g
• Continuing exhibition of the Oriental
collection. Its Islamic pottery is con-
sidered the best outside the Islamic
w o r l d .
Leighton House Museum
12 Holland Park Road
London W14
T e l: + 44 20 7602 3316
15 April - 30 April 2000
• Teliz. Woven paintings. An exhibition
of post-modernist rugs selected by
Rose Issa in collaboration with
Bokhara Gallery, Iran.
15 April - 30 April 2000
• Aneh Mohammad Tatari. An exhibi-
tion of paintings by an Iranian-Turko-
man artist.
Victoria and Albert
M u s e u m
Cromwell Road, London SW7 2RL
T e l: +44 171 938 8500
U R L: http://www.vam.ac.uk
C o n t i n u i n g
• The collection includes a rich collec-
tion of Islamic metalwork.
Tate’s Duveen Galleries
L o n d o n
24 March - 9 July 2000
• Mona Hatoum is a Lebanese-born
Palestinian British sculptor who fo-
cuses on confrontational themes
such as violence and oppression and
the vulnerability and resilience of the
human body. For this first large solo
show, she has created large-scale
works that reflect her interest in
everyday objects.
Brunei Gallery
L o n d o n
T e l: +44 20 7898 4020
U R L: www.soas.ac.uk/Brunei/exhi-
b i t i o n s . h t m l
13 April - 17 June 2000 and
1 0 July - 16 September 2000
• In the Shade of the Tree: Photographs
by Peter Sanders, who has been pho-
tographing Islamic cultures around
the world for more than three
d e c a d e s .
Egee Art Gallery
9 Chelsea Manor Studios
Flood Street, London SW3 5SR
T e l: 44 171 351 68 18
F a x: 44 171 376 85 10
URL: w w w . e q e e a r t . c o m
C o n t i n u i n g
• Contemporary and antique Middle
Eastern Art.
Sony Gallery
25 Connaught Street Marble Arch
London W2
T e l / f a x: +31 171 262 9101
U R L : w w w . s o n i g a l l e r y . c o m
C o n t i n u i n g
• International contemporary art espe-
cially from the Indo-Pak subcontinent
and the Arab World.
U N I T E D  S T A T E S
E x h i b i t i o n s
Harvard University Art
M u s e u m s
Arthur M. Sackler Gallery
Cambridge, Massachusetts
T e l. +1 617 495 9400
8 June - 3 September 2000
• A Decade of Collecting: Recent acqui-
sitions of Islamic and later Indian Art.
• Beginning in March 2000, the Har-
vard University Art Museums will em-
bark on a year-long, multi-gallery
programme of exhibitions showcas-
ing recent additions to the collec-
tions. On 8 June 2000, the Islamic and
Indian Department’s recent acquisi-
tions exhibition will open.
C o n t i n u i n g
• Harvard’s collection of Islamic and
later Indian art is small but magnifi-
cent. It comprises a broad range of
works, from Samanid pottery and
Mamluk calligraphy to Qajar lacquers
and Ottoman textiles. Its masterpieces
include a group of miniatures from
the extraordinary 14t h-century Great
Mongol (‘Demotte’) Shahnama, the
Safavid master Mir Sayyid-’Ali’s Night-
time in a Palace, and the miniatures
of the ‘pocket-size Divan of Anvari
produced for the Mughal emperor
Akbar. The department also has one
of the most important representations
of Rajasthani painting in the world.
De Paul University Art
G a l l e r y
John T. Richardson Library
2350 North Kenmore Avenue
Chicago Il 60614
T e l: +1 773-325-7863
URL: w w w . d e p a u l . e d u / ~ i s l a m
11 March - 15 July 2000
• A kaleidoscopic 11-week programme
illustrates the global significance of
Islamic cultures. Exhibits cover
themes such as the weaving culture
of Morocco, incense, faces of Islam,
mosque design in North America, Per-
sian painting, Persian tiles and con-
temporary Arabic art. Exhibit items
are on loan from e.g. Indianapolis
Museum of Art, Minneapolis Institute
of Arts, Belghazi Museum, Sale, Mo-
rocco, Oudaia Museum, Rabat, Mo-
rocco. Lectures and Forums are held
on a wide variety of topics: cuisine,
sociology, history, medicine, educa-
tion and women. Performances in-
clude recitations from the Qur’an,
music, dance and coffee and tea cere-
m o n i e s .
Los Angeles County Muse-
um of A r t
5905 Wilshire Boulevard
Los Angeles, CA 90036
T e l: +1 323 857 600
30 March - 31 July 2000
• A Bold Aesthetic: Textile Arts of Cen-
tral Asia features 60 outstanding ex-
amples of the dress, textiles and jew-
ellery of the peoples of western Cen-
tral Asia from the early 19t h to the
early 20t hcentury. The exhibition pre-
sents extraordinary examples of
what is perhaps the greatest artistic
achievement of 19t h- c e n t u r y
Bukhara: intricately patterned silk
and velvet textiles, fashioned into
robes and hangings.
2 July - 25 September 2000
• Gold of the Nomads: Scythian Trea-
sures from Ancient Ukraine. Approxi-
mately 165 works of art will comprise
the finest Scythian gold objects from
the Treasures of Ukraine Museum
and the Archaeological Institute in
Kiev. This exhibition will be the
largest and most complete ever as-
sembled from the Scythian material
in Ukraine.
Metropolitan Museum
o f A r t
1000 Fifth Avenue
at 82n d S t r e e t
New York, New York 10028
T e l: +1 212 535 7710
26 April - 24 September 2000
• Riding across Central Asia: Images of
the Mongolian Horse in Islamic Art,
examines the depiction of horses in
Islamic art, especially during the
Seljuq and the Ilkhanid periods (ca.
1 2t h- 1 4t hcentury) in Iran. The Mongo-
lian horse can also be viewed as a
swift carrier of different cultures and
traditions to the Islamic world. Unit-
ing some 25 objects from the Muse-
um’s collection, this exhibition dis-
plays representations of the horse as
seen in various media, including illus-
trated manuscripts, inlaid metalwork,
ceramic tiles, stone, and textile.
Brooklyn Museum of Art
200 Eastern Parkway
Brooklyn, NY 11238
T e l: +1 718 638 5000
F a x: + 1 718 638 3731
27 Oct. 2000 - 21 Jan. 2001
• Gold of the Nomads: Scythian trea-
sures from Ancient Ukraine. Although
the Scythians are often portrayed as
warring barbarians, they also left be-
hind a wealth of gold pieces fash-
ioned by Greek craftsmen in the Black
Sea region. This exhibition consists of
170 Scythian treasures, most of which
are gold, dating from the 7t h c e n t u r y
to the 2n dcentury, with a heavy con-
centration on the 5t h through 3r dc e n-
t u r i e s .
The Art Museum, Princeton
U n i v e r s i t y
Princeton, New Jersey 08544-1018




• Letters in Gold: Ottoman Calligraphy
from the Sakip Sabanci Collection, Is-
t a n b u l .
• Draws upon one of Turkey’s leading
private collections to display 70 ex-
ceptional examples of Ottoman-era
c a l l i g r a p h y .
The Arthur M. Sackler
Gallery 
and Freer Gallery of Art
Smithsonian Institution,
Washington, D.C, 20560.
T e l: +1 202 357 2700 (voice), +1 202
357 1729
17 November 1999 - 7 May 2000
• Imaging the Word: Selections of Cal-
ligraphy from the Islamic World pre-
sents some of the principal calli-
graphic styles that have evolved in
the Islamic world from the 9t hto the
2 0th century as they appear in differ-
ent media, from silk to agate and
parchment to steel. The selection in-
cludes a folio from a minute, 9t h- c e n-
tury Koran, a 15t h-century royal wine
cup from Iran, and contemporary
works exploring the power of Arabic
l e t t e r s .
21 November 1999 - 28 May 2000
• Antoin Sevruguin (late 1830s–1933)
and the Persian Image includes fifty
images of rulers, courtiers, and com-
moners, and scenes of daily life in
Iran from the late 1870s to the 1930s.
3 May 1998 - Indefinitely
• Arts of the Islamic World. Some 60
works – Koran pages, metalwork, ce-
ramics, glass, paintings, and calligra-
phy – from the 9t hto 17t hc e n t u r i e s
explore Islamic artistic traditions.
Themes include the forms and func-
tions of the works of art, the role of
calligraphy, the use of figurative dec-
oration, and the meaning of abstract
d e s i g n s .
C o n t i n u i n g
• Luxury Arts of the Silk Route Empires:
In these two galleries connecting the
Freer Gallery of Art and the Arthur M.
Sackler Gallery, examples of metal-
work and ceramics from the collec-
tions of each museum illustrate the
effect of multicultural interaction on
the arts of the first millennium AD Or-
naments, bowls, cups, bottles, jars,
mirrors, ewers, and ritual objects in
gold, silver or silver and gilt, earthen-
ware and porcelain from Iran, China,
Turkey, Syria, and Afghanistan are in-
cluded in this exhibition.
Textile Museum
Washington, D.C.
18 February- 30 July 2000
• Flowers of Silk and Gold: Four Cen-
turies of Ottoman Embroidery offers a
unique window on urban Ottoman so-
ciety, for embroideries played a role in
most aspects of domestic and public
life.
Corcoran Gallery of Art
500 17t h Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20006
T e l: 1+ 202-639-1700
1 March - 15 June 2000
• he Topkapi Palace: Jewels and Trea-
sures of the Sultans features more
than 200 artefacts and works of art
from Topkapi Palace in Istanbul, for
400 years not only the residence of
the rulers of the Ottoman Empire but
also the centre of the empire’s dynas-
tic power, its military administration
and its religious leadership.
The Balch Institute for Eth-
nic Studies
18 S. 7t h S t r e e t
Philadelphia, PA 191106
T e l: +1 215 925 8090
U R L: http://www.balchinstitute.org
12 February - 12 August 2000
• A Community between Two Worlds:
Arab Americans in Greater Detroit.
3 March – 30 August 2000
• Ahlan wa-Sahlan! Welcome to our
Home! Philadelphia’s Arab Americans
U N I T E D  N A T I O N S




108 Cowley Road, Oxford, OX4 1JF
United Kingdom
Art & Culture Agenda
The Agenda is produced by
t h e Centre of Islamic Culture
in Rotterdam, The Nether-
lands. Please send all
information with regard to
activities related to culture
and art in the Islamic World
t o :
The Centre of Islamic Culture,
P.O. Box 361,
3 0 0 0 AJ Rotterdam,
T h eN e t h e r l a n d s
Fax: +31 10 270 71 82
E-mail: mediatheek@wereld
m u s e u m . r o t t e r d a m . n l




Arab World 2000: 
Transformations and
C h a l l e n g e s
Date: 30-31 March 2000
Information: Ms. Anne Marie Chaaraoui, 
Center for Contemporary Arab Studies
Georgetown University, 
Washington, D.C. 20057-5793
tel: +1 202 687 6215 or +1 202 687 5793
fax: +1 202 687 7001
ccasinfo@gunet.georgetown.edu
Islam and Constitutionalism
Date: 7-9 April 2000
Venue: Harvard Law School, Boston,
Massachusetts USA
Information: Professor Sohail Hashmi, 
Mount Holyoke College (or)
Professor Houchang Chehabi, 
Boston University
fax: +1 617 353 9290
Mediation and Minority
C u l t u r e s
Date: 15 April 2000
Venue: Harvard Law School, Boston,
Massachusetts, USA
Information: Peri Bearman at:
p b e a r m a n @ l a w . h a r v a r d . e d u
(or) Asifa Quraishi at:
a q u r a i s h @ l a w . h a r v a r d . e d u
L’individu et ses rapports au
pouvoir dans les sociétés
musulmanes de la région
Méditerranéenne
Date: 3 May 2000
Venue: Hammamet, Tunisia
Sponsored by: Université de Tunis, Faculté des
Sciences Humaines et Sociales and
European Science Foundation
Al-Andalus and Europe: Between
Orient and Occident
Date: 3-7 May 2000
Venue: Bonn, Germany
Information: Secretary, 
Seminar für Orientalische Kunstgeschichte
Regina-Pacis-Weg, 
53113 Bonn, Germany
Perception According to Mulla
Sarda and Western Schools of
Philosophy
Date: 12-13 May 2000
Venue: The School of Oriental and African
Studies (SOAS), University of London, UK.
Sponsored by: The Institute of Islamic studies,
the Department of Study of Religions at
the School of Oriental and African Studies
(SOAS) at London University and Sadra
Islamic Philosophy Research Institute.
Information: S. Safavi, 
Director of the Institute of Islamic Studies, 
PO Box 8148, London, NW6 7ZS England,
UK





Islamic Thought in Africa
Date: 12-14 May 2000
Venue: Northwestern University, Illinois, USA
Information: John Hunwick, 
Department of History, Northwestern
University, Evanston, IL, 60208 USA
tel: +1 847 491-7412 / fax: +1 847 467-1393
Women and Society 
in the Middle East
Date: 15-16 May 2000
Venue: Emek Yezreel College, Israel.
Information: The Organizing Committee,
WSME Conference, Emek Yezreel College,
Emek Yezreel, 19300 Israel.
tel: +972 6 6423456 / fax: +972-6-6423457
Michal Palgi at: palgi@research.haifa.ac.il
(or)




Respect and Tolerance between
Islam and Christianity in the
Texts 
of History and Literature
Date: 15-18 May 2000
Venue: Canakkale, Turkey
Information: Professor Zeki Cemil Arda,
Canakkale Onsekiz Mart University,
Terziglu Kampusu, Canakkale, Turkey
tel: +90 286 213 02 05 or +90 213 01 55
fax: +90 286 212 2030
zekicemilarda@hotmail.com
Ethnic and Religious Conflict 
in Cross-Cultural Perspective
Date: 18-19 May 2000
Venue: Ohio University, Athens, Ohio, USA
Information: Polly Sandenburgh, Interethnic
and Religious Conflict Conference, Ohio
University, 
Center for International Studies, 
Burson House, Athens, OH, 45701
Twenty-five years of Middle
Eastern and Islamic Studies in
the Netherlands
Date: 19 May 2000
Venue: Theological University, 
Kampen, The Netherlands
Information: Ruud Strijp, 
Dr. Jan Berendsstraat 132-A, 
6512 HE, Nijmegen, The Netherlands
tel: +31 24 360 5852
Steen.strijp@inter.NL.net
Muslim Identities in North
A m e r i c a
Date: 20-21 May 2000
Venue: University of California, Irvine
Information: Prof. Karen B. Leonard
kbleonar@uci.edu
The Third Biennial Conference
on Iranian Studies
Date: 25-28 May 2000
Venue: Bethesda, Maryland
Sponsored by: The American Institute of
Iranian Studies (AIIrS) 
and The Society for Iranian Studies (SIS)





Dutch Association for the
Study of the Law of Islam and
the Middle East
Date: 27 May 2000
Venue: Leiden, The Netherlands




Afghanistan: Country without a
S t a t e
Date: 15-18 June 2000
Venue: Museum of Anthropology, 
Munich, Germany
Information: Conrad Schetter, Coordinator,
Scientific Program, Center of Development
Research, Walter-Flex-Str. 3, 
53113, Bonn, Germany





Endowment for the Humanities
(NEH) Summer Institute 2000
Date: 19 June - 21 July 2000
Venue: University of Chicago, Illinois, USA
I n f o r m a t i o n: h t t p : / / h u m a n i t i e s .
u c h i c a g o . e d u / i s l a m i c - o r i g i n s /
Muslim Europe: The Changing
Cultural Contours of the West (An
Institute for Educators)
Date: 19 June - 14 July 2000
Information: Hazel Sara Greenberg, The
American Forum for Global Education, 120
Wall Street, Suite 2600, New York, NY,
10005 USA
tel: +1 212 624 1300 / fax: +1 212 624 1412
Time & Space in Islam
Date: 1-3 July 2000
Venue: The Islamic Foundation, Villa Park,
I l l i n o i s
Sponsored by: The Iqbal Society, The American
Islamic Heritage, and the Ameer Khusro
Society of America
Information: Dr Habibuddin Ahmed,
Coordinator
tel: +1 630 739 9028
hahmed@unistarinc.com
BRISMES 2000 Centre for
Middle Eastern and Islamic
Studies: Annual Conference
Date: 2-5 July 2000
Venue: University of Cambridge, UK
Information: Faculty of Oriental Studies,
Sidgwick Avenue, Cambridge, CB3 9DA UK 
tel/fax: +44 1223 335103
oriental-mes-admin@lists.cam.ac.uk
The Second International
Conference on Jordanian Social
History
Date: 3-5 July 2000
Venue: Amman, Jordan
Information: Hani Hourani, 
Director General, Al-Urdun Al-Jadid
Research Center, P O Box 940631, Amman
11194, Jordan
tel: +962 6 553 3113/4 / fax: + 962 6 551
1118
ujrc@go.com.jo
East Timor, Indonesia and the
Region: Perceptions of History and
Prospects for the Future
Date: 3-8 July 2000
Venue: Lisbon, Portugal
Information: José Esteves Pereira Magalhães,
Vice-Rector, Symposium and of the
Universidade Nova de Lisboa Universidade
Nova de Lisboa, Praça Príncipe Real, 26, 
1250-184 Lisbon, Portugal (or)
António Barbedo, Coordinator of the
Institute for Studies and Cooperation with
East Timor, Alameda da Guia, 139-3o Esqo 
2750-370 Cascais, Portugal.
tel: +351 969 033 618 /
fax: +351 222 003 599
The Mediterranean in the 21s t
Century: Enduring Differences
and Prospects for Co-operation
Date: 3-14 July 2000








C o n f e r e n c e
Date: 5-6 July 2000
Venue: Melbourne, Australia
Information: Dr. Shahram Akbarzadeh,
Politics, 
La Trobe University, Vic. 3083,Australia. 




Navigation and Trade in the
Mediterranean from the 7th to the
19th centuries: 8th International
Congress on Graeco-Oriental and
African Studies
Date: 5-9 July 2000
Venue: Oinousses, Greece
Sponsored by: the Institute for Graeco-Oriental
Studies, Athens, and the Department of
History, Cairo University
Information: Professor V. Christides, Institute
for Graeco-Oriental and African Studies,
Solomou 39, Kryoneri Attikis, 14568 Greece
fax: +30 1 816-1037
Borders, Orders and Identities of
the Muslim World
Date: 12-14 July 2000
Information: Michelle Speak, External
Relations Officer, International Boundaries
Research Unit, Suite 3P, Mountjoy
Research Centre, University of Durham,
DH1 3UR, UK
tel: +44 191 374 7705
fax: +44 191 374 7702
michelle.speak@Durham.ac.uk
(or) Ali Ansari, Centre for Middle Eastern
& Islamic Studies, South End House,
South Road, Durham, DH1 3TG, UK
tel: +44 191 374-2822




Literature and Nationalism in
the Middle East and North Africa
(MENA)
Date: 10-13 July 2000
Sponsored by: The Edinburgh Institute for the
Advanced Study of Islam and the Middle
East
Information: Secretary, Edinburgh Institute for
the Advanced Study of Islam and the
Middle East, University of Edinburgh, 7-8
Buccleuch Place, Edinburgh EH8 9LW,
Scotland





Date: 17-19 July 2000
Venue: British Museum, London UK
Information: Julian Reade
jreade@british-museum.ac.uk
Media, Religion and Culture: 
22nd General Assembly and




Date: 17-20 July 2000, Venue: Singapore
URL: http://www.iamcr2000.org
The 19t h International Congress
of Historical Sciences
Date: 6-14 August 2000
Venue: Oslo, Norway
Information: Congress-Conference AS, PO Box
2694 Solli, 0204 Oslo, Norway
tel: +47 22 56 19 30 / fax: +47 22 56 05 41
URL: www.oslo2000.uio.no
History of Religions: 
Origins and Visions
Date: August 5-12 2000
Venue: University of Durban-Westville, 
South Africa
Sponsored by: The International Association
for the History of Religions (IAHR) and
hosted by the Department of Science and
Religion at the University of Durban-
Westville, South Africa
Information: Prof. P. Kumar, Dept. of Science
and Religion, University of Durban-
Westville, Private Bag X54001, Durban
4000, South Afric
tel: +27 31 204 4539 / fax: 027-31-204-4160
kumar@pixie.udw.ac.za
URL: http://www.udw.ac.za.iahr
3 6t h International Congress of
Asian and North African
Studies 
(ICANAS 2000)
Date: 27 August - 1 September 2000
Venue: Montreal, Canada
Information: ICANAS 2000 Secretariat, Bureau
des congrès, Université de Montréal, P.O.
Box 6128, 
Station Downtown Montréal, 
Québec H3C 3J7, Canada
tel: +1 514 343 6492 / fax: +1 514 343 6544
congres@bcoc.umontreal.ca
URL: http://www.bcoc.umontreal.ca.
Religion and Society in Qajar
I r a n
Date: 4-6 September 2000
Sponsored by: The British Institute of Persian
Studies and the Iran Heritage Foundation.
Information: Robert Gleave (Conference
Coordinator), Department of Theology and
Religious Studies, University of Bristol,
Bristol, BS8 1TB UK
tel: +44 117 928 8168 / fax: +44 117 929
7850
r.m.gleave@bristol.ac.uk
Seminar for Arabian Studies
Date: 4-6 September 2000
Venue: The Institute of Archaeology,
University College London.
Information: Nanina Shaw Reade, Secretary,
Seminar for Arabian Studies, Institute of
Archaeology (UCL), 31-34 Gordon Square, 
London WC1H 0PY





Date: 8-10 September 2000
Venue: San Diego State University, California,
USA
Sponsored by: The Institute of Druze Studies in
collaboration with the Department of
Religious Studies, San Diego State
University (SDSU), The Society for the
Academic Study of Religions (SDSU) and
the G.E. von Grunebaum Center at the
University of California, 
Los Angeles (UCLA)
Information: Institute of Druze Studies, 
San Diego State University 
P.O. Box 22828, San Diego, CA 92192
idsi@druzestudies.org with copy to Samy s.
Swayd sswayd@mail.sdsu.edu
Muslims of Europe in the New
Millennium: Multiculturalism,
Identity and Citizenship
Date: 9-10 September 2000
Venue: Islamic Cultural Centre of Ireland,
Dublin
Information: The Steering Committee,
Association of Muslim Social Scientists
(UK), P.O. Box 126, Richmond, Surrey, TW9
2UD, UK
tel: +44 208 948 9511 or +44 208 948 9512
fax: +44 208 940 4014
amss@dial.pipex.com
International Conference 
on Middle Eastern Popular
Culture
Date: 17-21 September 2000
Sponsored by: University of Oxford
Information: Professor Clive Holes
(clive.holes@oriinst.ox.ac.uk) or the NESP
Administrator at Near Eastern Studies
Programme, University of Oxford
(neareast@orinst.ox.ac.uk)
URL: users.ox.ac.uk/~neareast/middle.htm
Central Asia: Past, Present and
Future (7t h E u r o p e a n
Conference on Central Asian
S t u d i e s )
Date: 25-29 September 2000
Venue: University of Vienna, Austria
Information: Dr Gabriele Rasuly-Paleczek,
Institute for Social and Cultural
Anthropology, University of Vienna, A-
1010 Vienna, Universitatsstr. 7/IV, Austria
tel: +43 1 4277 4806 / fax: +43 1 4277 9485
gabriele.rasuly@univie.ac.at






Sponsored by: the Modernity and Islam
Working Group of Berlin Universities and
extra-university institutions
Information: Arbeitskreis Moderne und Islam,
Geschäftsstelle: Wissenschaftskolleg zu
Berlin
Georges Khalil Wallotstraße 19, 
D - 14193 Berlin Germany
tel: +49 30 89 00 1258 / fax: +49 30 89 00
1200
Khalil@wiko-berlin.de
Congress of the International
Association of Middle East
Studies (IAMES)
Date: 5-7 October 2000
Venue: Berlin, Germany
Information: Prof. Dr. Friedemann Büttner,
Freie Universität Berlin, Arbeitsstelle Politik
des Vorderen Orients, Ihnestr. 31, 
D-14195 Berlin, Germany
tel: +49 30 838 6640 / fax: +49 30 838 6637
fbue@zedat.fu-berlin.de
7th Annual Congress of the
German Middle East Studies
Association (DAVO)
Date: 12-14 October 2000
Venue: Centre for Research on the Arab World
(CERAW), University of Mainz, Germany
Deadline for papers: 
12 September 2000
Information: DAVO-Congress Organization,
Professor Dr. Anton Escher, Center for
Research on the Arab World (CERAW),
Institute of Geography, University of
Mainz, 
D-55099, Mainz, Germany
tel: +49 6131 39 25654
fax: +49 06131 39 24736
davo-congress@geo.uni-mainz.de
URL: http://www.geo.uni-mainz.de/davo
Islam and Society in the 21s t
Century: 29t h A n n u a l
Association of Muslim Social
Scientists (AMSS)
Date: 13-15 October 2000
Venue: Georgetown University, Washington,
D.C.
Sponsored by: The Association of Muslim
Social Scientists (AMSS) in collaboration
with The Center for Muslim-Christian
Understanding at Georgetown University.
Information: The International Institute of
Islamic Thought (IIIT), 
Attention: AMSS Conference 2000, 
P.O. Box 669, Herndon, VA, 20170, USA, (or)
Deonna Kelli
tel: +1 703 471-1133, ext. 116
fax: +1 703 471-3922
Dkelli@iiit.org
URL: http://www.iiit.org/callpapers.htm
2 9t h Annual Conference 
on South Asia
Date: 13-15 October 2000
Venue: University of Wisconsin-Madison, USA
Information: Center for South Asia, University
of Wisconsin-Madison, 203 Ingraham Hall,
1155 Observatory Drive, 
Madison WI 53706, USA
tel: +1 608 262 4884 / fax: +1 608 265 3062
conference@southasia.wisc.edu
The Third World in the 21s t
Century: 18t h Annual Meeting of
the Association of Third World
S t u d i e s
Date: 19-21 October 2000
Venue: Denver, Colorado
Deadline for registration: September 1, 2000
Information: Professor Norman W. Provizer,
Director, Golda Meir Center for Political
Leadership, Metropolitan State College of
Denver, P.O. Box 173362, Campus Box 43, 
Denver, CO, 80217-3362 USA
tel: +1 303 556 3157 / fax: +1 303 556 2716
provizen@mscd.edu
God, Life and Cosmos: 
Theistic Perspectives
Date: 6-9 November 2000
Venue: Islamabad, Pakistan
Sponsored by: The Center for Theology and
the Natural Sciences (CNTS), the Islamic
Research Institute of the International
Islamic University and the International
Institute of Islamic Thought
Information: Muzaffar Iqbal
tel: +1 780 922 0927 / fax: +1 780 922-0926
mwsrp@icrossroads.com
The US and the Middle East 
after the Gulf War
Date: 9-10 November 2000
Venue: La Plata University, Argentina
Further information: Dr Virginia Petronis
tel/fax: +221 423 0628
iri@isis.unlp.edu.ar (or)




Islamic Identities in the
Periphery: A Panel at the
American Anthropological
Association Annual Meeting
Date: 15-19 November 2000
Venue: San Francisco, California, USA
Information: Dr Ron Lukens-Bull, Assistant
Professor of Anthropology, University of
North Florida, Jacksonville, FL, 32224-2650
USA
tel: +1 904 620 2850
rlukens@unf.edu
Contesting and Constructing
Islamic Masculinities: A panel to
be presented at the American
Anthropological Association
Annual Meeting
Date: 15-19 November 2000
Venue: San Francisco, California, USA
Information: Dr Ron Lukens-Bull, Assistant
Professor of Anthropology, University of
North Florida, Jacksonville, FL 32224-2650
USA
tel: + 1 904 620-2850
rlukens@unf.edu
Middle East Studies Association
(MESA) Annual Meeting
Date: 16-19 November 2000
Venue: Orlando, Florida
Information: MESA of North America,
University of Arizona, 1643 E. Helen Street,
Tucson, Arizona, 85721 USA
tel: +1 520 621 5850





People and Power in 21s t
Century Africa: 43r d A n n u a l
Meeting of the African Studies
A s s o c i a t i o n
Date: 16-19 November 2000
Venue: Convention Center, Nashville,
Tennessee, USA
Information: Loree D. Jones, 
Executive Director, African Studies
Association, Rutgers, The State University
of New Jersey, Douglass Campus, 132
George Street, 
New Brunswick, NJ, 08901-1400 USA
tel: +1 732 9328173
fax: +1 732 932 3394
callas@rci.rutgers.edu
1s t Graduate Student 
Conference on Ibn Sina
Date: March 2001 (tentative)
Venue: Yale University, New Haven,
Connecticut, USA
Information: David C. Reisman or Ahmed al-
Rahim, NELC, 
Yale University, P0 Box 208236, 
New Haven CT 06520-8236 USA
tel: +1 203 432 2944
fax: +1 203 4322946
david.reisman@yale.edu (or)
ahmed.al-rahim@yale.edu
Medical Ethics and Law in Islam
Date: 19-21 March 2001
Venue: Haifa, Israel
Sponsored by: The Department of Arabic
Language and Literature and the Center
for Health, Law and Ethics at the Law
School, both of the University of Haifa,
Israel.
Information: Dr. Vardit Rispler-Chaim,
Department of Arabic, University of Haifa,
Haifa, Israel 31905
tel: + 972 4 8249789
fax: +972 4 8249710
rhla103@uvm.haifa.ac.il
Islam in America: Series of
s e m i n a r s
A Seminar or a series of seminars are planned
to develop a comprehensive research
program on the theme ‘Islam in America.’ 
A working paper is to be developed shortly
which will contain a series of research
questions. The seminar will be based on
these questions and, subsequently, a
special issue of the American Journal of
Islamic Social Sciences will be published.
Information: Dr Abdul Hameed
Abusulayman, President, International
Institute of Islamic Thought, 
P.O. Box 669, Herndon,
VA 20172 USA
tel: +1 703 471 1133
fax: +1 703 471 3922
iiit@iiit.org (or) 
Dr Ilyas Bayunus, Professor of Sociology,
SUNY Cortland, 4339 Alexandria Drive, 
Cortland, NY 13045 USA
tel: +1 607 753 2475
fax: + 1 607 753 5987
In order for the ISIM Info
Pages to prosper, we kindly
ask for your participation by
filling out the forms for
Vacancy Announcements and
Special Events. These forms
can be found online on the
ISIM website:
h t t p : / / i s i m . l e i d e n u n i v . n l
If you wish to have a formula
sent by e-mail, fax, or post,
please contact the ISIM
S e c r e t a r i a t :
Tel: +31 71 5277905
Fax: +31 71 5277906
E - m a i l :
I S I M @ r u l l e t . l e i d e n u n i v . n l
Olivier Roy
Muslims in Europe: 
From Ethnic Identity to Religious Recasting
1
I S I M
E d i t o r i a l
by Dick Douwes
2
Islam and the Electoral Process
by Martin van Bruinessen
3
A tribute to Prof. Dr. W.A.L. Stokhof
by Mary Bakker
4
Visions of Modernity in the Islamic
Middle East
by Erik J. Zürcher
4
Muslim Intellectuals and
M o d e r n C h a l l e n g e s
by Martin van Bruinessen
5
Gudrun Krämer
On Difference and Understanding: 
The Use and Abuse of the Study of Islam
6 - 7
G E N E R A L  I S S U E S
Léon Buskens
An Islamic Triangle: Changing Relationships
between S h a ri ca, State Law, and Local
C u s t o m s
8
Patrick Chabal






Owning the Future: 
Modern Arabs and Hamlet
1 1
Sylvia Wing Önder
Indigenous Evaluations of Health Care in
T u r k e y
1 2
Sabine Strasser
Impurity as Criticism: 
Reports from a Black Sea Village in Turkey
1 3
Aisha Ali
Dances of the Ouled Naïl
1 4
Jérôme Bellion-Jourdan
Islamic Relief Organizations: 
Between ‘Islamism’ and ‘Humanitarianism’
1 5
R E G I O N A L  I S S UE S
Ahmad F. Yousif
Religious Life and Institutions in Brunei
1 6
Anne-Hélène Trottier
A Case of Grassroots Syncretic Sufism: 
The Fakir of Bengal
1 7
Matthijs van den Bos
Roots of modern S h ici t e Sufism in Iran
1 8
Yoginder Sikand
The Sufi Shrines of Jammu
1 9 - 2 0
Ziba Mir-Hosseini




i n Morocco and Jordan
2 2
Krisztina Kehl-Bodrogi
The New Garments of Alevism
2 3
Imad F. Sabi’
Islamic Associations in the Politics
of the Turkish Earthquakes
2 4
Vladimir Bobrovnikov
Mythologizing Sharia Courts 
in the Post-Soviet North Caucasus
2 5
Raymond Detrez
Religion and Nationhood in the Balkans
2 6
Werner Schiffauer
The End of the Caliphate State? 
The Metin Kaplan Case
2 7
Michael W. Suleiman
The Arab Community in North America
2 8
Yasha Lange
A Handshake May Be Refused
2 9
P U B L I C A T I O N S
Nimat Hafez Barazangi




Re-collecting Algerian Cultural History: 
The Work of Bilqasim Saca d a l l a h
3 1
Patricia Sloane




The Azur Decade: 
A Brief History of Mediterraneans
3 3
S P A C E  A N D  A R C H I T E C T U R E
Anton J. Escher and Sandra
P e t e r m a n n
Neo-colonialism or Gentrification 
in the Medina of Marrakesh
3 4
Peter Clark
From Fantasy to Faith: Islamic Architectural
Influences in Britain, 1800-2000
3 5
V I S U A L  A R T S
Claudia Preckel
Muslim Actors in ‘Bollywood’
3 6
Leyla Bouzid Discacciati
The Image of Women 
in Algerian and Tunisian Cinema
3 7
N E W S
O b i t u a r i e s
3 8
M E D I A
Jon W. Anderson
New Media in the Muslim World: 
The Emerging Public Sphere
3 9








DAVO Study Group on Arabic-Ottoman




Modern Turkey and the Alevis
4 3
I N S T I T U T E S
Lucette Valensi
Institut d’Études de l’Islam 
et des Sociétés du Monde Musulman
4 4
Muhammad Syukri Salleh
Islamic Development Management Project:
Managing Development the Islamic Way
4 5
C O M M E N T
Wolf D. Ahmed Aries
Muslims in Germany
4 4
I N F O  P A G E S




C o n t e n t s
The International Institute for
the Study of the Modern World




movements in Muslim societies
and communities. The ISIM’s
research approaches are
expressly interdisciplinary and
comparative, covering a large
geographic range which includes
North Africa and the Middle East,
Sub-Saharan Africa, Central Asia,
South and Southeast Asia, and
(Muslim communities in) the
West. Broad in its scope, the ISIM
brings together all areas of
e x p e r t i s e .
4 8 I S I M  N E W S L E T T E R  5 / 0 0
ISIM Events
Journalists Day
Date: 5 June 2000
Venue: Utrecht
Sponsored by: ISIM and the Scherpenzeel
Media Foundation
ISIM PhD Workshop
Date: 14 June 2000
Venue: Leiden
Vingt ans après: 
Islamist movements in the last
quarter of t h e 20th century
Date: 21-24 June 2000
Venue: Paris, France
Sponsored by: ISIM and CERI
Muslim Family Law Workshop
Date: 30 June - 1 July 2000
Venue: Berlin, Germany
Sponsored by: ISIM 
and Wissenschaftskolleg zu Berlin
Religion and Economy 
in Muslim Societies
Date: 14–15 August 2000
Venue: Jakarta, Indonesia
For information on these and other ISIM Events:
ISIM Secretariat
tel: +31 71 527 7905
fax: +31 71 527 7906
isim@rullet.leidenuniv.nl
URL: http://www.isim.nl/
